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IV ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes the use of a ‘whole of system’ approach to the analysis of 
security in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems and introduces a 
reference model for this purpose.  It illustrates the advantages of this approach in the 
context of detecting clone tags within RFID systems, including the specific example 
of a pharmaceutical supply chain.  It compares the results from using the proposed 
model with those from previous work that adopted a more localised approach (Rotter 
2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010).  In order to enable the ‘whole of system’ approach, a 
domain model for RFID systems is introduced and a simulator based on this is 
implemented.  Interesting insights arising from simulator results are confirmed 
through laboratory experiments.   
The reference model proposed consists of the three horizontal layers suggested by 
previous authors: real world, RFID and strategic (Mitrokotsa et al. 2008, 2009), but 
adds vertical security partitions for such things as the problem context.  This 
provides a structure that allows existing analysis methods from any appropriate 
source to be applied systematically, such that their results are integrated across the 
whole system.  It is shown that this provides for the analysis of not only the security 
requirements of the whole system but also, where in the system it is practicable to 
place measures that achieve these requirements. 
The domain model introduced comprises a logical view of RFID components and a 
data view of the associations and features that characterise the component 
interactions.  The model’s controlled vocabulary allows the domain constructs in 
RFID systems to be identified and described.  A simulator, which has been validated 
for preliminary ‘whole of system’ analysis and is based on this domain model, allows 
experimentation with systems via an application programming interface (API).  
Work suggested by the reference model is reported as simulation results, and 
confirmed by laboratory experimentation using Class-One Generation-Two RFID 
equipment.  Whereas Juels (2005) showed that tags of this standard can be 
reprogrammed so that they can be authenticated by a reader, the results in this thesis 
illustrate how readers can be reprogrammed to expose clone tags, thereby 
contributing an additional security solution. 
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This thesis addresses an analysis gap in the RFID security field by introducing a 
‘whole of system’ approach made possible by the proposed reference model.  The 
results illustrate that the effectiveness of security in RFID systems can be improved 
by employing a range of individual analysis methods integrated into this model.   
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been used to identify objects for over 50 
years (Garfinkel and Holtzman 2005).  During World War Two, the Identification 
Friend or Foe (IFF) system allowed for Allied aircraft to be distinguished from the 
enemy on the basis of coded radio signals sent from transponders to a base station.  
Years later, advances in electronics led to commercial adoption (Landt 2005).  
Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS), developed by Sensormatic, Checkpoint, and 
Knogo in the 1960’s was an early commercial RFID system, used to counter the theft 
of merchandise.  Rapid growth in commercial use of RFID occurred in the late 
1980’s when electronic toll collection was introduced in Europe and then the United 
States.  Since then RFID has undergone significant developments.   
Nowadays, the basic premise of RFID is that objects are marked with tags which 
emit serial numbers obtainable by readers using radio signals (Weinstein 2005).  
When compared with barcode technology, RFID identifies objects without requiring 
line of sight.  Once a tag’s serial number has been obtained, a reader retrieves 
information about the serial number from a database, and acts upon it accordingly.  
Tags fall into two general categories: active or passive.  Active tags contain their 
own battery power making them physically large and expensive.  Conversely, 
passive tags obtain their power from the signal of a RFID reader, and are therefore, 
usually small and low cost.  Consequently, passive tags are expected to be more 
widely adopted then active tags and will dominate the widespread adoption of RFID 
into the future.  (Weinstein 2005) 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) technology, developed by the Auto-ID Center, 
established at MIT in 1999 and now managed by EPCglobal, is leading the 
widespread adoption of RFID technology into various operations (Garfinkel and 
Rosenberg 2005).  Electronic Product Code (EPC) technology was introduced as an 
extensible range of tag standards, of which, the Class-One standard represented a 
cost effective and widely accepted design.  It was mandated for use as a Supply 
Chain Management (SCM) technology by Wal-Mart and the United States 
Department of Defence (DoD), and its later standard, Class-One Generation-Two 
was ratified as an international standard, ISO 18000-6c, a few years later (Roberti 
2004).  This, along with rapid growth in item level tagging in the retail apparel 
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industry, has led to a surge in EPC Generation-Two integrated circuit (IC) sales 
volume, which is expected to exceed one billion units in 2010 (Swedberg 2010b).  
This has led Bill Colleran, chief executive officer of Impinj, among the first 
companies to introduce products based on the EPCglobal UHF Generation-Two 
standard (O'Connor and Roberti 2005), to speculate that the widespread use of these 
tags in the clothing industry is only a few years away, leading the way for its 
widespread adoption in other industries.     
A recent study by ODIN Technologies, reported by news sources (Swedberg 2010a), 
has indicated that EPC Class-One Generation-Two tags remain at a price of around 
15 cents apiece for quantities of 10,000 and 11 cents each when ordered in quantities 
of one million or more, however; years ago Sarma (2001) speculated that tags would 
need to cost as little as five cents each before they could begin to become widely 
adopted.  He speculated that to achieve this cost, such tags would be nothing more 
than integrated circuits equipped with a radio antenna and a serial number.  If we 
follow the argument of Sarma (2001), it may mean that tags undergo some 
reductions in functionality to achieve a cost of five cents.  Therefore, tags which may 
become widespread would be relatively simple devices, with a minimum level of 
functionality for such things as security.   
Widespread adoption of RFID will bring many benefits to industry, but at the same 
time, the need for security can be seen in the following application examples, which 
highlight a variety of RFID uses, but illustrate the varying security requirements of 
different systems:   
• Since the United States Federal Drug Administration (FDA) recommended 
the use of RFID (FDA 2004), news sources have reported trials of ISO-15693 
tags by GlaxoSmithKline on bottles of Trizivir (O'Connor 2006), (a Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) medicine), for preventing the introduction of 
counterfeit drugs.  However, Hancke (2005) demonstrated ISO-15693 tags 
are vulnerable to relay attacks, implying the possibility that even with RFID, 
counterfeit Trizivir could still be introduced into the system.   
• The MiFare Classic inlay is a smart-card which uses RFID technology in over 
200 million tags, in systems like the London Oyster Card system, and the 
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Dutch OV-Chipkaart system.  The MiFare Classic’s encryption algorithm and 
authentication protocol can be reverse engineered, revealing ways an attacker 
can read a card, clone a card, or restore a card to a previous state to commit 
payment fraud (Garcia et al. 2008).   
• Finally, the Texas Instruments Digital Signal Transponder (TI-DST), used in 
over 150 million vehicle immobiliser keys and the ExxonMobil Speedpass 
system, has been cloned by a research team from John Hopkins University.  
A cloned tag was used to purchase petrol in the Speedpass system, and to 
spoof the immobiliser authentication system of a 2005-model Ford Escape 
sport utility vehicle (SUV).  (Bono et al. 2005) 
Fundamentally, the link between the object, the tag, and the reader is one based on 
surrogacy.  As radio frequency communication is non-contact and non-line-of-sight, 
it is more difficult for the owner of a tag to validate this relationship (Sarma et al. 
2003).  Trust in this system could be achieved if cryptography could fit into a label’s 
functionality without dramatically increasing the cost of the label (Ranasinghe et al. 
2004).  However this seems unlikely for the tags which are envisaged to become 
widespread, as the number of gates available in these tags is 4000 gates or less.  
Unfortunately, for private key cryptosystems such as the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES), a commercial implementation of AES typically requires 20,000 to 
30,000 gates (Sarma et al. 2003).  While other onboard options for cryptography 
have been suggested for authentication of tags or readers, such as modified hashing 
algorithms, these do not meet the cost requirements of these tags.   
The examples above expose the need for structured analysis of security issues in the 
widespread adoption of RFID technology.  This has led to the research topic 
explored in this thesis:  the use of a ‘whole of system’ approach to the analysis of 
security in RFID systems.     
Methods for analysis of security in RFID systems currently exist; however these take 
a relatively localised view of security.  Rotter (2008) proposed a privacy and security 
risk assessment framework which was used to assess domain risks using three 
criteria:  the system’s deployment range; the link between the RFID tag and identity-
related data; and the domain’s security demands.  Conversely, Mitrokotsa et al. 
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(2008, 2009) structured threats into system layers, enumerating the threats as well as 
offering potential defences for each layer.  The model they introduced for this 
purpose discriminates attacks by layers: physical, network-transport, application, and 
strategic.  Finally, work by Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) extended the concept of 
assessing security using layers, introducing the concept of security principles at each 
system layer in addition to attribute columns for such things as cost and potential 
damage.  When considering these examples, it seems likely that an improvement to 
be made is the capacity for capturing sufficient system information which would 
enable the derivation of security requirements which consider the ‘whole system’.   
Consequently, this thesis addresses an analysis gap in the RFID security field by 
introducing a ‘whole of system’ approach to analysis, made possible by way of a 
reference model.  This model consists of the three horizontal layers suggested by 
previous authors: real world, RFID and strategic (Mitrokotsa et al. 2008, 2009), but 
adds vertical security partitions for such things as the problem context.  This 
provides a structure that allows existing analysis methods from any appropriate 
source to be applied systematically, such that their results are integrated across the 
‘whole system’.  
Throughout this thesis a central theme will be challenging the established analysis 
approaches which currently exist in the field.  Using the model together with various 
analysis techniques (for example: domain modelling, entity-relationship modelling, 
and attack trees) illustrates the advantages of the proposed approach in the context of 
detecting clones within RFID systems, including the specific example of a 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  Results from using the proposed model are compared 
with those from previous work that adopted a more localised approach. Overall, the 
results illustrate that the effectiveness of security in RFID systems can be improved 
by employing a range of individual analysis methods integrated into this model, 
which is not facilitated by existing approaches.   
1.2 MOTIVATION 
The work reported in this thesis has emerged out of the need to develop practicable 
security to prevent or detect tag cloning.  Tag cloning, one problem explored 
throughout this thesis, allows an attacker to duplicate a tag’s identification data.  A 
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clone tag can be assigned to an unauthorised entity, thereby allowing the tag to 
derive an authorised entity’s privileges in a system (Juels 2005).  For systems which 
rely on tags for authentication, like the system reportedly in use by GlaxoSmithKline 
on bottles of Trizivir (O'Connor 2006), the ability to clone tags, implies counterfeit 
Trizivir could enter the system and remain undetected even though an RFID system 
is in use.   
Early research on developing an intrusion detection system capable of detecting 
clone tags illustrated the advantages of placing security in the middleware - where 
security is usually more cost effective than on the tag.  The system used statistical 
profiling of tag data to identify instances which represented when a tag had change 
ownership between entities (Mirowski 2006).  Considered as ‘state of the art’ by  
Lehtonen et al. (2007b), it was proposed to be used in places where cryptography on 
tags was not practical.  The derivation of practicable solutions, however, demands 
knowledge of a system’s security requirements.   
1.3 KEY CONTRIBUTIONS 
The key contributions made by this thesis are as follows: 
• Illustrating the advantages of taking a ‘whole of system’ approach to analysis 
of security in RFID systems by employing a range of individual analysis 
methods which are integrated into a reference model.  (Chapter 6 - Chapter 
10). 
• Introducing a model for security analysis which provides a structure that 
allows existing analysis methods from any appropriate source to be applied 
systematically, such that their results are integrated across the whole system. 
(Chapter 5).   
• Presenting a domain model which comprises a logical view of RFID 
components, in addition to a data view of the associations and features that 
characterise the component interactions.  The domain model’s controlled 
vocabulary allows the domain constructs in RFID systems to be identified 
and described.  (Chapter 6). 
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• Enumerating RFID threats over system layers which illustrates that a 
systematic approach to threat analysis can assist in identifying attacks, and 
where it is more effective to address threats in a system.  (Chapter 7). 
• Contributing a simulator, validated for preliminary ‘whole of system’ 
analysis, which has been based on a domain model.  It also implements the 
model’s controlled vocabulary via its application programming interface 
(API) allowing for repeatable systems modelling.  (Chapter 8). 
• Suggesting that a reference model based approach gives impetus to 
interesting simulation results, and confirming these through laboratory 
experimentation using Class-One Generation-Two RFID equipment.  
Laboratory work also illustrates how readers can be reprogrammed to expose 
clone tags, thereby contributing an additional security solution (Chapter 9). 
• Illustrating the advantages of a ‘whole of system’ approach in the context of 
the specific example of a pharmaceutical supply chain.  When results from 
using the proposed model are compared with those from previous work that 
adopted a more localised approach, the effectiveness of the approach is 
illustrated.   (Chapter 10). 
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE 
What follows is the structure of this thesis. 
• Chapter 2 reviews previous work on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
security in the context of cloning attacks and system constraints.  Considering 
that cloning has system-wide consequences and various methods for 
enactment, and because of system constraints, it seems likely that achieving 
practicable security for cloning requires systematic analysis of security 
requirements.   
• Chapter 3 reviews previous work on approaches to security analysis in RFID 
beginning with a review of standard-system models. The properties common 
to systems are discussed, and these are used to consider the closeness of 
existing security models to system concepts.  In considering these security 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
- 8 - 
models, it seems that existing work has focussed on a relatively localised 
view of security.  Consequently, it seems likely that these examples have a 
limited capacity to distil more relevant information that contributes to more 
explicit security requirements in actual systems.   
• Chapter 4 reviews a range of individual analysis methods suitable for 
proposing an alternative model for the proposed ‘whole of system’ analysis 
approach.  These methods come from a variety of backgrounds, but are 
focussed on systematic analysis.  The reference model paradigm suggests a 
method for model derivation, whereas other methods are envisaged as useful, 
when integrated into a reference model, for the purpose of specific modelling 
tasks in RFID security analysis.   
• Chapter 5 introduces an alternative model for security analysis in RFID 
systems, based on the reference model approach.  When considering the 
examples of previous work, this model is distinguished on the basis of 
integrated layer and partition properties, and is therefore entitled, An 
Integrated Layered and Partitioned Reference Model.  Its qualities are 
discussed along with its intended use to enable a ‘whole of system’ approach 
to analysis using existing analysis methods.   
• Chapter 6 illustrates how analysis using the standard operating partition of 
the reference model facilitates the enumeration of system elements into a 
domain model.  Various domain analysis methods are integrated to define a 
logical view of components and these are modelled using the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML).  Following this, a data view of the system 
associations is derived using Entity-Relationship Diagramming (ERD) and 
from this, new features are constructed.  What emerges is a domain model 
and controlled vocabulary which allow for domain constructs to be identified 
and described.  This forms the basis for security analysis in a systems 
context. 
• Chapter 7 illustrates how analysis using the problem partition of the reference 
model, enables the systematisation of attacks.  The attack tree method is 
applied to two system types, and attacks are organised as a hierarchy which 
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broadly matches RFID system layers.  The chapter makes practical use of the 
taxonomy to identify good locations for solutions in the example problem of 
the Trizivir pharmaceutical system.  As the taxonomy is relatively generic, its 
broader potential for use is discussed. 
• Chapter 8 introduces a software simulator based on the domain model, which 
has been validated for ‘whole of system’ analysis. It is applied to the analysis 
of solutions in the reference model’s solution partition. The simulator is used 
to explore the example solution of tag and reader associations for attack 
exposure.  The benefits of taking a systems approach to solution analysis are 
discussed using this example, while impetus for exploring some of the results 
further with EPC Class-One Generation-Two equipment is identified.    
• Chapter 9 demonstrates, through experimentation with EPC Class-One 
Generation-Two equipment, how results obtained following a ‘whole of 
system’ analysis, first explored conceptually through the model, and then in 
simulation, can be realised in a system.  The results of simple 
experimentation, confirm the results of simulation, while illustrating the 
possibility, in systems which use the Slotted Random Anti-Collision (SRAC) 
protocol, of exposing clone tags through the reprogramming of an RFID 
reader.  The findings are discussed in relation to the need for appropriate 
systems analysis prior to solution deployment.   
• Chapter 10 validates the ‘whole of system’ approach in the context of the 
specific example of a pharmaceutical supply chain.  The validation takes 
place in each partition, while the results are integrated across the whole 
model.  It compares the results from using the proposed model with those 
from previous work that adopted a more localised approach.  These results 
suggest that a ‘whole of system’ approach made possible by the proposed 
reference model leads to more effective security requirements.   
• Chapter 11 summarises the conclusions that can be drawn from the work 
presented within this thesis and ends by describing several promising 
research directions for further investigation.   
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2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter reviews some of the issues which surround the use of security in Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) systems.  It is not intended as a complete 
exploration, and therefore, many tangential issues are not covered; however, a good 
overview of these can be found in Juels (2006).  This review examines the extent to 
which security is relevant to the operational goal of ensuring every tag in an RFID 
system is unique.  Unlike barcodes which usually identify a class of products, in 
comparison, RFID is distinguished by its ability to identify entities to the item level.  
However, in order to achieve this, each tag needs to be unique (Glover and Bhatt 
2006).  In considering how this operational principle can be invalidated, this chapter 
will establish a rationale for approaching security on a ‘whole of system’ basis.    
To this end, two issues will be considered which are influential in ensuring tags in a 
system remain unique.  The first issue is cloning, which allows the principle to be 
invalidated by an attacker (Bono et al. 2005).  This attack is presented in various 
forms which illustrate that cloning is a problem which is not localised to a part of a 
system and is therefore difficult to prevent if security is approached at that part in 
isolation.  The second issue is the constraints on functionality which determine how 
security can be implemented in various parts of a system to deal with the cloning 
problem.  The review of constraints mainly focuses on the tag and reader as these are 
the more important parts of an RFID system.  Having examined these issues, it will 
be apparent that structured analysis of at least these issues, across the whole system, 
is needed for the operational principle to be maintained.   
2.2 CLONING 
Cloning is a threat to system operations as it allows unauthorised entities to claim the 
privileges of authorised entities via tag credentials (Bono et al. 2005).  This often 
occurs when the serial number of an authorised tag has been obtained and encoded 
onto a reprogrammable tag - there are also other ways this can occur.  This 
unauthorised tag is in the possession of the unauthorised entity, and as the tag is a 
surrogate, cloning makes it challenging to distinguish entities based on tag data.  
Thus, security in RFID systems is needed to ensure that cloning does not prevent the 
achieving of a system’s operational goals.  The rest of this section examines the 
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various forms of cloning, based on where in a system attacks occur and how the 
attack is used. 
2.2.1 TAG CLONING 
This section reviews what will be referred to here as “tag cloning,” which represents 
the more direct form of cloning as a system contains physical tags which share the 
same identification data.  Serial-number-only systems are highly vulnerable to 
cloning of this form.  These systems rely solely on a tag’s serial number for 
identification purposes.   
Obtaining a clone tag is no more difficult than the introduction of physical tags 
which contain duplicate serial numbers.  A simple attack of this form is when an 
attacker introduces a tag which they have obtained from another system.  In both 
systems, the tag serial number is valid, but in the latter system, the tag clashes with a 
serial number which is already activated.  This attack is called cross contamination 
(Heydt-Benjamin et al. 2006).  Similarly, the data from an Electronic Product Code 
(EPC) tag can be skimmed: read by an attacker’s RFID reader and encoded onto a 
reprogrammable tag, to produce a clone tag (Juels 2005).  As tags are validated on 
their serial number, these attacks are relatively easy to perform.   
The following examples focus on cloning of cryptographically enabled contactless 
smart cards.  These cards use RFID technology to identify themselves and 
communicate with readers, but also use cryptography for more robust identification.  
The review of these attacks illustrates that even RFID technology thought to be 
secure, when deployed in a commercial application, is little more secure than serial 
number only tags.   
To begin with, the most commercially widespread contactless smart card, the MiFare 
Classic is vulnerable to cloning.  The MiFare Classic has mutual authentication and 
data secrecy capabilities implemented using a proprietary stream cipher called 
Crypto-1 which relies on a 48-bit secret key.  Garcia et al. (2008) have demonstrated 
that, by recording and studying traces from transmissions between cards and readers, 
the encryption algorithm and authentication protocol can be reverse engineered - 
revealing two attacks which enabled the secret keys of cards to be determined.  With 
knowledge of the secret key, an attacker can read a card, clone a card, or restore a 
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card to a previous state.  As these cards use RFID technology, contact between the 
attacker and target card occurs without the knowledge of the card holder, allowing 
the attacker to commit payment fraud surreptitiously. 
Attacks against the MiFare Classic have been demonstrated in the London Oyster 
Card system, and the Dutch OV-Chipkaart system (Garcia et al. 2008).  While the 
losses which could occur in these systems are financial, as the attacker obtains 
ticketing at no cost, when one considers that the manufacturer, NXP Semiconductors, 
estimated in 2008, that 200 million cards were in use, a global recall to correct the 
problem would come at a significant cost to the manufacturer.   
Work by Courtois (2009) illustrated that with a few enhancements, the attack against 
the MiFare Classic can be improved so that the number of queries required is around 
300.  This enables the attack to be performed very quickly and suggests the ease with 
which the assumption that every tag in a system is unique, even when security on the 
tag exists, can be invalidated.  As will be seen in the section on tag constraints, most 
low-cost passive tags have less functionality than the MiFare Classic for onboard 
security, so these types of attacks should be easier to perform against these tags. 
Recent work by Kasper et al. (2010) on attacking the ‘ID-Card,’ used widely in 
Germany, which they report as a MiFare Classic card, reveals obvious vulnerabilities 
using inexpensive custom-built equipment (which costs less than 40 euros to build).  
The vulnerabilities enable cloning which can then enable the theft of up to 150 euros 
of stored value from cards in this system.  While the possibility of conducting such 
threats is widely acknowledged in literature, because this system allows for large 
currency values to be stored on cards, it surprising to learn that this system does not 
employ additional security checks to prevent attacks from occurring.   
While work on attacking the MiFare Classic by Garcia et al. (2008) has demonstrated 
that reverse engineering enables cloning wirelessly, work by Nohl et al. (2008) has 
demonstrated that card ciphers can be reverse engineered at the silicon level, using a 
combination of image analysis of circuits and protocol analysis.  Using this type of 
attack, it was revealed that several weakness in the cipher exist in addition to its short 
key size.  As the process to attack was largely automated, it could be applied to 
larger circuits as well; meaning future enhancements to chip size are no protection.  
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This work demonstrates that finding an algorithm set in hardware is within reach of 
an attacker, and thus, security at the protocol layers, there to prevent cloning, can be 
largely bypassed. 
When considering the above examples, this form of cloning illustrates that the 
assumption that every physical tag is unique can be invalidated.  When considering 
that more powerful RFID-enabled smartcards which use cryptography, deployed in 
commercial environments, fail to prevent cloning, the expectation that tags could be 
secured to prevent cloning in lower cost systems seems unlikely.     
2.2.2 PSEUDO-CLONING 
What will be referred to here as “pseudo-cloning,” covers methods largely 
independent of a physical tag such as simulation or spoofing of an authorised 
identifier.  As most of these attacks use simulator devices, these attacks bypass 
security meant to authenticate a tag. 
The first example is found in the VeriChip, a commercially deployable RFID tag for 
use as a human implant.  Halamka et al. (2006) demonstrated that a VeriChip could 
be cloned when an attacker uses a device to scans its data, eavesdrop on its signal, or 
learns its serial number.  In the case of signal eavesdropping, an attacker can use the 
Prox Mark II - an RFID tag reading and simulation device developed by Westhues 
(2005), to obtain and replay VeriChip data.  Alternatively, an existential cloning 
attack – when the tag serial number is already known by the attacker – allows the 
attacker’s device to simulate a tag’s identity without actually engaging the original 
tag (Halamka et al. 2006).  These attacks are of the pseudo-cloning form as they 
occur when a replaying device is used.     
Relay attacks between contactless smartcards, which use RFID technology, are 
another example of pseudo-cloning.  These were predicted as an effective way of 
spoofing tag signals to a reader over long distances by Kfir and Wool (2005).  In a 
basic relay attack, a ghost device simulates a card to the reader, and a leech device 
simulates a reader to the card.  A channel is established between the ghost and leech, 
and as these have more powerful transmission capabilities than the tags or readers, 
these increase the range at which attacks take place.  Using this type of attack, an 
attacker can assume the privileges of an authorised entity via the relayed tag data.  
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This attack was demonstrated by Kirschenbaum and Wool (2006) when they built the 
leech device as a portable and extended-range RFID skimmer.   
Relaying can also be a way of avoiding protocol based security between the tag and 
reader as the next example illustrates.  Relay attacks at 13.56Mhz using the ISO-
14443A standard were demonstrated by Hancke (2005).  To enable relaying, similar 
to that proposed by Kfir and Wool (2005), two devices were used: a mole and a 
proxy.  The mole interfaced with the user’s card and appeared as a valid reader, 
whereas the proxy appeared as a valid card to the reader, and passed instructions to 
the mole, which responded with tag information.  In systems that do not measure 
added time delay – a possible way of detecting relay attacks (Reid et al. 2007) - it 
would be possible to circumvent cryptographic protocols using this method as they 
are routed through the attacker’s devices.   
Finally, the next example illustrates the consequences of pseudo-cloning, and what 
can happen when clones exist in a commercial system.    
Cryptographically enabled tags have been spoofed - recording and replaying tag data 
- by a research team from John Hopkins University (Bono et al. 2005).  The 
researchers reverse engineered the cryptographic cipher underpinning the challenge 
response-protocol which is used to authenticate the Texas Instruments Digital Signal 
Transponder (TI-DST).  In this system, the key was 40-bits long (a relatively weak 
encryption key), and was recovered using an array of sixteen Field-Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA) integrated circuits, operating in parallel in less than one hour.  
Given the secret key and tag serial number, this allowed the researchers to reproduce 
the tag’s radio signals. (Bono et al. 2005).   
The consequences of such attacks were demonstrated.  The researchers used their 
simulated TI-DST to purchase petrol in the Speed Pass petrol payment system and to 
spoof the immobiliser authentication system of a 2005 model Ford Escape sports 
utility vehicle (SUV), starting it with a bare ignition key (Bono et al. 2005).  In 2005, 
this type of tag was in use in more than 150 million vehicle immobiliser keys and 
also in the ExxonMobil SpeedPass system which than contained seven million units.  
Although the SpeedPass system employs additional fraud checking constraints in the 
back-end, therefore possibly detecting suspicious behaviour, a system such as the 
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vehicle immobiliser is relatively vulnerable, as usually there is no additional security 
at the ignition, except for the key.  Thus, once such attacks are performed, a 
simulator device is now the attacking device, and security based on the tag which 
was targeted, is rendered ineffective.   
The attacks discussed above, constitute pseudo-cloning as they result in another 
entity claiming the privileges of an authorised entity via tag credentials but not 
necessarily using a physical tag.  The difference from cloning of the first form is that 
the original tag is usually bypassed during the attack, such as when a simulator 
device is used.  This invalidates the assumption that every tag is unique, as actually, 
simulator devices are claiming to be the tag.  This means tag based security is 
relatively ineffective when it comes to reusing the cloned data.   
2.2.3 CLONING BY THEFT 
What will be referred to here as “cloning by theft,” allows an unauthorised entity to 
assume the privileges of an authorised entity by stealing a tag (not actual cloning as 
such) or by cloning it.  However, the nature of attack is not clear from the system’s 
perspective.  In these attacks, an attacker takes advantage of systems which do not 
verify the associations between tags and physical entities.  An attacker can remove 
an authorised tag from an authorised physical entity, for example, without this 
change being noticed by the system, until the point at which the physical entity is 
examined – if this occurs at all for security.  In cases where tag theft occurs, even if 
there are physical entity authentication methods in place, such as holograms or 
watermarks, these do not assist an RFID system as typically these are not conveyed 
at the time the tag serial number enters the system (Ranasinghe and Cole 2008). 
The examples now reviewed illustrate that tag or reader based security is rendered 
ineffective as most attacks are not definable at the tag or reader.  Unless physical 
inspection of the entity occurs, usually solutions in the middleware such as intrusion 
detection are the only means of protection, as these can look for anomalies in entity 
behaviour by analysing the data produced by tags attached to entities.   
From a system’s perspective, it may be difficult to ascertain whether the identifier is 
coming from an authorised source.  To this end, the concept of a change-of-tag 
ownership was proposed by Mirowski and Hartnett (2007).  This concept 
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characterises how a system could perceive the use of stolen or clone tags by an 
unauthorised entity.  As an unauthorised physical entity using an authorised tag may 
exhibit different behaviour from the authorised entity, it may be possible to detect 
misuse when analysis of RFID data is performed.  Using statistical methods, 
Mirowski and Hartnett (2007) were the first to demonstrate that if the behaviour 
associated with a tag serial number does not appear to be authorised, it could be 
evidence to suggest that the associated physical entity is not genuine.  In this case, 
changes in behaviour may be indicative of cloning by theft. 
A different way of defining and detecting identity misuse in systems is using 
synchronised secrets.  A synchronised secret is a way for a system to expose the use 
of duplicate tag serial numbers on different tags (Lehtonen et al. 2007c).  It works on 
the basis that each time a tag is read, the reader writes a piece of data to the tag based 
on its serial number.  Each time the tag is re-read, the tag conveys its serial number 
and its synchronised secret, and if both are valid, when compared to the records 
maintained by the system for the tag serial number, a new synchronised secret is 
written to the tag.  As the authorised tag and clone tag are separate devices, the 
assumption is that a clone is exposed when a tag has out-of-synch data, as data is 
changed each time the tag serial number appears.   In this case, the classification of a 
tag as clone is based on behaviour arising in the system being implausible.  Clearly, 
the use of synchronised secrets must exist in the system in order for this type of 
implausibility to be identified.  Its use, however, involves security in different parts 
of the system.  It also relies on the original and clone being active in the system; if an 
attacker clones a tag and discards the original then although the clone is used, the 
synchronised secret would fail to detect clone tags – which is why it is classified as 
cloning by theft. 
Similarly, the solution of a heuristic classification to define cloning was explored by 
Lehtonen et al. (2009).  They characterised cloning as having occurred in a system 
when entity behaviour, analysed in RFID data, was deemed to be likely to have been 
produced by clone tags as it did not fit within a probabilistic behavioural threshold.  
Under the classification, this approach is detecting cloning by theft as entities may be 
using originals or clones.    
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Whether or not implausibilities are due to clones in this third form is less well 
defined from a system’s perspective.  As such, these may only become apparent if 
more parts of a system are included in attack detection.  The detection of the attack 
as a cloning attack does not necessarily occur at the source of attack, such as the tag 
or cloning device.  The detection of the attack involves the analysis of the event data 
generated by tag usage.  Including other parts of the system in RFID security to 
detect these attacks illustrates that the problem of cloning is not localised to one part 
of a system.   
To summarise, when considering the forms of cloning (tag cloning, pseudo-cloning, 
cloning by theft), it seems likely that threats from clones can not be defined, nor 
dealt with in a single part of a system.  These attacks may involve an attacker 
claiming an identity which has associated privileges, but these claims do not always 
originate from a tag.  Also, exposing them through detection methods, does not 
always clearly define what form the attack has taken, and can involve different parts 
of a system such as RFID data.  Attacks against cryptographically enabled smart 
cards; which use RFID technology but are themselves more powerful than low-cost 
RFID, illustrate that security on the tag is largely tenuous in commercial 
applications.  When considering these examples, it seems likely that a broader 
analysis of attacks in RFID systems, in the case of cloning at least, needs to be 
undertaken to maintain a system’s operational goal of tag uniqueness.  Conversely, if 
this class of problems was considered in isolation of the whole system, one may miss 
other forms of cloning which occur.   
2.3 CONSTRAINTS FOR RFID AND SECURITY 
In exploring why solutions on the tag have failed to prevent cloning, this section 
considers some of the challenges surrounding security in RFID systems.  It focuses 
on the tag, as the tag is the cornerstone of identification in these systems.  In 
reviewing these constraints, an overview of some of the limitations on addressing 
security at a single point in isolation is provided.   
2.3.1 COST 
Cost is a major influencing factor in achieving security in RFID systems.  This 
section considers several cost analyses which have focussed on RFID components 
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such as tags.  It should be noted that these analyses do not consider the variable 
financial aspects of cost in RFID systems such as fluctuations in currency.   
In order for an RFID tag to compete with the barcode, and achieve widespread 
deployment, it was predicted years ago that a tag would need to cost five cents 
(Sarma 2001).  The five cent tag cost model speculated that such a tag, at this cost, 
could be developed.  However, this tag would be severely limited in terms of 
hardware resources.  It would be a packaged tag, containing an integrated circuit 
(IC), 64 bits of memory, passive powering, with around 400 to 4000 logic gates and 
a read range of a few feet.  As will be discussed, these constraints pose severe 
challenges for normal operations as well as for security at the tag.   
If we follow the argument of Sarma (2001), it may mean that tags undergo 
reductions in functionality to achieve a cost of five cents; as a recent survey by 
ODIN Technologies, reported by news sources (Swedberg 2010a), has indicated that 
EPC Class-One Generation-Two tags remain at a price of around 15 cents apiece 
when ordered in quantities of 10,000 and 11 cents each when ordered in quantities of 
one million or more.   
To cost five cents, most of the modifications required would be made to the IC – the 
most expensive part of the tag (Sarma 2001).  To reduce the cost, the size of the IC 
needs to be reduced to less than 0.25mm2.  There are three major contributors to the 
area on an IC, and consequently, these would need to be reduced: memory, logic, and 
power circuitry.  The memory would be reduced by using read-only memory rather 
than non-volatile memory, and by storing only an Electronic Product Code (EPC) - a 
tag’s serial number.  The EPC is used as an index into a database where additional 
information about the entity can be found.  The logic on the chip would be 
minimised by using efficient anti-collision protocols such as the Tree Walking 
protocol (Glover and Bhatt 2006).  Finally, the power circuitry would be minimised, 
a ‘synergistic effect’ of minimising the other areas of the tag (Sarma 2001).  
Considering these limitations, this costing model places severe limitations on what 
would normally be operationally achievable for tags, let alone, what could hoped to 
be achieved for security.  
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As will be discussed, the implications of constraining the cost of a tag, and hence its 
capabilities, mean security on the tag is weak, and this has consequences for the 
entire system.  This was briefly alluded to in the previous section when the Texas 
Instruments Digital Signal Transponder (TI-DST) was mentioned (Bono et al. 2005) 
- if security cannot be addressed at the tag, then additional security measures like 
fraud checking need to be put in place.  Such solutions are themselves, not without 
system implications.  This was illustrated when Mirowski and Hartnett (2007) 
demonstrated that incorrect classification of attacks causes false positive alarms, 
meaning entities may be prevented from accessing the system.  Thus, security in 
RFID systems involves system-wide considerations.   
The concept of low-cost tags was largely formalised by the Auto-ID Centre when 
they developed EPC technology and a related class hierarchy for RFID labels 
(Ranasinghe et al. 2004).  This hierarchy specifies the amount of functionality 
prescribed to tags that conform to this cost model.  Class-One and Class Two 
represent low-cost tags and contain simple EPC read-only labels and read-write 
memory, respectively.  In 2004, Class-One labels consisted of around 1000 to 4000 
logic gates while Class Two labels contain several thousand more logic gates.  The 
IC memory had a few hundred bits available for data storage.  The memory use 
between these two classes was distinguished between read only memory for Class-
One tags, whereas Class Two tags have read-write memory.  The logic on board 
these tags was designed to only execute reader commands and implement an anti-
collision scheme.  In terms of power, at the time it was estimated 150 microwatts of 
power would be needed to operate such a tag.  As this specification was developed 
with the intent of standardising basic tag operations, it seems likely that any security 
would be constrained by this specification.  Thus, proposed security features may 
need to be backwards compatible.   
For cryptography, the predominant tag based solution to cloning attacks (Juels 2006), 
the implication of constraints influenced by cost, are essentially this:  given the 
limitations on the number of logic gates, private key cryptosystems such as the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are not suitable in commercial 
implementations as AES typically requires upwards of 20,000 gates (Ranasinghe et 
al. 2004).  As the number of gates available to low-cost tags, which is less than 4000, 
is far below this requirement it seems likely that cryptography would have to be less 
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secure in a commercial implementation.  The John Hopkins example described above 
(Bono et al. 2005) demonstrates this, as the asymmetric nature of computing 
resources available to the attacker and on the tag means that tags will nearly always 
be at a security disadvantage. 
When considering these costing models, the constraints which exist on low-cost tags 
are rigid.  The development of security solutions, would come as an addition to the 
normal operating conditions of tags, and would therefore be subject to not only the 
constraints which are imposed on the whole tag, but also the constraints imposed on 
competition for resources between the security solution and the tag’s normal 
operations.   
2.3.2 FREQUENCY 
The radio frequencies at which tags and readers operate is another constraint on 
achieving security in RFID systems at the tags and readers.  The regulations 
surrounding each frequency place constraints on power emissions, which in turn 
influence: read distance, transaction time and anti-collision methods.  These issues, 
amongst many others surrounding the use of certain frequencies for RFID security 
are now briefly discussed.   
Most RFID systems operate in the Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) bands 
designated by the ITU (Ranasinghe et al. 2004).  The most commonly used High-
Frequency (HF) ISM band in Europe and America is centred at 13.56 MHz and the 
Ultra High-Frequency (UHF) band in the US is 902-928 MHz.  Each frequency band 
places regulations on the isotropic radiated power at certain distances; thus, tags have 
different types of constraints according to frequency.   
For passive tags these place severe restrictions on what can feasibly be achieved on 
the tag.  These regulations place an upper limit on the power available at a given tag 
distance from a reader (Ranasinghe et al. 2004) and these place limits on the type of 
security scheme and cryptographic hardware.  As power emissions are limited, if 
cryptographic hardware is used, it will use the available power or it will require 
additional power.   
As it stands, tags which operate at 13.56 MHz have typical reading ranges of 30 
centimetres (cm) to 50cm; conversely the United States regulations allowing the 
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longest communication, 902-928 Megahertz (MHz), passive Ultra High Frequency 
(UHF) RFID tags have reading distances of around 3m to 5m.  Any onboard 
addition, such as cryptography, therefore, may be detrimental to these estimated read 
distances.  If cryptography uses the available power sent from the reader, it will 
severely diminish the tag reading distances and degrade the performance of the 
whole RFID system (Ranasinghe et al. 2004). When considering this consequence, 
diminished read range may place low-cost tags on par with barcodes, making the 
perceived benefit of longer read distances less attractive.  Conversely, the depth at 
which tags embedded in objects could be read may be influenced; tagged objects 
inside packages may not be as readable requiring the packages to be unpacked 
impacting on a tag’s non-line of sight feature. 
Frequency also places limitations on communication time (Ranasinghe et al. 2004).  
In the United States, for example, UHF regulations for frequency hopping specify a 
maximum time limit of 400 milliseconds (ms) on the use of a frequency channel.  
This means a tag cannot be assumed to be in continuous communications across a 
frequency hop, further limiting security transaction time.  For readers, the ability to 
read a minimum number of tags within a given time period - such as 300 tags per 
second - may be diminished as any increase in transaction time, which would come 
from security protocols, will inevitably reduce maximum read rate.  Consequently, 
this may mean that fewer tagged entities are identified within a time period, in which 
case, the total number of entities in the whole system may take longer to identify.   
There are also limitations on bandwidth.  According to work done by Sarma et al. 
(2003), a tag at 13.56 MHz must use far less signalling between readers and tags 
when compared to what can be achieved at the 915 MHz.  Consequently, 
implementations for anti-collision protocols vary accordingly, to account for this 
lack of bandwidth.  For example, Aloha-based anti-collision algorithms are more 
common in systems that operate in the 13.56 MHz band, whereas deterministic anti-
collision algorithms are more common in the 915 MHz band.  Similarly, protocols to 
secure the tag at 13.56 MHz must use far less signalling from reader-to-tag than at 
915 MHz.  Thus, the decision to use a certain frequency has ramifications for what 
can be achieved between the tag and reader in terms of security.   
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To summarise, when considering the examples above, it appears likely that cost and 
radio frequency are factors which influence the development of RFID security on 
components.  Cost imposes constraints more severely on those tags which are 
situated at the bottom end of costing models.  The five cent tag clearly represents a 
low cost tag, but with little capability for supporting tag based security.  Frequency 
imposes system design constraints as well as a security design constraints.  The 
choice of frequency affects the read range, read rate, and bandwidth – all of which 
influence the operation of the whole system.  The example used was that of entity 
enumeration in systems: increases in frequency resource usage, because of 
cryptography, will be detrimental to the basic goals of enumerating tagged entities 
over long distances, in the hundreds per second, and through multiple layers of 
product packaging.   
2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter began with an exploration of cloning to illustrate that forms of this 
attack relate to different parts of an RFID system and then it considered the 
constraints which make it difficult to protect systems from cloning.  This review has 
suggested the need to consider the ‘whole system’ in analysing the security 
requirements of a system to account for these issues.   
Cloning attacks invalidate the operating principle that every tag in a system is unique 
meaning unauthorised entities can be validated as authorised.  Cloning is constituted 
differently in various parts of the system.  It is easy to define at the tag but more 
challenging when it occurs from a cloning device which may be relaying a signal 
through a ghost and leech.  Relaying attacks illustrate that even tags with security are 
vulnerable to cloning, whereas attacks against RFID-enabled smart cards - which are 
generally more powerful computationally than low-cost tags - illustrate the 
challenges of implementing strong security in commercial applications.   
The need to consider the ‘whole system’ in defending against cloning was made 
more apparent when constraints in the system were reviewed.  The ‘synergistic 
effects’ (Sarma 2001) expected due to cost and frequency goals suggests that 
implementing security involves tradeoffs.  When developing low-cost tags: 
integrated circuit (IC) size influences logic gates, memory, and powering;  and the 
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choice of frequency influences read range, read rate, and available bandwidth.  The 
introduction of cryptography in places like the tag, complicate these linkages.  One 
consequence is suggested as reduced read range as cryptography on passive tags will 
require more power for logic gates.  Whether this is likely to be feasible is not clear 
as commercial implementations of standard algorithms require many more gates than 
those which are currently available for a projected cost of around five cents.   
This all suggests that consideration should be given to the ‘whole system’ when 
considering how to respond to threats like cloning.  The achievement of sufficiently 
strong security, within the constraints, and in relation to specific implementations, is 
challenging.  To this end, the next chapter reviews previous work which has 
considered how analysis can assist in examining the security requirements of RFID 
systems. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews previous work which has analysed security in RFID systems.  It 
starts with a review of what broadly constitutes ‘the system’ and uses this as a basis 
for examining the appropriateness of existing systems analysis approaches to 
security.  The review of system analysis approaches focuses on the structures which 
make up the system, as the previous chapter has already identified some of the 
components which exist.  This serves as the basis for examining how, and where in 
the system, security analysis has been focussed.  As the previous chapter has 
suggested, security relates to the ‘whole system’, therefore, this review will attempt 
to establish how much of the system is captured in these approaches.   
3.2 RFID SYSTEM ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
To understand the place of security in RFID systems, this section begins by 
reviewing what is considered as ‘the system’.  To this end, systematisations of RFID 
components and other elements are reviewed along an architectural basis, that is, 
identifying the internal and external system boundaries which organise elements.   
Whether such systematisations are actually appropriate is contentious amongst some 
researchers - Glover and Bhatt (2006) have suggested no single universal RFID 
system architecture exists given the wide variety of application environments for 
RFID.  As will be illustrated, the following architectural perspectives and 
representations could be perceived as subjective, having been developed by various 
authors based on their own set of beliefs.  However, to avoid potential biases in this 
review, a number of perspectives are examined, and this section then attempts to 
extract properties which are common to systems from a number of these examples.   
3.2.1 RFID SYSTEMATISATIONS 
Two categories of RFID systematisation are reviewed: assessments and models.  
Assessments are characterised by their textual description of system features, 
whereas models are focused on graphical abstractions.  This distinction is used to 
illustrate the advantages imparted by each approach in its description of systems 
information.  As will be seen, the latter category not only imparts information 
concisely, it does so in a means by which the architectures are actually reflected in 
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the reporting approach.  From each of the categories emerges the properties of what 
broadly constitutes the architecture of ‘the system’.   
The concept hierarchy is a characteristic of some RFID systematisations.  Hierarchy 
appears to emerge from the organisation and information flows of the three major 
RFID components (Garfinkel and Holtzman 2005).  Usually tags are the lowest 
element in the hierarchy, above which are readers, and then databases.  Sometimes 
these components have been further decomposed to include the antenna and 
middleware components, however, usually these components are accepted as parts of 
the larger components.  Usually, tags are below the readers in the system as these are 
attached to more entities and the readers are there to aggregate identification.   
The information which flows from the tag, when its data is obtained by a reader, is 
transferred into a database.  In this ordering of information flow, the tag is 
subordinate to the reader as it is the reader which initiates commands, to which the 
tag which responds.  This instantiation of hierarchy, albeit a temporal one, has been 
prevalent in Electronic Product Code (EPC) technology (Ranasinghe et al. 2008). 
However, it is a characteristic that seems likely to apply to most RFID systems, as 
most systems function on this basis (Glover and Bhatt 2006).  Thus, the organisation 
of components and the information flow between components forms a basic 
architectural property of RFID systems – a hierarchy.   
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Figure 1 - Original (low-quality) depiction of the OSI reference model 
The model depicts the seven layers of the model and illustrates how systems are interconnected 
through a common layer.  (Zimmermann 1980) 
What constitutes an RFID system’s hierarchy has been extended by the introduction 
of the organisation of components into a series of layers.  Layers have been used to 
organise RFID components into distinct categories; from the physical environment 
through to the RFID technology, to the information goals of the system.  As will be 
seen, what constitutes these layers varies amongst models.  
The use of layers as a systems concept seems to stem from the similarities between 
RFID systems and communication systems.  A well-known communication model, 
the Open System Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (Zimmermann 1980), 
illustrated in Figure 1, uses layers to organise communication elements.  
Consequently, various authors in RFID have used OSI layers for describing the 
architecture of these systems.   
On the basis that RFID systems are a type of communication system, Shepard (2005) 
systematised RFID components using four layers of the OSI model.  The model he 
proposed uses: physical layer (layer one); data link layer (layer two); presentation 
layer (layer six); and application layer (layer seven).  The model does not use the 
other OSI layers as things like routing and congestion control are irrelevant to the 
RFID systems.   
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Table 1 illustrates the use of OSI layers in RFID systems and includes the 
descriptions provided by Shepard (2005) in an additional column to show why they 
are used.   
Table 1 – OSI Layers and ISO RFID standards 
The model uses the concept of layers and their use is justified by similarities between the OSI layers 
and various RFID technology standards.  (Shepard 2005) 
 
OSI Layer Associated Standards Description 
Layer 1 (Physical) ISO 14443-2 for Type A, B devices 
ISO 7816-2 for contact card 
implementations 
The physical interface between tag 
and reader.  Bit rate, electrical 
signal representation. 
Layer 2 (Data Link) ISO 14443-4 
ISO 7816-3 for contact card 
implementations 
Address management using the 
Channel Identifier (CID) field, 
transmission of sequential data 
blocks, link control, and anti-
collision.   
Layers 6 and 7 (Presentation and 
Application) 
ISO 7816-4 
ISO 7816-7 
Various vendor-specific proprietary 
protocols 
The presentation and encoding of 
data such as encrypted data 
between tag and reader.  The 
onboard tag or reader software.   
 
Other authors have also made frequent use of the OSI layers, however, the common 
use is only to describe the RFID technology.  Avoine and Oechslin (2005) have used 
the concept of OSI layers to organise RFID components for traceability threats.  
Figure 2 shows the communication model they proposed, which uses three layers: 
physical layer, communication layer, and application layer.  The physical layer 
captures the RFID air interface elements such as frequency, modulation of 
transmission and data encoding.  The communication layer contains the protocols 
which make possible interaction between a tag and a reader such as anti-collision 
protocols.  Finally, the application layer represents user defined information relating 
to the entity.  It is worth noting the model was applied to the analysis of a privacy 
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problem called traceability.  Traceability is an attack which allows an attacker to 
monitor the whereabouts of a particular person through their RFID tags (Avoine and 
Oechslin 2005).  As the model does not make explicit that it is restricted to only 
privacy considerations it has been reviewed in this section.   
 
Figure 2 - Communication model   
This is an example of an early attempt to use a model for analysis of security in RFID systems.  It 
systematises RFID using three OSI layers, and is used as a basis for examining traceability threats. 
(Avoine and Oechslin 2005) 
 
This model appears to represent the first known example of analysis of security in 
RFID systems over layers.  In the next section, it will be seen that this is an 
increasing trend amongst various researchers.  However, the above example is 
limited to security only at the tags and readers.   
As RFID systems are used within physical environments, some researchers have 
introduced layers beyond the RFID technology itself.  In Figure 3, Mitrokotsa et al. 
(2008, 2009) introduced the concept of a physical layer that captures physical 
components which pertain to the RFID system.  The communication layer and data 
link layer are reused from OSI-based models, like those seen above.  However, in 
their model these are represented as a combined layer, the network-transport layer.  
This combined layer includes all the protocols responsible for tag and reader 
interaction.  The concept of an application layer has been extended in this model.  It 
captures any enterprise level application.  Finally, a strategic layer is introduced 
which contains the information goals of a system’s owner e.g. a company.  When 
considering this example, it is apparent that the notion of what constitutes an RFID 
system can include more than just the RFID technology. 
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When considering previous examples, it is worth pointing out that the model by 
Mitrokotsa et al. (2008, 2009), is distinguishable on the basis of vertical 
demarcations at each layer.  These demarcations organise elements into object 
classes.  Figure 3 shows that, for example, tag and reader components, of which 
there could be many types, are organised into two separate classes: reader hardware 
(Reader HW), and RFID tags.  These vertical demarcations are a way of including 
more detail at each layer.   
 
Figure 3 –Layers beyond the RFID technology   
The use of a physical layer and the strategic layer allow a broader view to be taken of what constitutes 
the system.  The use of vertical demarcations enables elements at a layer to be grouped. (Mitrokotsa et 
al. 2008, 2009)  
 
Conversely, a taxonomic representation has been proposed by Hassan and Chatterjee 
(2006).  The taxonomy organises RFID system components as members of four 
object classes.  One class, the physical class, is illustrated in Figure 4.  The usage 
class organises systems into two roles: monitoring systems or authorisation systems.  
The frequency class organises communication protocols.  The physical class 
organises tags and readers based on hardware configuration.  Finally, the data class 
organises the enterprise level services performed by the system.  In this taxonomy 
the organisation of elements, with higher level elements having precedence over 
lower elements, appears to form a hierarchy.  As natural divisions are formed 
between classes and sub-classes in this taxonomy, and as the branches extend from a 
root node and sub-branches are introduced, it appears as though this taxonomy 
achieves a similar vertical separation of concepts to the vertical demarcations which 
appear in the model presented by Mitrokotsa et al. (2008, 2009).   
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Figure 4 – The physical class 
The taxonomy decomposes system elements into various classes to identify their constituent elements, 
but does not signify where in the system these elements are located.  (Hassan and Chatterjee 2006) 
 
When considering previous examples, Glover and Bhatt (2006) have expanded the 
systematisation of RFID by including middleware.  In their model, illustrated in 
Figure 5, middleware is a concept which is used to capture anything that supplies 
data to the enterprise management applications which are used by clients for 
information processing.  Sensors - such as RFID readers, as these detect the presence 
of tags - are responsible for collecting sensory data such as temperature or tag data.  
This data is then transferred into device drivers which coordinate the transfer of all 
data into the middleware.  An event database located in the middleware is 
responsible for aggregating and transforming the data, and then preparing it for use 
by applications.  The interfaces in the middleware seem to form layers around which 
components of the middleware are grouped.  If one were to rotate the model on its 
side, the arrangement of these demarcations would be horizontal like Mitrokotsa et 
al. (2008, 2009) layer’s rather than vertical.     
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Figure 5 - Conceptual architecture for an RFID middleware 
The model illustrates that middleware can be decomposed into layers thereby extending the layers 
from sensors to the clients which operate at the enterprise level.  (Glover and Bhatt 2006) 
 
Another systematisation of RFID was proposed by Glover and Bhatt (2006).  Figure 
6 illustrates a model which is based on an RFID application of a retail-store.  It adds 
contextual information such as where in the enterprise merchandise is stored for sale 
(in addition to it being sourced from business partners).  There are merchandise items 
which the retail store is monitoring via RFID technology.  These are confined to 
shelves and checkout lanes, also where the physical tags and physical readers are 
located.  RFID middleware software modules are depicted and these manage the 
readers.  Edge applications represent any enterprise application that has components 
operating in the store, such as point of sales (POS) systems.  The RFID Edge 
Information Service stores RFID events and related data in the system.  Externally, 
the retail store is connected to a data centre whereby, enterprise level data processing 
- one assumes on the RFID data feed - is occurring.  Thus, it shares a hierarchical 
organisation and separation of elements into groups which constitutes a layered 
model.   
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Figure 6 – RFID system in a retail application environment   
This model includes the elements which are external to the RFID system such as a store and data 
centre.  (Glover and Bhatt 2006) 
 
To summarise, when considering the above examples, hierarchies and layers appear 
as common architectural properties used to systematise RFID components, but some 
models have also used these for organising other elements.  Some models achieved 
this wider view by including the application environment and the company which 
operates in the system.  The addition of these properties illustrates that the 
application environment is relevant to the discussion on what constitutes ‘the 
system’.     
3.3 RFID SECURITY ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
This section reviews approaches to security analysis in RFID which fall into the two 
general categories of assessments or models from the previous section.  As with the 
system descriptions, assessments have focused on describing the elements of the 
problem domain, whereas models have focused on graphical representations.  This 
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review builds upon the above systematisations of RFID as a basis for evaluating how 
closely security is integrated into the context of RFID systems.  Reference will be 
made to the previous chapter, which examined cloning attacks and system 
constraints, and, along with the security properties which emerge from these 
approaches; a view will be presented on the appropriateness of existing approaches 
to examining security on a ‘whole of system’ basis.   
3.3.1 SECURITY ASSESSMENTS 
Security assessments have focussed on elucidating the properties of systems and 
security and (loosely) relating these to one another in an attempt to illustrate the 
feasibility of security requirements.   
Privacy concerns in systems have been considered by Ranasinghe et al. (2004).  A 
set of constraints for low-cost RFID was described, these included: manufacturing 
costs, capabilities of integrated circuits, frequencies and regulations.  In the case of a 
spoofing attack, whereby the behaviour of a tag is imitated by an electronic device, 
this threat was seen to arise in part due to the lack of authentication on the tag.  In 
addressing this threat, consideration was given to the constraints on the tag e.g. the 
number of logic gates potentially available for cryptography.  This solution has 
focussed largely on the tag and it appears to lack detail on how security operates in 
other parts of the system and therefore lacks a system wide perspective.   
When system-wide constraints were explored by Sarma et al. (2003) it was shown 
that these have implications for security.  Consideration needs to be given to the 
system constraints, which include: transceiver-transponder coupling and 
communication, data coding, modulation, anti-collision, frequency and regulation.  
This means, for example, to prevent eavesdropping within the interrogation zone of a 
reader, tags may need to encrypt their data using a random nonce to prevent tracking; 
however, supporting strong public key cryptography is beyond the resources of low-
cost tags.  This approach illustrates an assessment based approach to analysis, as 
security is considered in relation to system constraints, requiring some understanding 
of the interconnectedness of system components.  However, when considering this 
work it is apparent that consideration was not given to parts of the system beyond the 
tags and readers.   
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The major shortcoming in the above examples appears to be the lack of system 
architectures to organise elements.  While the above examples have given some 
consideration to how constraints influence system design, and in turn influence the 
feasibility of security, including system structures would assist in distinguishing to 
which layers these effects are relevant.  This may assist in realising at which layer 
security should be situated to deal with various attacks.   
Conversely, some approaches have focused on fewer systems facets when 
deliberating security requirements for systems.   
Peris-Lopez et al. (2006) considered various security threats and solutions, and an 
overview of RFID systems was given brief treatment when various components were 
considered.  While system characteristics were considered, these were not really used 
to provide a robust framework in discussions centred on threats and solutions.  That 
is, proposed solutions were discussed, such as the Kill command, Faraday cage 
approach and Blocker tag; however, these were not considered in a system context.  
Consequently, it seems likely that it would be difficult to determine the feasibility of 
security in different parts of a system through this assessment.   
Thompson et al. (2006) considered a characterisation of RFID threats.  They used the 
STRIDE (Howard and LeBlanc 2003) method of threat analysis, which is an 
abbreviation for: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of 
service, and elevation of privilege.  Consideration was given to various threats within 
two of these criteria, and these are now briefly mentioned.  Spoofing identity 
includes: scanning RFID tags using an unauthorised reader.  Tampering with data 
includes: an attacker modifying tag data such as modifying a high-priced item’s EPC 
to be the EPC of a lower costing item.  When considering these examples, the 
analysis made possible by this approach is relatively limited.  Consideration to the 
associated system constraints, for example, is not related to how attacks arise.  Thus, 
while the threats are considered, the constraints these would be influenced by, which 
determine if they are in fact feasible for actual systems, does not appear to have been 
considered.   
Again, when considering the above examples of security analysis, the major 
shortcoming which is apparent is the lack of structure to the analysis.  Each analysis 
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has considered different parts of security in relation to systems, usually, but not the 
structures which are apparent in system descriptions.  For example, Thompson, et al. 
(2006) have listed information disclosure threats such as a retailer receiving a tagged 
pallet but then claiming the pallet was never received.  However, this analysis fails to 
take into account in which parts of the RFID system repudiation occurs.  For 
example, if a trace of the pallet travelling through a supply chain had been formed, 
and the delivery company had a record of delivering the pallet, then it seems likely 
such a threat would not be valid.  Of course, this all depends on system context.  In 
comparison to system assessments, the above examples appear to lack any noticeable 
context using established system architectures.   
3.3.2 MODEL BASED ANALYSIS APPROACHES 
Model based analysis approaches are an alternative when compared to the 
assessment based approaches discussed above.  In each of the examples now 
discussed, a model has been constructed which represents the relationships in RFID 
and security, and these form the basis for a security proponent to deliberate about 
during security analysis.   
Spiekermann and Ziekow (2005) considered various privacy threats, attack 
feasibility, and solutions.  The attack tree threat method (Schneier 1999) was used to 
structure attacks around a central attack goal.  One attack goal considered is for an 
attacker to identify a person’s belongings based on the tags attached to those 
belongings.  This could occur if an attacker was intent on determining, for example, 
the contents of a person’s home prior to targeting the home for burglary.  The 
intermediate steps in achieving this goal were organised into attack tree.  In this case, 
the attacker needs to obtain and interpret EPC data and prior to this, exploit reader-
to-tag communications, or read the tag data off some tags.  These elements constitute 
the attack tree illustrated in Figure 7.   
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Figure 7 - Attack Tree for assessing objects 
This model organises the various ways an attacker may scan individual items to determine an 
individual’s belongings via attached tags.  (Spiekermann and Ziekow 2005) 
 
In considering the examples provided in the various attack trees by Spiekermann and 
Ziekow (2005), clearly there are limitations on what can be achieved in each attack 
sequence, due to constraints in systems.  For example, to determine what an EPC tag 
is identifying, an attacker would need to consult an EPC Information Service (EPC-
IS) database.  Such limitations are discussed; however, the major limitation is that 
the discussion is not aligned with the attack tree.  As constraints pertain to nodes in a 
tree, and the attack tree does not depict this information it is not explicit whether 
attacks are feasible.  Moreover, in considering possible solutions, again, some 
constraints are discussed, but the influence of constraints on these, across the whole 
attack tree is not clear.  For example, in one case, a hash-lock is proposed as a 
potential solution – but no depiction is given of the implications the use of this 
solution would have on system performance – a clear addition to tag functionality 
which, when considered with the ‘synergistic effects’ discussed by Sarma et al. 
(2001), would have implications for different parts of a system.   
The next examples of security analysis approaches have introduced security models 
which enable deriving security requirements for systems.  Each introduces a means 
of classifying threats and solutions, and subsequently, deriving an indication of the 
amount or type of security to employ. 
Mitrokotsa et al. (2008, 2009) classified threats by system layer, and solutions were 
related to each threat at a layer.  The physical layer comprises the physical RFID 
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devices and these are vulnerable to physical modification by an attacker.  For 
example, a tag could be removed from its entity, physically damaged, or destroyed 
using the Kill command.  Defences to physical layer attacks can include: increased 
physical security; enhanced attachment of tags to entities; or stronger kill passwords.  
The relationship of the attack to the solution is generally suggested as constrained to 
a single layer, and appears as such in the model seen in Figure 8.   
 
Figure 8 - Classification of RFID attacks at layers 
The use of layers indicates where in a system threats and solutions co-exist.  (Mitrokotsa et al. 2008) 
Some attacks are suggested as occurring across multiple layers, such as replay 
attacks.  As an attacker may record a signal, they may reuse it at a later time in order 
to gain physical access to a part of the system.  Some suggested solutions include the 
use of timestamps, challenge response cryptography and radio frequency shielding.   
When considering the above example, it seems likely that many more attacks would 
have influences across the layers.  Tag removal, whilst depicted at the physical layer, 
would mean that a denial of service attack occurs at the strategic layer, as the entity 
monitored by the tag is no longer producing data in the system for it be identified.  
Thus, localising threats and solutions limits the capacity to represent the relationships 
which exist between attacks and solutions throughout the system.     
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Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) introduced a layered security model which captures threats 
and solutions at layers: RFID edge hardware; communication; back-end.  The RFID 
edge hardware layer contains the tags and readers.  The communication layer 
contains the radio link between tags and readers.  The back-end layer contains the 
middleware components like databases and web servers.  Elements of each layer are 
subdivided into three security properties: confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
Another characteristic of the model is that each classification has assigned values for 
various attributes: associated damage caused by threat; cost to implement threat; type 
of tags most vulnerable to threat; possible countermeasures; and associated costs.   
 
Figure 9 – Edge Hardware Layer threats and countermeasures 
This figure organises threats and solutions at this layer according to security principles. (Mitrokotsa et 
al. 2010)  
There appears to be a number of opportunities for improving upon this model for it 
to be used for ‘whole of system’ analysis.  The model depicts a strong 
correspondence between attacks and solutions at a single layer and a single security 
principle.  For example, a side channel attack is dealt with using a tamper resistant 
tag; limiting electromagnetic emissions; or increasing a circuit’s complexity.  These 
attract a medium to high cost of defence, and generally target low cost tags.  
However, the classification does not appear to indicate what influence this attack has 
on other attacks at the same layer or layers above it.  A side-channel analysis, for 
example, can be performed when the attacker undertakes simple power analysis 
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(SPA) attack to reveal the kill password of UHF tags, and once they have the kill 
password, the attacker may disable a tag.  Consequently this would cause a denial of 
service attack at the same layer, as the entity no longer has a valid tag attached to it 
allowing it entry into the system.  This would also mean a database in the higher 
layers may not be able to resolve the location of the entity as it will no longer 
generate a history of movement in the system.  Thus, it appears that the organisation 
of an attack, and subsequent solutions at the same layer, could be improved to 
account for these interrelationships which arise when an attack is perpetrated.   
Following this, as attacks can have interrelationships throughout a system like those 
described above; the model could be improved on the point of how it assigns values 
to each classification.  Potential damage for example may vary according to the other 
attacks involved in an attack, as illustrated above.  Performing an SPA may not 
involve any damage; however, its combination with the kill password would have a 
potentially high damage rating.  Thus, the derivation of these values may vary as 
different combinations of attacks are used.  Similarly, the derivation of values for 
solutions, when coupled at the same layer would benefit from the same 
improvement.  In the case of impersonation attacks, suggested solutions include: 
tamper resistant tags; memory protection mechanisms; or encryption.  It may be the 
case that dealing with this threat directly at this layer involves the associated medium 
to high costs; however, this overlooks the ability to deal with impersonation attacks 
using solutions at the higher layers.  Intrusion detection (Mirowski and Hartnett 
2007) or synchronised secrets (Lehtonen et al. 2007c) are two solutions which could 
assist in thwarting this attack and for very little cost to the tag or system; however, 
these are not depicted nor feasibly represented in the model as these solutions engage 
elements throughout a whole RFID system.   
Finally, by classifying attacks and solutions using security principles at each layer, 
this model appears to suggest that a threat is unlikely to impact on other security 
principles at the same layer or at different layers in the system.  It may be true that a 
replay attack is an integrity attack at the communication layer, for example.  
However, if RFID data, which is replayed, goes on to be inserted into a database, 
which is at a higher layer in the system, it will invalidate the assumptions of the 
database – therefore, causing an integrity attack at a higher layer.  Thus, as security 
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principles are not always confined to the layer at which an attack occurs, there is an 
opportunity to improve on this characteristic.   
When considering the above example, it seems likely that dividing security into three 
main layers which broadly constitute RFID technology, and confining elements to 
security principles and categories, could be improved upon to take into account the 
synergistic effects and interrelationships which arise when elements interact across 
layers.   
The next analysis of security is performed using a framework which represents 
several system properties to derive a security classification.  When compared to the 
previous examples, it makes actual system classifications.   
Rotter (2008) has introduced a framework, illustrated in Figure 10, to assess privacy 
and security in RFID systems.  The framework has been used to derive a 
classification of various domain risks using three criteria: a system’s deployment 
range; the link between the RFID tag and identity-related data; and the domain 
security demands.  Using these properties, various systems have been classified, and 
their security demands determined.  Some classifications appear to overlook relevant 
properties which are influential in determining the security requirements of a system.  
These are now discussed in conjunction with the security classification suggested by 
the framework.     
To begin with, according to Rotter (2008) “most industry applications” demand 
“medium to low security” as these systems are “closed systems” which have a low 
link between an RFID tag and identity-related data.  This appears to assume that 
nobody outside the system can attack.  However, attacks such as cross contamination 
imply that cloning attacks can be transferred between systems (Heydt-Benjamin et al. 
2006), invalidating the assumption that a closed system is safe.  An attacker within 
the organisation, using a cross contamination attack, could obtain the privileges of 
another individual in the system, thereby invalidating this classification.   
Moreover, the MiFare Classic card which is used in some very large closed systems 
does have a very strong link to individuals.  The London Oyster card system is used 
by individuals for transportation ticketing (Garcia et al. 2008).  Given the 
vulnerabilities of the MiFare Classic, it seems likely that this type of system, which 
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is closed, but has a strong link to individuals, should have a very strong demand for 
security – and not a medium to low demand for security.  When consideration is also 
given to the widespread use of the MiFare Classic around the world, which has been 
estimated at over 200 million cards, it seems likely that there would be a very high 
number of systems at risk of attack.   
 
Figure 10 - Privacy and security risk assessment framework  
It represents security as a trade-off between range of system deployment, and the link between tags 
and personal identity.  (Rotter 2008) 
Similarly, medical supply systems, item-level tagging and Object Name Service 
(ONS) systems – although classified as more “open systems” and “systems which 
establish a temporary link to identity,” are also rated as having “low to medium” 
demand for security.  This classification, made possible by the framework, seems to 
overlook the value of the entity attached to the tag.  The necessity to make this 
consideration can be seen in the following example.  As previously mentioned, 
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GlaxoSmithKline has implemented an RFID system to monitor the Trizivr Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) drug bottle via tags at the item-level (O'Connor 
2006).  It seems likely that if an attacker could introduce counterfeit Trizivir into the 
system on the basis of performing a cloning attack to assign a valid identity to 
counterfeit products, there is a potential risk that users of the drug fall victim to 
inferior quality Trizivir.  Thus, consideration in medical supply systems or item-level 
tagging systems needs to give consideration to the entity, not just the link to privacy.  
Moreover, as the Trizivir system is using EPC tags, when considering the analysis of 
surreptitious scanning of personal belongings for EPC tags by Spiekermann and 
Ziekow (2005), it seems likely that in the same context, an attacker could scan an 
individual’s shopping to reveal the drugs they are carrying, and loosely, identify 
them as a HIV patient.  Thus, more context than the three properties considered in 
this model, are needed to take into account a fuller set of security issues. 
On the other hand, domains which demand “high” security for RFID systems are 
generally those systems which identify a person.  These systems include “implant 
based medical systems” and “electronic passport systems”.  In considering implant 
based systems, such as the VeriChip which is a human implantable tag; this tag 
contains usually only a serial number (Halamka et al. 2006).  These tags also operate 
at 125Khz, making them relatively short range devices.  Consequently, with the tag 
firmly embedded in a person, obtaining personal data would require access to the 
database which contains this data, in addition to the attacker getting extremely close 
to the individual.  While attacks such as tag relaying could extend the range of such 
attacks, or existential cloning provide the serial number without physical 
intervention; this would put a system’s security on par with other serial-number-only 
systems.  Thus, when considering the derived classifications, this model appears to 
make classifications on the basis of limited information.   
When considering the above approach to security analysis, it seems likely that many 
of the influential system properties are not considered when a classification is 
derived.  This may mean that a system’s security requirements may not be as 
effective if derived through this approach.   
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3.4 SUMMARY 
The previous chapter suggested the examination of security in a whole system on the 
basis of attack scope and constraints in various parts of the system.  It seemed likely 
that understanding the relationships in system security could lead to practical 
security improvements.  To this end, this chapter set out to examine how previous 
work on RFID and security analysis approaches would facilitate this.   
When considering the examples of various analysis approaches of security in RFID 
systems, it seems likely that much of the focus has been on the RFID technology.  
Work by Sarma et al. (2001) identified the influence of various ‘synergistic effects’ 
on the tag (for example: reducing cost by minimising the size of the integrated 
circuit, memory, logic and power circuitry) which affects security in RFID systems, 
but the focus was largely at the tag and reader level.  Some authors have taken a 
more systematic approach to threat analysis such as Thompson et al. (2006), 
however, they did not consider these synergistic effects in systems, nor the 
interrelationships which occur throughout the system as security is introduced.  
These assessments and models have appeared to lack integration amongst system 
properties.   
Conversely, Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) have provided a view of security in the context 
of system layers, which is on par with accepted views of the domain, but many of the 
attributes were fixed to attacks or solutions – something which should change in 
order to consistently reflect the variations which arise when consideration is given to 
security interrelationships in systems (for example: the changes to solution cost when 
addressing an attack at a layer different from which it occurs in).  Moreover, Rotter 
(2008) illustrated that actual system security could be classified based on system 
properties, however, these classifications appeared to be limited to a few properties 
at the oversight of other influential system properties.  When considering these 
examples, it seems likely that these would benefit if the capacity for capturing 
appropriate system information, especially context, is enabled - the derivation of 
security requirements which consider the ‘whole system’ may then be more 
achievable.   
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Thus, this chapter concludes with the thought that an alternative RFID security 
model should be proposed to make possible a ‘whole of system’ approach to the 
analysis of security.   
 
  
 
4 Methods for 
Reference Model 
Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Chapter 4
Chapter 4 – Methods for Reference Model Construction 
- 48 - 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
To enable a ‘whole of system’ approach to the analysis of security in RFID systems 
this chapter reviews methods which will be used to introduce an alternative security 
model, as well as methods specific to various security analysis goals.  Recall that in 
Chapter 2, the need to consider more of the system in security solutions was apparent 
when the forms of cloning and the inherent constraints in RFID systems were 
reviewed.  Following the review of previous work in Chapter 3, it was suggested that 
existing models would not facilitate this approach to security analysis.  The methods 
examined here will offer an alternative analysis approach which can accommodate 
these requirements. 
To this end, a method to define a systems architecture is reviewed as a basis for 
defining an alternative model.  Methods thought suitable for the specific tasks of 
enumerating security information make up the second part of the review.  These 
latter methods focus on three facets of security thought relevant to this problem 
domain: standard system operation, threats, and solutions.  These methods are 
embodied within various paradigm areas.  For example, domain modelling provides 
a general paradigm, while specific methods relevant to domain modelling such as 
object oriented analysis (OOA) and entity relationship diagrams (ERD) are reviewed 
within this theme.  The reason is to convey the general sense of the ‘themes’ which 
facets of the reference model to be constructed will embody.   
In the chapters which follow, an alternative model which embodies the ‘whole of 
system’ paradigm will be introduced and following chapters will illustrate how 
individual methods, when integrated into the model, enable the derivation of security 
information.   
4.2 DEFINING A SYSTEM’S ARCHITECTURE 
As this thesis aims to make possible a ‘whole of system’ approach via a model, seen 
as the most beneficial approach to take from the previous chapter, it reviews a 
method for constructing and evaluating system models.   
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4.2.1 REFERENCE MODELS 
A reference model is constructed when a system’s operations need to be more 
effectively understood.  A reference model is essentially a generic blueprint of a 
system type which contains the desirable properties of systems.  Working from a 
reference model should lead to higher quality outcomes for solutions derived from 
the model as it embodies the system’s most relevant qualities.  (Fettke and Loos 
2003).   
 
Figure 11 - Object Management Group (OMG) reference model for electronic commerce 
A high level framework for specification of requirements for electronic commerce systems.  (Mišic 
and Zhao 2000)   
 
Other more tangential outcomes are possible using a reference model (Mišic and 
Zhao 2000).  Some of these outcomes include: the model being used as a framework 
to standardise representations or communication amongst stakeholders; to develop 
more specialised models for specific scenarios; to map out specific system 
architectures; and finally, a widely accepted reference model leading to an 
architecture based development process.  For security analysis in RFID, this may be 
beneficial, as Chapter 3 has suggested; security does not currently appear as wanted 
considering the influences of cloning and constraints.  Thus, working from such a 
model may lead to more effective security analysis, and subsequently, more effective 
solutions.   
Chapter 4 – Methods for Reference Model Construction 
- 50 - 
A reference model facilitates increased understanding of a system by modelling a 
system’s architectural properties - usually by examining individual system elements 
and modelling these elements along conceptually similar system functions enables 
derivation of these architectures.  For example, one way of modelling elements in 
systems, is to hide individual characteristics using layers.  Layers have found 
widespread appeal largely because of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model 
(Zimmermann 1980) reference model (see Chapter 3).  The OSI model, used in the 
communications domain, enables improved understanding of communication 
systems as it represents a communication system as a simpler system: having 
compressed all elements into a simpler structure, increased system understanding 
occurs as the focus is on what is contributed by each layer, rather than what each 
element contributes.   
4.2.1.1 CONSTRUCTING REFERENCE MODELS 
There does not appear to be an established method for constructing a reference 
model, and therefore, guidance on this matter has been sourced from the principles 
which are considered desirable for achieving high quality reference models.  Misic 
and Zhao (2000) have proposed that consideration be given to a reference model’s 
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties in order for a model to achieve 
sufficient quality.  These are now listed to form a basis for constructing a reference 
model:   
• Syntactic properties describe how the model is represented in a modelling 
language.  The Unified Modelling Language (UML) is a popular language 
for representing models, and one could consider a model’s conformance to 
the rules of UML as a basis for possible model quality.  (Mišic and Zhao 
2000).   
• Semantic properties describe how the model describes the domain; a model 
should be coherent in capturing meaningful elements which contribute to the 
overall goals of the model; and complete in capturing the amount of elements 
appropriate for the model’s boundaries and scope, for it to be useable.  (Mišic 
and Zhao 2000).   
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• Finally, pragmatic properties describe the association of the model with the 
intended audience.  Pragmatic quality considers how well the model 
corresponds to the audience’s interpretational needs.  For example, system 
developers may find it desirable that a reference model focus on technology, 
whereas system analysts could find more benefit in a model of business rules.  
(Mišic and Zhao 2000).   
When considering these properties, it seems likely that they are a suitable guide for 
ensuring a model exhibits quality, and they will be used when constructing the 
alternative security model.   
4.2.1.2 COMPARING REFERENCE MODELS 
While the above properties seem relevant for constructing and assessing individual 
reference models; the matter of evaluating reference models by comparison against 
each other is now considered.  Fettke and Loos (2003) have suggested four reasons 
why such evaluation is necessary:  
1. Evaluation leads to more effective understanding of each model’s 
characteristics; 
2. Similarities and differences in models can be identified;  
3. Identification of which model are more relevant to a problem domain;  
4. The strengths of each model’s theoretical basis can be determined.   
There a variety of ways in which reference models can be evaluated on the basis of 
quality.  Fifteen approaches are summarised by Fettke and Loos (2003).  These fall 
into various classes, ranging from descriptive, theory based, through to empirical 
methods.  Some of these methods are awkward to use if reference models are even 
marginally different from one another.  Case study evaluation investigates a specific 
reference modelling situation in a particular application scenario.  The quality 
assessment is derived from the outcome of the evaluated case study using the 
reference model.  Conversely, laboratory experiments can evaluate the model in an 
environment which is unbiased, as the influence of independent variables on 
dependent variables can be controlled.   
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To summarise, reference models offer an accepted approach to modelling a system.  
The use of the approach, in developing a model of security in RFID systems, would 
be a distinct advantage as it offers a formal development process when quality 
criteria are considered, as well as offering accepted ways to evaluate model 
usefulness.  This may lead to the development of a strong representational basis, 
which can enable the ‘whole of system’ approach to the analysis of security in RFID 
systems.   
4.3 ANALYSING FACETS OF A SYSTEM  
This section reviews methods which could be integrated into the reference model to 
achieve various analysis requirements.  An apparent limitation on a reference model 
is that the architectures must be relatively stable – the fact that a system could be 
demarcated by layers may never change – however, the elements of the systems 
which are hidden by the reference model could change.  As analysis moves from the 
reference model to actual systems, as the level of abstraction decreases, the 
similarities between systems at an element level may vary.  Consequently, 
understanding the analysis methods which could be facilitated by the reference 
model would be useful in order to choose which would more effectively yield useful 
information when used for the analysis of a specific system.     
From previous work reviewed in Chapter 3, it appears that three general concepts are 
relevant to the analysis of security in RFID systems:   
• Analysis of actual RFID systems based on their functional capabilities under 
standard operation – without security matters influencing the behaviour of 
the system.   
• Analysis of security threats which result in a system moving from a standard 
operating situation, to one where operations are invalidated by attacks.   
• Finally, analysis of solutions in the context of system properties in 
conjunction with threats, to achieve practicable security requirements.   
The basis for the inclusion of these facets in a reference model is established from 
the review of previous work on models in the previous chapter, Chapter 3.  To this 
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end, methods which may allow for the derivation of information in the above areas 
are reviewed.  In the coming chapters, the reference model will facilitate the 
integration of these methods for achieving specific analysis outcomes.   
4.3.1 DOMAIN ANALYSIS 
One method to define what broadly constitutes a system’s standard operations is 
domain analysis.  Domain analysis can refer to a variety of approaches:   
• The process of creating reusable views – usually a domain model - of 
components in a domain for creating a software representation of a domain 
(Pressman 2000).   
• The knowledge acquisition stage in the development of expert systems 
(Prieto-Diaz 1987).   
• Conceptual modelling and knowledge engineering in addition to software 
engineering (Zand 1998).   
A domain model forms the basis for understanding how system components 
function.  To determine how a system functions, usually two analysis stages are 
undertaken: data analysis and classification.  The data analysis stage is when a 
domain’s basic elements are identified as entities, operations, events, or 
relationships.  The classification stage uncovers information structures which 
characterise classes of elements.  (Arango 1994).   
The classification stage can give rise to a taxonomy of objects, which allows 
coverage of entity clusters via abstraction.  The branches in the taxonomy become 
the relationships between the entities thereby communicating domain rules.  From 
the taxonomy, a controlled vocabulary can emerge which enables identification of 
the domain concepts.  Thus, the domain model can provide not only generic views of 
system elements, but also a set of terminologies, to assist one to understand the 
domain.  (Arango 1994).   
It is worth noting that domain analysis is an ongoing process, and thus, a domain 
model is generally never fully completed.  Analysis is repeated a number of times 
depending on the amount of detail required (Zand 1998).  Once reusable components 
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are identified and added into a domain’s abstraction, the reuse data are gathered and 
fed back to the domain analysis process for tuning and updating of the domain 
model.  The process of domain analysis repeats itself until a satisfactory level of 
accuracy has been reached. 
As a basis for understanding how security is needed in RFID systems, it makes sense 
to begin by understanding what constitutes the elements of a system.  The following 
review examines methods which can be applied in a domain model approach.   
4.3.1.1 OBJECT ORIENTED ANALYSIS 
As RFID contains a variety of objects, one may look to identify and model these in a 
logical view in order to capture system components.   
To model the standard objects for a domain model, Object Oriented Analysis (OOA) 
represents the content and behaviour of domain objects.  It results in various OOA 
diagrams, one of which is the class diagram.  This diagram generalises objects into 
templates called classes.  These diagrams can be depicted using the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004; Maciaszek and Liong 2005).   
Some OOA concepts are now reviewed: objects, messages, associations, and 
multiplicity.  These concepts, in particular, form the constituent parts of an OOA 
class diagram and can be represented in UML.   
Objects are instances of classes.  They are entities which can be created, modified, or 
destroyed during the life of a system.  An object has a state that includes the values 
of its attributes and its links with other objects.  Objects have attributes (such as 
shape, weight, colour, and type of material).  Operations represent behaviours of an 
object, whenever an object receives some stimulus, called a message, it initiates 
behaviour.  (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004; Maciaszek and Liong 2005) 
Messages allow objects to communicate with other objects.  A message stimulates 
behaviour to occur in the receiving object.  An object requests the execution of an 
operation from another object by sending it a message.  The message is matched up 
with a method which carries out the intentions of the message.  (Bruegge and Dutoit 
2004; Maciaszek and Liong 2005). 
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Associations are relationships between classes.  Associations represent relationships 
between objects e.g. objects which compose other objects.  Associations between 
classes are made up of types and multiplicity.  Association types include a “has-a” 
association for depicting structural interactions between a system’s components.  
Conversely, as a way of indicating the number of associations that can originate from 
an instance of a class, multiplicity is defined at the ends of each association.  There 
are various types of multiplicity.  For a one-to-one (1:1) association, exactly one link 
exists between instances of each class.  A one-to-many association has a multiplicity 
one (1) on an end, and zero to many (0…n) on the other end.  A many-to-many 
association has a multiplicity of zero to many (0…n) on both ends, thereby denoting 
that an arbitrary number of associations could exist between instances of the two 
classes.  These are a means of depicting rules of interaction between components in a 
domain at the logical layer.  (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004; Maciaszek and Liong 2005) 
To this end, OOA can be used in conjunction with UML to model the objects in a 
domain in a formal way.  For a ‘whole of system’ model of security in RFID 
systems, this type of approach may offer the advantage of standardising depictions of 
components such that security proponents could agree on what broadly constitutes 
the standard operations of RFID.  Knowledge of the logical system would therefore 
provide a basis for understanding what constitutes invalidation of parts of the system 
using attacks at the logical layer. 
4.3.1.2 ENTITY-RELATIONSHIP MODELLING 
While OOA models the logical layer – static objects and the relationships between 
objects - in a system like RFID, where object interactions lead to the production of 
RFID data, this data can also be modelled to provide system understanding.  As data 
is produced when a tag and reader have interacted, modelling the data would in effect 
be modelling associations which have taken place at the lower RFID system layers - 
for example, when tags and readers interacted via radio signals in physical 
environments.  Adding these details to a model of RFID could contribute detail to the 
view of the whole system, thereby further enhancing system analysis capability.   
To this end, entity-relationship modelling is briefly reviewed here.  This method 
usually results in an Entity-Relationship Diagram (ERD) which represents 
relationships in data (Pressman 2000).  It separates the data from the class or object 
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which has been defined in the Object Oriented Analysis (OOA) – thus, it defines a 
data view.  Originally credited to Chen (1976), his approach adopted the view that 
the real world consists of entities and relationships which are characterised by 
semantic information.  Only a brief description is given here, and a comprehensive 
overview can be found in Benyon (1997).   
Many of the concepts found in OOA are to be found within ERD but there are some 
differences as well (Bagui and Earp 2003).  In ERD, the object is referred to as the 
entity, although the entity is similar to an object, having attributes and associations.  
Relationships provide a way for associations to be modelled at the data level.  Teorey 
et al. (2006) discussed several semantic properties to capture enterprise rules using 
relationships: degree and multiplicity.  Degree specifies the number of entities 
participating in a relationship: a binary relationship has degree two (two entities); a 
ternary relationship has degree three; and to be non-specific, n entities participate in 
an n-ary relationship.  Multiplicity specifies the number of instances of each entity in 
a relationship.  The basic connections are: one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-
many.  These various relationships are focused on events which occur between 
entities.  These differences are the way ERD can focus on modelling data when 
entities or objects have interacted in parts of a system. 
4.3.1.3 FEATURE CONSTRUCTION 
Through object interaction in a system, data can emerge.  In RFID systems, this 
happens when tags are read by readers (Garfinkel and Rosenberg 2005).  The data 
which is produced is a combination of: a tag serial number, a reader serial number, 
and the timestamp of when the interaction took place.  While OOA could model the 
components in an RFID system – tags and readers – and ERD the relationships at the 
data layer – the context surrounding these interactions is, at first glance, relatively 
sparse.   
When considering only the above RFID data features, it seems likely that one could 
deduce very little information about the system.  Consequently, on the basis that few 
data features are established through such interactions, in establishing a 
comprehensive view of an RFID system, it may be necessary to define a substantial 
amount of context to understand what exactly the RFID data means.  However, this 
has the disadvantage of making a representational model highly application specific.  
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Thus, an alternative to be explored in this section is how features can be produced 
without having to provide application context.   
Feature construction is a method which enables the derivation of features from 
existing features in data (Alfred 2008).  The approach is used when more information 
needs to be gained from sparse data.  This is different from feature extraction which 
looks for classes which exist amongst values in a dataset and uses these to derive 
additional features as a way of classifying records which share those values.  
Although feature construction is associated with the machine learning domain it also 
has relevance outside of that domain.   
Several types of approach exist (Alfred 2008), and these are briefly reviewed.  
Hypothesis driven methods construct new features based on a previously generated 
hypothesis or discovered rules (Alfred 2008).  A hypothesis is constructed and 
examined to construct new features.  These new features are then added to the set of 
original features to construct another new hypothesis.  The process is repeated until a 
stopping condition is satisfied, although this is highly dependent on the quality of the 
previously generated hypothesis.  Data driven methods construct new features by 
directly detecting relationships in data (Alfred 2008).  However, other approaches 
appear less reliant on an automated approach, and thus suitable for modelling 
systems manually.  Of these methods, knowledge driven methods (Wnek and 
Michalski 1994) – are the most common approach (Tan et al. 2006) to feature 
construction and appear to apply expert domain knowledge to construct features.   
Using feature construction in the RFID domain may allow for alternative features to 
be listed, which are generic to a class of RFID systems.  This may further enhance a 
model of standard system operations, providing a context around sparse RFID data.   
To summarise, methods have been reviewed which could be used to derive parts of a 
domain model.  A domain model would provide a logical and data basis for 
understanding how RFID systems are supposed to function, and therefore, a way of 
identifying when they are not functioning as they are supposed to.  While this section 
has encompassed a variety of methods, both overarching and specific, the following 
chapters will show how a solid domain model provides a good basis for approaching 
security analysis on a ‘whole of system’ basis.     
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4.3.2 THREAT ANALYSIS 
As the focus of this thesis is the security of RFID systems, methods which can 
analyse the threats to systems should be reviewed.  Approaching this systematically 
would offer the advantage of identifying how a system influences attack 
instantiation, as well as solution implementation.  A method which makes this 
possible is the attack tree method and this is now briefly reviewed.   
4.3.2.1 ATTACK TREES 
Attack Trees are a threat modelling method proposed by Schneier (1999, 2004).  
They are an attacker centric approach to deriving a depiction of the ways a system’s 
goals can be invalidated.  Attacks are modelled from an attacker’s perspective as a 
tree structure.  The root node of the tree represents the attacker’s attack goal and the 
leaf nodes depict ways of achieving that goal.  As an attack can be a goal, it can be 
further decomposed into further attacks – in effect, this can be a recursive process 
until sufficient decomposition has been attained.   
Attack trees can be augmented with logical operations and by assigning values to 
attack tree nodes.  Two logical operations can be used for this purpose.  Conjunction 
(logical “And”) between nodes, represented as a diagrammatic arc, indicates a 
dependency between nodes in achieving a parent goal.  Disjunction (logical “Or”) 
between nodes is the default state, and does not have any special diagrammatic 
symbol.  It specifies that there are different ways of achieving a parent goal.  Values 
can be added to each node to signify, for example, the cost and skill required, or 
whether an attack is legal.  Adding these constructs to nodes is intended to enhance 
an attack tree’s semantics; however, they have the distinct disadvantage of 
introducing specific application detail making them application specific.  (Schneier 
1999, 2004). 
When these constructs are specified throughout the branches of an attack tree, it is 
then possible to determine the likely sequences an attacker could choose.  The node 
values in a sequence are aggregated to derive an indication of the overall value of the 
sequence.  For example, the cost of an attack sequence could be derived by adding 
together the cost of each component.  When such calculations are applied to all 
branches, the branch of least cost could be identified, which could be the most likely 
sequence the attacker chooses, for example.  However, as these values are 
Chapter 4 – Methods for Reference Model Construction 
- 59 - 
instantiated for a specific system implementation, again, these make any particular 
attack tree specific to that system.  (Schneier 1999, 2004).   
 
Figure 12 - Attack tree for opening a safe 
This attack tree represents the series of attacks an attacker may enact to obtain access to a safe.  
(Schneier 1999) 
 
To indicate an attacker’s behaviour, the nodes of an attack tree are traversed from 
leaf node to root node, or vice versa.  As each node is the composition or 
decomposition of an attack, the steps in achieving the attack goal are a sequence of 
attacks.  As illustrated in Figure 12, for example, in order for an attacker to open a 
safe, the attacker could learn the combination by getting the combination from the 
target, and this could by achieved by eavesdropping on a conversation where the 
combination is being discussed (Schneier 1999).  Each sequence through an attack 
tree represents a way the attacker behaves to attain the attack goal.  This suggests 
that a systematic approach to analysing threats can be achieved using this method.  
(Schneier 1999, 2004).   
Attack trees have been used previously in RFID research for modelling threats 
against privacy.  The ways tags reveal information about the objects they are 
associated with has been analysed by Spiekermann and Ziekow (2005) using this 
method.  However, recall from Chapter 3 that the lack of alignment to system layers 
was a perceived shortcoming as the method lacked the ability to determine which 
security solutions were feasible.  This shows that attack trees are an accepted way of 
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modelling RFID threats, but that there are outstanding problems to be solved in their 
use in RFID security.   
Attack trees are not the only threat modelling approach which would be useful for 
analysing attacks in an RFID system.  The main benefit they offer is the ability to 
structure attacks hierarchically – which can be linked to the architectural property of 
RFID systems (see Chapter 3).   
4.3.3 SOLUTION ANALYSIS 
One approach to analysing solutions on a ‘whole of system’ basis is to study 
solutions in the context of actual systems.  However, some authors report that this is 
not so straightforward for researchers.  In our work on developing an intrusion 
detection system for RFID, Mirowski and Hartnett (2007) reported that the 
availability of actual systems for examining security was limited.  We had to 
evaluate the intrusion detection system using, not an actual RFID system, but 
sanitised RFID data injected with synthetic attacks from a system.  This had the 
disadvantage of being an artificial representation of what attacks may look like rather 
than being an actual representation.  As the data was sourced from a live system, any 
attacks which may have been prevalent but unbeknownst to us may have influenced 
the accuracy of the results.  In addition, very little information was available about 
the users of the system, and thus, the context of the data was minimal.   
Recognising that the availability of RFID data was also an ongoing problem for other 
researchers, Mirowski et al. (2008) released RFID data on the internet for other 
researchers to use.  Since releasing the (presumed) attack free output data on the 
internet, it has had over 900 downloads1.  This suggests that there is an ongoing need 
for actual systems to be available for analysis of solutions.  To this end, this section 
reviews a method which may be suitable for analysing solutions for security in RFID 
systems on a ‘whole of system’ basis.   
4.3.3.1 AGENT BASED MODELLING AND SIMULATION (ABMS) 
ABMS is a simulation methodology which models a system as a collection of agents 
and the relationships between those agents.  Although what exactly constitutes an 
                                                 
1 Statistics were viewed on 16/12/2010 from the University of Tasmania electronic prints database at 
http://eprints.utas.edu.au/es/index.php?action=show_detail_eprint;id=6903; 
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agent is contentious, in general, an agent executes various simple independent 
behaviours (Macal and North 2005; Korth 2006).  While the individual rules of each 
agent could be simple, the model’s agents collectively exhibit more complex 
behaviours than a single agent.  This is called emergent behaviour.  This is seen as 
beneficial, as often systems are easier to understand as constituent components 
(Bonabeau 2002).  Thus, highly complex systems can be modelled using relatively 
simple components, whilst still attaining the behaviour of the ‘whole system’.  An 
example of this emergent behaviour is that of termites working together to create 
large mounds that have very complicated temperature control structures.  Even 
though no single termite plans to produce a specific mound, the mound emerges 
through termite interactions.  In simulations of similar phenomenon, the design of 
each agent is simple, but the whole system emerges through these simple 
interactions.   
From a review of general simulation literature (Robinson 2004), it seems likely that 
consideration should be given to two general simulation issues: firstly, how the 
simulation can be implemented – and thus, how to implement the ABMS; and 
secondly, the methodological approach which is to be taken to simulation 
development.  These are briefly reviewed and related back to the concept of ABMS.   
ABMS can be implemented more easily using toolkits (Gilbert and Bankes 2002).  
An example toolkit is the Multi-Agent Simulator of Neighbourhoods (MASON) 
(Balan et al. 2003; Luke et al. 2004).  MASON provides some of the core elements 
needed for ABMS: modelling and visualisation.  It allows a modeller to define agents 
as entities.  These can be scheduled to perform some action inside a continuous 
virtual environment.  Visualisation can occur in a three-dimensional viewport which 
animates agent interactions.  MASON is an extensible toolkit allowing a modeller to 
make customised simulations.  For these reasons, MASON has been used for a wide 
range of multi-agent simulations, ranging from swarm robotics to social complexity.   
The relationship of developing a simulation to using a methodology is now 
considered.  The procedures to develop a simulator, have been discussed in Robinson 
(2004) and Law (2005).  Robinson (2004) has proposed that simulators have modes; 
ranging from highly accurate representations of systems for predicting outcomes in 
real systems (Mode One), to less formal representations, which facilitate a group of 
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individuals through discussions which take place during the modelling process 
(Mode Three).  These modes give direction to the approach one may take in 
developing a simulation for the purpose of system analysis.   
For RFID simulation, one assumes that there would usually be a single security 
proponent involved in an analysis task.  Thus, for a ‘whole of system’ approach, 
Mode Two simulators appear to be the most relevant method.   
A Mode Two simulator is developed for problem understanding and problem solving 
by a single modeller.  These are seen as a process of ‘social change’ as learning 
occurs through the process of development, as well as through experimentation with 
the simulator.  Model users are highly involved during the modelling process, 
gaining benefits from all stages in terms of an improved understanding as well as the 
solutions that could be derived from experimentation with the model.  These users 
are the direct beneficiaries of the modelling process.  Consequently, validation is 
considered in terms of whether the model is sufficiently accurate for its purpose and 
is performed by the modeller in conjunction with the users.   
For a ‘whole of system’ approach to RFID security, the main benefit ABMS would 
offer is the ability to simplify systems into their constituent components.  This could 
allow an analyst to examine tags individually, or the ‘whole system’, depending on 
analysis goals.  In implementing an ABMS, one would be providing a mechanism for 
the analysis of solutions prior to actual system investigation.   
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed existing methods that will be used in the coming chapters 
to derive an alternative security model which makes possible a ‘whole of system’ 
approach to security analysis.   
The reference model method will be used to derive an alternative representation of 
security in RFID systems to facilitate the ‘whole of system’ approach.  This method 
offers an overarching approach to defining a system’s architecture.  The principle of 
quality ensures that a suitable representation would be derived.  Another benefit is 
the means of evaluation to compare a derived model to existing work.  Using this 
approach, a more robust model of RFID could be derived when compared to existing 
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models, and thus, such a model may be more suitable to facilitating the ‘whole of 
system’ approach. 
Moreover, a variety of methods which will be applied to a reference model were 
reviewed for the specific purpose of identifying how these would contribute systems 
information.  These came from a variety of domains but if integrated in a reference 
model, would be made to work for the specific goal of analysing security on a ‘whole 
of system’ basis.  It is important to make this requirement clear, as without a 
representational basis, the results which would be derived from each analysis method 
may not be integrated across the whole RFID system nor related to one another.  In 
using these methods this concept of integration is a perceived necessity as what is 
proposed is that threats and solutions are considered in relation to a domain context.   
This chapter ends with the thought that a ‘whole of system’ approach can be 
facilitated by a reference model, and individual methods, which have systematic 
qualities, can then be applied to the model, in order to achieve specific security 
analysis information.  Consequently, the next chapter introduces an alternative model 
for the ‘whole of system’ approach and successive chapters illustrate how ‘whole of 
system’ analysis achieves specific analysis outcomes by integrating the methods 
reviewed above in the model.   
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3, in order to determine how facilitative existing approaches are to a 
‘whole of system’ approach to RFID security, previous work on security analysis for 
such systems was reviewed.  Models imparted the most concise representation of 
security matters, and two models in particular, illustrated the benefits of examining 
security in relation to RFID systems but their limitations were apparent.  Rotter 
(2008) proposed a model which enables system classification, however, his model 
does not appear to be suitable for analysis beyond several system properties.  
Conversely, Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) proposed a model which enables analysis over 
system layers, however, the use of security principles and attributes only within 
individual layers reduces the model’s generality.  In summary, it seems that previous 
work has been localised to specific system properties, which has the drawback of 
missing the interrelationships which are relevant throughout the ‘whole system’.   
To address these apparent limitations, this chapter introduces and describes an 
alternative model which makes possible a ‘whole of system’ approach to the analysis 
of security in RFID systems.  It is distinguished from previous models which have 
been reviewed in Chapter 3, on the basis of integrating layer and partition properties, 
and is therefore entitled, An Integrated Layered and Partitioned Reference Model.  
The layers are: real world, RFID, and strategic.  Conversely, the partitions are: 
standard operating, problem, and solution.  The model integrates these layers and 
partitions using a reference model approach.  The architecture of this model is 
explained and how this will facilitate a ‘whole of system’ approach is described.  
Successive chapters will expand on the use of the approach, by integrating individual 
methods through the model’s structure for specific analysis goals and present 
evidence to support its advantages over previous work.   
5.2 THE PROPOSED REFERENCE MODEL 
The alternative model, illustrated in Figure 13, is based on the reference model 
paradigm (Fettke and Loos 2003) and is distinguished from previous work reviewed 
in Chapter 3, by integrating layer and partition properties.  Layer properties are 
horizontal in the model to capture system elements.  Conversely, partition properties 
are vertical in the model to capture security elements.  The model is non-prescriptive 
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as to what constitutes the elements of the system; leaving these details to the security 
proponent in their use of various modelling methods, however those should be 
modelled around the definition of a particular layer or partition.   
 
Figure 13 - The integrated layered and partitioned reference model  
 
The rest of this chapter explains the model’s structure, on a per property basis, and 
will conclude by describing how these properties are integrated to facilitate a ‘whole 
of system’ approach to the analysis of security in RFID systems. 
5.2.1 LAYERS 
The layer property of the reference model is illustrated separately from partitions in 
Figure 14.  A horizontal layer captures a composition of system elements along 
functionally similar lines.  In the reference model, systems are constituted not only 
by the RFID technology such as tags and readers, but also the physical world and the 
strategic layer which defines the system owner’s information goals.  To attain this 
broader perspective of what constitutes an RFID system, the reference model uses 
major abstraction layers.  In contrast, previous work (Avoine and Oechslin 2005; 
Shepard 2005; Mitrokotsa et al. 2008, 2009) has usually focused on specific system 
layers mostly concerning RFID technology, which has the drawback of excluding the 
interplay between the environment and enterprise.   
To this end, three major layers are introduced in this model: real world, RFID, and 
strategic.  The real world layer captures the application environment in which an 
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RFID system is situated, specific to that system.  The RFID layer captures the RFID 
technology such as tags, readers, and middleware.  Finally, the strategic layer 
captures the company’s information goals in using RFID in the particular application 
environment.  This model takes a broad view, using these major horizontal 
abstraction layers, of what constitutes the ‘whole system’, when compared to 
previous work in Chapter 3.   
The real world for interconnection grounds systems which are under comparison.  It 
represents the environment which is common to these systems.  For example, in a 
pharmaceutical supply chain, it may be the ‘supply chain’ (which contains several 
RFID systems each located at different distribution centres).  It is modelled 
separately from the real world layer as it represents the common environment and 
not the local environment of each RFID system (the local environment is represented 
in the real world layer).  If a single system is modelled, then the use of the ‘real 
world for interconnection’ is irrelevant.   
Strategic
Layer
RFID
Layer
Real World
Layer
Real World for Interconnection
System A System B
 
Figure 14 – The reference model depicting the major layers   
These are represented as horizontal separations around which minor layers can be decomposed to 
organise system elements.   
Within each of these major layers, the principle expounded in this model is that 
additional layers can be included.  To attain greater detail of the RFID layer, for 
example, any of the previous work on modelling RFID as layers could be used – 
provided they are layered.  These would include previous work on models based on 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers (Avoine and Oechslin 2005; Shepard 
2005) at the RFID layer.  As this model takes a broader view of what constitutes a 
system, it remains extensible to capture existing work on RFID systems modelling.  
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This is a feature which is not apparent in any previous work that was reviewed in 
Chapter 3.   
This model achieves hierarchy of layers, a key characteristic of RFID systems, as 
seen in previous work on RFID models (Garfinkel and Holtzman 2005; Ranasinghe 
and Cole 2008), by ensuring a strict ordering between the major layers.  It is assumed 
in this thesis, that the lowest layer is the real world layer, as all systems are going to 
have some sort of physical environment in which they operate.  Next, the RFID layer 
is modelled, as it would be implemented into a particular application environment.  
Finally, the strategic layer is modelled, as information goals can only be achieved on 
the basis of an RFID layer having been implemented into an application 
environment.  The concept of hierarchy via layers is therefore apparent in this model 
and is further explored in the next sections.   
5.2.1.1 REAL WORLD FOR INTERCONNECTION 
While not a layer which contains individual system elements, comparisons between 
RFID systems can be performed in this model on the basis of the real world for 
interconnection.  It is a fundamental concept which represents a common 
environment to all systems which are under an analysis.  An early representational 
concept for showing interconnection between systems can be found in the OSI model 
specification (Zimmermann 1980), and on the same basis, of representing 
interconnection between communication systems, this is reused in this model.  To 
illustrate this ability, two sets of layers are depicted: System A and System B.    
However, if a single RFID system was being analysed then only one set of layers, 
and hence system, need be used, as no comparison is being made.  
The ability to compare several RFID systems on the basis of common layers is a 
feature which is distinct in this model, due to the fact that this layer is included as 
distinct from the real world layer.  This enables the making of general comparisons 
between systems.  Rotter (2008) has attempted to achieve this comparison in his 
model using various system properties such as ‘openness’.  However, not every 
system can be evaluated on the basis of only a few criteria.  As the only commonality 
amongst systems in the proposed model here is the system layers, the advantage 
imparted is that systems can be compared across any layer, and hence, any system 
property can be utilised during analysis.    
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5.2.1.2 REAL WORLD LAYER 
The real world layer contains a system’s local application environment and its 
characteristics.  Local application environments can include: supply chain 
‘custodians’, ‘zones’ in a toll way, or ‘rooms’ in a building.  Depending on the level 
of abstraction needed, characteristics could be modelled using geometric concepts 
like those defined by a coordinate system such as the global positioning system 
(GPS).  Other elements in the local application could also be modelled and may 
include: physical entities, movement constraints, or rules of interaction between 
objects.  The advantage is that consideration can be given to the influences the local 
environment has on the RFID system.   
It is worth noting that the real world layer is distinguished from the physical layer 
which has appeared in previous work (Mitrokotsa et al. 2008, 2009).  Previous work 
referred to a physical instantiation of RFID components, whereas the real world layer 
in the proposed model captures the physical environment and components relevant to 
the system but which are not RFID components (for example: physical entities).  
This allows the model to capture more of the constraints imposed by the physical 
environment when compared to that of previous work (Mitrokotsa et al. 2008, 2009).  
This is an important feature in an RFID security model, as often RFID 
implementations are largely governed by physical constraints in the real world.  For 
RFID security, this could be the factor determining whether a system is designed 
properly, and potentially more secure, or poorly designed and thus potentially less 
secure.   
5.2.1.3 RFID LAYER 
The RFID layer captures the RFID technology which broadly constitutes what 
previous work has always focused on as constituting the RFID system – recall this 
heavy RFID focus from Chapter 3.  In the proposed model, tags and readers operate 
at this layer through radio frequency and anti-collision protocols, as does the 
middleware which links the RFID technology to the rest of a company’s information 
systems.  As this model takes a broader view of what constitutes an RFID system, 
RFID technology is contained in a single layer, which downplays the influence of the 
technology on analysis.  What is provided here is a balance between the RFID 
technology and the physical and strategic layers.   
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The representation of the RFID layer as the centre layer of the proposed model is 
intentional.  It conveys an overarching concept generally expounded by RFID - that 
RFID bridges the physical world to the digital world of a company.  In previous 
work, for example Mitrokotsa et al. (2008, 2009), this central role that RFID plays 
has not been depicted as centralised, to some extent downplaying the centrality of the 
RFID system between the environment and enterprise.  Conversely, in this model, as 
the RFID layer is the central layer, it suggests that RFID security should be 
considered central to the analysis task, and yet at the same time, RFID should be 
considered in the context of applications and the information goals of the company.  
Thus, this addresses the perception that previous work has appeared to focus more on 
RFID technology (see Chapter 3). 
As the reference model has been derived using layered decomposition, more layers 
can be used to attain granularity.  For the RFID layer, this is where the use of 
previous work on RFID layers (Avoine and Oechslin 2005; Shepard 2005; 
Mitrokotsa et al. 2008) could be introduced.  Also, representations from previous 
work that have taken less formal approaches to layers (Hassan and Chatterjee 2006), 
could be included.  This can be achieved not by decomposing the major layers into 
finer layers, rather, simply inserting the less structured representations, such as 
taxonomies, inside the major layer.   
Centrality of this layer in the model and its intended further decomposition into 
minor layers, addresses limitations which are apparent in previous work, whilst 
ensuring that it remains specific to modelling RFID systems.  For these reasons, the 
replacement of the RFID layer for a more generic ICT layer is not expected and its 
possible general use is beyond the scope of this thesis.     
5.2.1.4 STRATEGIC LAYER 
The strategic layer captures the information goals of the company which implements 
an RFID system.  If a general approach to analysis is taken, then this layer can 
capture the generic information goals of RFID.   
The concept of a strategic layer has been obtained from Mitrokotsa et al. (2008, 
2009).  In their model, the strategic layer captured various system properties, such as: 
costs vs. utility tradeoffs, logistical factors, and real world constraints.  In this 
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alternative model, however, the concept of a strategic layer focuses on the 
information goals of the system’s owner e.g. the company.   
In doing so, through the introduction of a real world layer, the model further 
differentiates itself from the work of Mitrokotsa et al. (2008, 2009) as it leaves the 
logistical factors or real world constraints to the real world layer.  It also leaves 
concepts like cost and utility tradeoffs to the discretion of the specific application 
which is being analysed through the model, choosing not to put these into the model.  
These values would be instantiated from specific analysis techniques.  Consequently, 
it is therefore differentiated from Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) who chose to include these 
values in the model.  The benefit of the approach expounded in the proposed model 
is that these values can be left to vary amongst actual system implementations, 
ensuring the model remains generic.  These are derived when specific analysis 
methods are integrated into the model.   
To this end, the example information goals for the strategic layer, suggested in this 
thesis, are the two proposed by Hassan and Chatterjee (2006): authorisation and 
monitoring.  They have proposed information as sourced from RFID systems, to be 
used for monitoring or authorisation purposes.  Both goals can be attained from the 
RFID layer with no change to the underlying system.  Consequently, the decoupling 
of the strategic layer from the RFID layer, in this model, ensures appropriate de-
emphasis on the reliance on the RFID layer in achieving strategic layer goals.  This 
has an advantage over the model proposed by Rotter (2008), as the information goals 
in his model are largely fixed to the two criteria used to classify systems, whereas the 
proposed model can define any information goals a proponent chooses.   
To summarise, this model uses horizontal system layers to capture system properties.  
Advantages are achieved over previous work as only three major, but relatively 
abstract, layers are presented – meaning less detail is fixed in system representation.  
To attain more detail, these layers can be decomposed using previous layered 
decompositions e.g. the OSI model at the RFID layer.  Thus, the model is relatively 
extensible.  The alignment of two system types enables comparisons to be made 
between systems on the basis of any layer due to the real world layer for 
interconnection.  Finally, placing the RFID layer as the central layer indicates the 
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‘whole of system’ approach, across layers, is a balance between RFID, the real world 
and strategic information goals.   
5.2.2 PARTITIONS  
Vertical partition properties, depicted in Figure 15, capture the security concepts 
which have featured in previous work which was reviewed in Chapter 3: standard 
operations, threats (problems), and solutions.  While not explicitly a structure which 
has appeared in previous RFID security models, partitions in this model are used to 
demarcate across the system layers, the threats and solutions which are associated 
with standard system operations.  Thus, the paradigm expounded in this model is that 
in order to consider a threat, or solution, one must also consider what is standard for 
a system.   
One could perceive the columns used by Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) to be partitions, 
however, these are not partitions in the same sense, as their model’s columns do not 
represent distinct independent concepts that span all system layers.  That is potential 
damage, attack cost, class of tag, solution-cost – all columns used in their model, 
depend on the attack column.  Conversely, in the proposed model, partitions are 
complete security concepts, distinct from attributes which pertain to parts of a system 
or parts of security.  This has the advantage of indicating that security concepts 
should be considered across all system layers. 
In the proposed model, a partition divides the RFID domain using concepts relevant 
to security in RFID systems.  To this end, the standard operating partition captures 
systems operating as intended by a company.  The problem partition captures threats 
against a system.  Finally, the solution partition captures any form of analysis which 
attempts to address threats in the context of systems.  The use of partitions is a novel 
feature to RFID security representational approaches, and it will be illustrated that 
the primary advantage they impart is the ability to analyse security in a manner more 
linked to a system’s properties. 
It is worth noting that in this section, partitions are explained without reference to the 
horizontal system layer property – except for the inclusion of the real world for 
interconnection - to make clear the difference between layer and partition concepts.  
The next section will discuss how properties have been integrated.   
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Figure 15 – The reference model depicting the major partitions  
Partitions are modelled as vertical separators which span the full length of the layers enabling security 
concepts to be considered across the whole system. 
 
As partitions have not appeared to such extent in previous work on RFID security 
models, the theoretical basis for their inclusion is briefly explained.  Chapter 3 
showed that it was often the case that systems in a normal mode of operation were 
discussed along with the threats and solutions which modify these standard 
operations.  Partitions are a way of aligning these concepts in a single model.  As 
they all pertain to the RFID domain, the RFID domain is demarcated from end to end 
by each security concept, as security is relevant to all ends of an RFID system.   
The concept of layers is grounded in the real world for interconnection as a way of 
comparing systems.  Partitions are a way of determining whether systems are 
compatible with security concepts.  Having modelled the partitions of various 
systems and at each layer, comparisons can be made on the basis of each system’s 
constituent parts.  For example, taking several custodians’ RFID systems in a supply 
chain, which share a common interconnection, one could analyse their standard 
operating partition to establish whether differences in operation exist, or 
alternatively, whether a solution in one system, would work in another system which 
was connected to the first system.  Systems can be compared on the basis of what is 
constituted in each of their partitions and across each layer in a partition.  Thus, a 
benefit of partitions is that comparisons can be made between system concepts to 
establish similarity of security.   
This feature of the proposed model has not appeared to this level of detail when 
compared to previous work.  Rotter (2008) has appeared to suggest that all systems 
of a particular system class are the same, however, they clearly differ along element 
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configurations resulting in different security classifications.  The opposite was 
represented by Mitrokotsa et al. (2010), as they did not discriminate which solutions 
are feasible for particular application domains, appearing to suggest that a generic 
applicability exists.  Consequently, the advantage imparted by the proposed model is 
that it can compare general system properties as well as specific systems. 
Having provided a brief overview of the theoretical underpinnings of the partition 
property, each of the major partitions is now explained.   
5.2.2.1 STANDARD OPERATING PARTITION 
The standard operating partition captures the intended operating principles of RFID 
systems.  This is where the standard domain components are modelled, such as in a 
domain model.  As such it would be possible to subsume previous representations of 
RFID components in this part of the model.  For example, the model proposed by 
Hassan and Chatterjee (2006), which has depicted different RFID components, could 
be inserted here as this partition is concerned with valid operations.  Although their 
model depicts a taxonomic representation, the overlaying of these components over 
layers is not being considered in this section.  This is discussed during the integration 
property later in this chapter.   
5.2.2.2 PROBLEM PARTITION 
The problem partition captures the security problems which affect RFID components 
which have featured in the standard operating partition.  These are usually the threats 
such as those threats reviewed in Chapter 2.   
Like the previous partition, as a relatively high level of abstraction of partitions is 
used, this partition can subsume previous work on threats.  In Chapter 3, Thompson 
et al. (2006) illustrated that threats can be listed using threat analysis methods.  This 
partition is where such a threat analysis would take place and the results situated.  
The improvement imparted by this model, over previous work, in particular the work 
by Rotter (2008) and Mitrokotsa et al. (2010), is that threat analysis if done in this 
partition, is automatically aligned with the standard operating partition and the 
solution partition, as partitions are aligned with each other.  Thus, the context of 
actual systems is taken into account during threat analysis.   
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5.2.2.3 SOLUTION PARTITION 
The solution partition captures the security solutions which could be implemented in 
the RFID domain.  This is where all solutions for RFID security could be analysed, 
or alternatively specific solutions to different threats in the neighbouring partition 
could be aligned.  Later in this thesis, ‘whole of system’ analysis towards solutions is 
illustrated using simulation, suggesting solution analysis can occur over system 
layers, and be aligned to threats and standard operations – a principle expounded in 
this thesis.   
Conversely, Chapter 3 showed that previous work has not integrated the depiction of 
the relationships between solutions, the threats, and the standard operations of 
systems.  This was a major shortcoming apparent in many previous attempts at 
modelling RFID security.  However, this is something this model achieves natively.  
The advantage of depicting the solution partition last is that it imparts the suggestion 
that all solutions should be grounded in these earlier partitions.  That is, one must 
give consideration to the solutions in relation to threats and the system in which 
threats and solutions are to be situated.   
This is a point of difference over previous work by Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) that 
appeared to suggest the direct coupling of solutions to threats as the primary 
approach to take.  The improvement is that direct coupling is only suggested as 
feasible when a basis exists in the standard operating partition.  For example, if 
encryption is recommended in the solution partition, then there should be an 
associated threat in the problem partition, and moreover, the standard operating 
partition should have the necessary components which are under attack, but may also 
support the solution in some way at the tag layer.  Thus, this model enables not only 
the encapsulation of generic security information, but also the modelling of specific 
systems for the derivation of specific system security information.   
The use of partitions enables system and security interrelationships to be considered 
across concepts (domain, problem, solution) during the analysis of security in RFID 
systems – a requirement which became apparent in Chapter 2.   
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5.2.2.4 MINOR PARTITIONS 
Layers can be decomposed to attain greater detail.  Similarly, partitions can be 
decomposed into minor partitions.  As partitions are an additional concept for 
representational approaches to RFID security, this section illustrates several minor 
partitions to show how partition decomposition can proceed    
Figure 16 depicts the standard operating partition with the inclusion of three minor 
partitions.  These have organised the standard components to consider: the 
components, their associations with each other, and the information which can be 
gained through their interactions, as separate concepts.  These were derived using the 
various analysis methods discussed in Chapter 4, however, this section of the thesis 
backtracks slightly in order for the later chapters to make sense.  Three minor 
partitions are introduced: components, associations, and features.  The elements of 
these minor partitions will be further explored in the next chapter.   
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Figure 16 - The reference model showing minor partitions 
These minor partitions are vertical decompositions of the major partitions as a way of achieving more 
security detail.   
 
The components partition comprises the logical view of the RFID domain such as: 
physical entities; tags; readers; middleware; and a system’s information goals.  It 
focuses on the representation of discrete objects which would have attributes and 
operations.  For example, in a pharmaceutical supply chain, in the real world layer, a 
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component would be a drug entity, whereas, at the RFID layer, a component would 
be a tag or reader.  Thus, each object would have a logical template from which it is 
instantiated in this minor partition.  In the next chapter Object Oriented Analysis 
(OOA) and the Unified Modelling Language (UML) (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004; 
Maciaszek and Liong 2005) are used to represent the components of this minor 
partition.     
The associations partition comprises the data view which emerges when components 
in the component partition interact.  These associations could be permanent 
associations if objects are associated with each other for the duration of their lifetime 
– such as the assembly of ingredients of a drug entity – or they could be temporary 
associations – such as the association which forms when a physical entity introduces 
a tag entity to a reader entity.  In the next chapter, a formalisation of these 
associations for the RFID data layer will be introduced using Entity-Relationship 
Diagram (ERD) methods (Pressman 2000).   
Finally, the feature partition represents metrics which can be constructed from the 
data associations between components in the previous two partitions.  While there 
could be observable features at any of the layers, the next chapter will demonstrate 
the advantages which are imparted when features are constructed at the data layer.  
Manual knowledge driven feature construction approaches (Wnek and Michalski 
1994) will be used to derive new features without the need to add additional systems 
context,  illustrating how this partition can be analysed.   
In this way the integration of minor partitions serves to enhance the granularity of 
analysis. 
5.2.2.5 ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLES OF THE MODEL IN MINOR 
PARTITION ORDERING 
The decomposition of minor partitions follows a simple principle that minor 
partitions should be abstracted such that the left-most minor partition is the most 
concrete, and the right-most partition is the most abstract.  For example, for the 
standard operating partition: the association partition emerges from the components 
partition, and the feature partition emerges from the association partition.   
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In this way, what is analysed occurs across increasing levels of abstraction – from 
the most concrete concepts (the extreme left) to the most abstract concepts (the 
extreme right).  This is illustrated in Figure 17 through the use of arrows which are 
directed from the bottom left corner to the top-most right corner, and vice versa.   
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Partition
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Figure 17 - The inclusion of minor-partitions follows an abstraction paradigm 
Abstraction of details across the minor partitions should be from most specific to least specific in 
order to facilitate abstraction across system layers.   
The reason for this depiction is now explained.  If one was to examine a major 
partition which had been decomposed using minor partitions, with the inclusion of 
layers, it would be apparent that in examination from the real world layer’s bottom 
left-most corner, to the strategic layer’s top-most right corner, a diagonal direction 
would be followed.  This convention is intended to convey the degree of abstraction 
of RFID systems.  That is, some systems abstract the environment more in terms of 
the number of layers between the real world layer and strategic layer – the Electronic 
Product Code (EPC) system which uses the Object Name Services (ONS) is one such 
system (Ranasinghe et al. 2008) – the ONS is a data layer which fits over the RFID.  
Thus, this model has a strong representational basis for actual RFID systems – a 
feature which was not facilitated by previous work examined in Chapter 3.   
Consequently, this could mean that consideration can be given to whether a threat is 
dealt with close to the source or destination.  For example, systems which exhibit 
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many layers and partitions between the source of attack and the attack destination, 
could offer more points for security solutions, in addition to more points of attack.  
This approach to abstraction is a feature unique to this model when compared to 
previous work. 
To briefly summarise, the use of a vertical partition property strongly distinguishes 
this reference model from previous work.  Partitions enable the separation of 
independent but related security concepts – standard operations, threats, and 
solutions.  The advantage imparted is that security is analysed across three major 
concepts in a system, making analysis more structured than if just threats or solutions 
were to be considered without relation to one another.   
5.2.3 INTEGRATING LAYERS AND PARTITIONS  
The integration of layer and partition properties enables a closer comparison 
between the RFID system and RFID security.  This was a major shortcoming which 
was apparent in previous work which was reviewed in Chapter 3.  This section 
explains how integration addresses this shortcoming, and consequently, makes 
possible a ‘whole of system’ approach to the analysis of security in RFID systems.   
The integrated layered and partitioned reference model is reintroduced in Figure 18, 
in its complete form.  In this diagram it can be seen that the layers have been divided 
using the partitions.  This is where the integration of these properties is depicted.  
Although there is a small separation between the layers, the partitions span all the 
layers, thereby enabling the derivation of security concepts under a single partition, 
across all three major layers.   
To this end, the standard operating partition should be thought of as spanning the 
strategic layer, RFID layer, and the real world layer.  The minor partitions have 
been included in the diagram; however, the use of these minor partitions is only 
illustrative of this integration concept – minor layers are in effect optional.  
Similarly, the use of the OSI layers at the RFID layer has not been depicted; however 
these could be added when the model is applied to real analysis problems.  The rest 
of this section expounds the reasons for this integration.    
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Figure 18 - The integrated layered and partitioned reference model 
The model is reintroduced in this section having explained the properties of layers and partition 
separately.   
Integration makes it possible to analyse partition concepts across layers of an RFID 
system.  For example, the standard operating partition can model: the physical 
entities and physical constraints at the real world layer; at the RFID layer (the RFID 
components such as tags and readers, anti-collision and other protocols); and at the 
strategic layer (the information goals of the company whether these are monitoring 
or authorisation).  Integration enables ‘whole of system’ analysis in each partition 
across system layers.   
Through the integration of both properties, it is possible to consider RFID and 
security concepts collectively.  For example, the standard operating partition can be 
used to consider how the strategic layer information goals of monitoring or 
authorisation are being facilitated by the RFID components, and whether these 
components are integrated within the real world layer adequately to achieve these 
information goals.  For the other partitions, the same approach can be used to take a 
systematic view of the concepts they represent.   
An approach which considers interrelationships is enabled as the major partitions are 
aligned to each other.  Comparisons can be made between partitions but at different 
layers.  For example, the solution partition could model solutions at the strategic 
layer, and these could be compared to the problems which occur at the same layer of 
the problem partition.  Whether modelled solutions and problems are in fact feasible 
or relevant to a system could be ascertained by modelling the standard operating 
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partition at the strategic layer as well.  Thus, integration of layers and partitions 
facilitates a ‘whole of system’ approach to the analysis of security in RFID systems.   
It is therefore possible to compare partitions to each other across all of the system 
layers.  Integrated security analysis is therefore achievable.  Questions can be 
proposed and answered along the lines of:   
• How can solutions at the strategic layer address threats which occur in the 
RFID layer in an actual system?   
• How will the choice of anti-collision protocols influence which threats may 
be possible in a system? 
• How will a system’s real world layer influence which attacks are feasible in 
the RFID layer? 
To this end, the integration of layers and partitions enables effective security 
requirements analysis to be undertaken.  It would be possible to consider security 
questions which are created across all facets of the system rather than on individual 
components. 
5.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced an alternative model for the analysis of security using a 
‘whole of system’ approach.  It was constructed using the reference model paradigm 
reviewed in Chapter 4.  It is distinguished from previous work (see Chapter 3) on the 
basis of integrated layer and partition properties, and has therefore been entitled, An 
Integrated Layered and Partitioned Reference Model.  The integration of these 
properties is expected to be more conducive to a ‘whole of system’ approach to 
analysis when compared to the examples of previous work.   
Recall that there were some apparent limitations on previous work which the design 
and intended use of the proposed model addresses.  The model proposed by Rotter 
(2008) does not appear to be suitable for analysis beyond several system properties.  
Conversely, the model proposed by Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) allows for the use of 
security principles and attributes only within individual layers, thereby reducing its 
generality.   
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As it seems that previous work has been localised to specific system properties, 
which has the drawback of missing the interrelationships which are relevant 
throughout the ‘whole system,’ the concept of integrating layers and partition 
properties was introduced in the proposed model. 
The horizontal system layer property captures system components at a relatively 
high level of abstraction.  One advantage is the ability to encapsulate previous work 
within representations of system layers.  The organisation of these layers, with the 
RFID layer in the centre, suggests that RFID is a central concept, but should be 
viewed in conjunction with the real world layer and the strategic layer.  Conversely, 
the partition property facilitates a means of analysing security in the RFID domain.  
Partitions demarcate the domain such that solutions can be evaluated against 
particular threats, in particular system contexts.  The organisation of layers, from the 
least abstract to the most abstract imparts the principle that analysis is based on what 
a system functionally supports.  Attacks and solutions are then related to the systems 
functions.   
The integration of layer and partition properties provides an option to use the model 
for complete ‘whole of system’ analysis of security.  Whether analysis has proceeded 
per layer or partition, the outcomes of analysis through the model should mean that 
an effective view of security can been taken.  The discussion in Chapter 2 suggested 
that could be a desirable approach to take, as cloning and constraints have system 
wide influences.  Integration allows all of these interrelationships to be taken into 
consideration during analysis.   
The following chapters will illustrate that when this model is used, structured 
security analysis can be achieved: 
• Chapter 6 illustrates how analysis using the standard operating partition 
facilitates the enumeration of system elements into a domain model. 
• Chapter 7 illustrates how analysis using the problem partition enables 
systematisation of attacks. 
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• Chapter 8 introduces a simulator model and demonstrates through its use the 
benefits of taking a systems approach to solution analysis in the solution 
partition. 
• Chapter 9 demonstrates, through experimentation, how the model facilitates 
systems analysis prior to solution deployment.   
• Chapter 10 validates the ‘whole of system’ approach in the context of the 
specific example of a pharmaceutical supply chain.   
The work presented in these chapters will show that the reference model improves on 
previous work by providing more structured security analysis.   
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to facilitate analysis of security ‘whole of system’, the broad constituent 
elements of the system should first be established.  In this chapter, this is done within 
the standard operating partition of the reference model.  This partition is for 
modelling the standard operations of RFID systems: How this can be achieved is 
explored when generic elements of the system’s internal boundaries are enumerated 
as a domain model.  As a ‘whole of system’ approach is applied to this task, it is 
necessary to make use of methods which are capable of enumerating system 
elements in a structured manner across system layers.  Pressman (2000) argues that if 
you want to use a systems approach, you should start with a model which is a 
representation of the processes, behaviours, inputs and linkages of the system in 
question – this is the area to be explored in this chapter.   
Strategic
Layer
RFID
Layer
Real World
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Standard Operating
Partition
Problem
Partition
Solution 
Partition
Standard Operating
Partition
Problem
Partition
Solution
Partition
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Figure 19 – Analysis of the standard operating partition 
This chapter illustrates how a domain model can be produced when systematic methods are applied 
across the layers within this partition.   
 
In Chapter 3, in addition to the architectures proposed by previous work, some work 
had identified components at various layers.  Work by Hassan and Chatterjee (2006) 
illustrated a taxonomy of system components and sub-components, whereas work by 
Glover and Bhatt (2006) represented some RFID and other components.  When 
considering these examples it seems that they have identified various objects and 
where they are located in system, and their relation to other components; however, 
they have not appeared to identify the standard operations of objects.  These 
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operations are the functions each object initiates to perform its role in the system.  
One must understand how interrelationships emerge between components, through 
component operations and interactions, in order to understand security ‘whole of 
system.’  Conversely, work on security models has discussed general system 
components but not applied this analysis in a domain model.  Therefore, integrating a 
model of the domain within the reference model would provide a basis for analysing 
security in a systems context.   
To this end, in this chapter the standard operating partition and its minor partitions 
are analysed and this is illustrated in Figure 19.  It defines a logical view of 
components by focussing on the major system components, their attributes, and 
operations.  As RFID is a system which produces data, when components have 
interacted, it will also define a model of associations and features, thereby providing 
a data view.  This work will introduce the concept of an RFID domain model, and in 
the later chapters, will use this when analysing the other partitions of the reference 
model.     
6.2 COMPONENTS PARTITION 
In this section, the standard components which are common to RFID systems are 
enumerated using Object Oriented Analysis (OOA), and these are modelled using the 
Unified Modelling Language (UML) in a class diagram (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004; 
Maciaszek and Liong 2005).  As described in Chapter 5, the component partition is 
the demarcation within the reference model’s standard operating partition which 
contains the logical components of the RFID domain.  The major RFID components 
considered here are: tags, readers, and database (Glover and Bhatt 2006).  Several 
additional components are included: zone and physical entity.  These have emerged 
from previous work which has considered a broad view of systems (Mitrokotsa et al. 
2008, 2009).  They are included to achieve a broader view of the system at the real 
world layer and strategic layer.   
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Using the UML notation for class diagrams, each type of RFID component is 
represented as an object class.  The properties of a component have been generalised; 
these describe properties found as common to a number of actual systems.  The focus 
is on the physical representation at the layers in which these exist.  The process in 
deriving the generalisations was driven by the question; what constitutes the object?  
The constituent parts of an object are represented as: an attribute which contains 
state values of a component; and operations which encapsulate functions that a 
component can perform to derive a new attribute value.  For example, every 
component in a system should have a name attribute which is unique to the RFID 
system – a tag serial number is one such name value common to tag components.  
An example of a valid operation for a reader is the read operation – when the reader 
queries the environment for tags.  In the case of tag cloning, a tag could derive a new 
name when an attacker reprograms it with a different serial number – this would be 
achieved using a clone operation.  The rest of this section expands on the class 
diagram.   
6.2.1 COMPONENTS 
This section describes the major components in their standard operational form.  
Figure 20 shows the class diagram for the five components of the component 
partition.  These components are: zone, physical entity, tag, reader, and database.  
They were selected across the three major layers of the reference model to show the 
hierarchical operations that lead to the production of output data.  Other components 
could have been considered, but were not, such as antennas, anti-collision protocols, 
and other middleware.  These are depicted in representations, such as those by 
Hassan and Chatterjee (2006), however, the major components here are chosen to 
focus on the major characteristics.   
6.2.1.1 ZONE 
A zone (Figure 21) represents the physical space within which an RFID application 
is situated.  Often the concept of a zone is referred to as the entire application 
environment; however, in this section a zone is introduced as a single location which 
is monitored by RFID components.  This distinguishes it from the application 
environment which contains a number of zones, and also without RFID.   
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Figure 21 - Zone component 
 
Numerous examples of zones exist in the literature: a dock door that is inside a 
warehouse; a toll gate along a toll road; a doorway inside a building; or abstract 
space around components situated on a forklift in a warehouse (Glover and Bhatt 
2006).  In addition to containing RFID components, usually a zone will constrain the 
movement of components in some way.  A doorway, for example, could only open in 
one direction.  Additional properties could be derived by a zone, from other zones, 
which introduce further constraints.  A doorway, for example, could be only 
accessible via a series of other doors, or the RFID system could impose restrictions 
on individual tags based on the serial number contained on the tag and permissions 
of a policy database.   
To this end, a zone is constituted by a number of attributes and operations which 
reflect its role for spatial demarcation.  A zone is typically distinguishable from other 
zones within an overall zone through a zone_serial_number attribute which is its 
unique name.  For example, different warehouses in a supply chain could have their 
own names, or different sectors in a building can be named differently.  If the zone 
specifies a permission policy then an authorisation_level attribute can be used to 
dictate the level of authorisation physical entities, and hence their tags have to attain 
in order to gain access to it.  In this section, a zone is assumed to perform a single 
major role, in that it enforces policy for the strategic goals of the system.   
The concept of authorisation is modelled as the authorise_physical_entity operation.  
This represents the checking of entity credentials, perhaps through RFID tags which 
identify the physical entity to the system, and also the actuation of mechanisms 
which enforce authorisation such as locks on doorways.  In this case, a zone works in 
conjunction with an RFID system to establish the presence of a physical entity 
through tags, establishing the permission of that tag through the reader, and 
associated permissions stated by the company, prior to it enforcing such access 
controls. 
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6.2.1.2 PHYSICAL ENTITY 
A physical entity (Figure 22) represents a physical object in a zone.  A physical 
entity could be an object which is of interest to the system, for example, a product or 
human.  This concept comes from various examples which have considered the 
system to be more than just RFID technology.  It could be a component which is 
used to constitute a larger component.  The ingredients in pharmaceuticals would be 
an example of this object relationship.  Conversely, it could be some object in the 
application environment which is of no direct interest to the system, however which 
in some way influences how other objects work.  The primary interest for RFID 
security should be limited to entities directly influential in the RFID system.   
 
Figure 22 - Physical entity component 
 
As the physical entity represents a tangible object in the application environment, the 
attribute and operations reflect its physical characteristics.  A physical entity’s 
attributes are used to establish an entity’s profile in a system.  As a system could 
contain many physical entities, the concept of an identifier, the 
physical_entity_serial_number attribute, is used to distinguish physical entities.  It 
could be possible to distinguish physical entities based on existing names.  For 
example, people in a system could have names which identify them, and similarly 
pharmaceutical products contain a product name as well as a manufacturer name 
such as the Trizivir drug manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline (O'Connor 2006).  
However, the desire to use RFID in systems indicates that some systems otherwise 
lack the ability to assign such identifiers, or in the least have the system establish 
them, as the entity is not capable of communicating the name to the system. 
The type attribute is used to specify the entity class from which the entity is 
instantiated.  Some systems could instantiate entities from a common template – 
pharmaceutical drugs are one such system, as many drugs are manufactured to a 
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single specification, a batch, or dosage strength.  The concept of a class defines a 
range of specificity for instantiated entities.  As the physical entity is assumed to be 
capable of acting independently of other objects, other attributes model the ability to 
move in the system: speed_minimum, speed_average, speed_maximum.  Also, a 
move_type attribute models whether a physical entity could move in a deterministic 
or stochastic manner. 
The operations of a physical entity model the valid movements within zones.  The 
move operation models how the physical entity can move from one location towards 
another location using the values instantiated in its speed attribute.  The exact 
underlying steps involved in moving are hidden away in this operation; it is 
sufficient to model that there is a concept of movement.  A physical entity could also 
be associated or disassociated with other physical entities, and hence move in 
conjunction with them, which is reflected in the attach_physical_entity and 
detach_physical_entity operations.  These operations would therefore signify the 
composition or decomposition of several entities, and thus, whether entities were 
affected by each other’s behaviour.  A group of products on a pallet is an example of 
several disparate entities being combined to form a single entity, in which case, the 
products would inherit the movement behaviours of the pallet.   
Thus, individual physical entities form the conceptual building blocks of all objects 
within an RFID system, while the concept of zones represents the environment in 
which these physical entities exist.  This establishes that the RFID system is not 
some ethereal system – rather it is grounded in a physical environment, and hence, 
subject to the rules governing the environment.  In addition, this is why the reference 
model includes a separate real world of interconnection layer and real world layer, 
and hence, this component identifies objects at these layers.   
6.2.1.3 RFID TAG 
A tag (Figure 23) represents an electronic device that acts as a surrogate for a 
physical entity by broadcasting a unique serial number using radio signals (Glover 
and Bhatt 2006).  It is distinguished from other automatic identification technologies, 
like barcodes, on the basis that it communicates a unique serial number or identifier 
and does this using radio signals and without requiring line of sight.   
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Although some RFID readers can perform tag operations, this model distinguishes a 
tag from a reader as a device which simply broadcasts data into the air.  The focus is 
on passive tags which are powered using passive methods.  Tags of this type include 
the Electronic Product Code (EPC) Class-One Generation-Two type (EPCglobal 
2005).   
Other types of RFID tag exist – active tags are one such tag type – however, these 
are not as easy to generalise, as what constitutes an active tag can be difficult to 
define.  Mobile phones, for example, could be a type of active tag, as they use an 
onboard power source and they use radio signals to broadcast an Extended Service 
Set Identifier (ESSID), which is a type of serial number.  Mobile phones these days 
also come with Near-Field-Communication (NFC) technologies which enable them 
to act as short range RFID tags and readers simultaneously.  To maintain simplicity, 
the model is limited to passive tags; however, as the model is extensible, active tags 
could be modelled with more investigation. 
 
Figure 23 - Tag component 
 
The attributes of a tag reflect its surrogacy role in RFID systems.  For most RFID 
systems, it is important that every tag is unique, and therefore, in the model a tag has 
an attribute which stores a unique serial number, the tag_serial_number attribute.  
Another name for the serial number is the Electronic Product Code (EPC) 
(Finkenzeller 2004), however, this is not used here as it is synonymous with the EPC 
standard.  A tag operates at a particular radio frequency to obtain power from a 
reader.  Whether it is powered by a reader or by an onboard power source, this is 
specified in the power_type attribute.  As this model is not capturing active tags, this 
could be used to signify that a tag is of interest as it is passive not active.  For passive 
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tags, those which obtain their power from a reader could be subject to a charge and 
discharge cycle which controls how quickly they dissipate power received from the 
reader.  To model this, a power_interval attribute is modelled.  To signify the 
maximum distance a tag can send back its tag serial number, a broadcast_range 
attribute has been modelled.  Clearly this simplifies the complex nature of radio 
frequency and the effect of environmental factors; however, including this attribute 
simplifies how a user conceptualises RFID under ideal conditions.  The last attribute, 
data_format represents the method by which data has been encoded in tag memory.   
Usually all tags are concerned with identifying themselves to the system using radio 
signals and unique serial numbers.  The variance in tag types comes from the ways in 
which these concepts are established in the system.  Passive tags achieve these by 
obtaining power from a reader, however consequently, are shorter range than active 
tags (Glover and Bhatt 2006).  Conversely, active tags have a greater read distance 
than passive tags, and can perform more complex operations.  To sidestep these 
complications, the model focuses on the principles which tags encapsulate.  A 
broadcast_serial_number operation models that a tag listens for requests and 
responds via its radio signals and a modulation scheme to a reader with its data. 
However, to undertake this operation, a tag has to be powered, in which case it will 
switch_on when it has sufficient power from a source.  Conversely a tag could 
switch_off once power has been dissipated.  These operations indicate the time 
period during which data can be obtained from a tag.   
Some operations are unique to some tag types and are briefly mentioned here.  As 
passive RFID is an imperfect technology, transmission errors or environmental 
interferences can disrupt transmission, a tag could fail, in which case the concept of a 
fail_to_respond operation models how errors are handled.  Sometimes tags can fail 
on purpose.  Some tag types such as the Electronic Product Code (EPC) come with 
an inbuilt self destruct command (known “Kill command” in EPC systems) which 
can permanently deactivate a tag  when it is no longer needed for use, or for security 
reasons (Glover and Bhatt 2006) – this has been represented as the kill_tag operation.   
6.2.1.4 RFID READER 
A reader (Figure 24) represents an electronic device in an RFID system that powers 
tags via radio signals – if it is a reader for passive tags - and also captures tag 
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responses over the air (Glover and Bhatt 2006).  A reader can also transfer received 
data, in the format of data records, to a database, usually located in the middleware.  
The concept of a reader is essentially a device which bridges the real world layer to 
the RFID layer as it performs these duel roles of reading tag data and transferring 
data to the middleware.  Sometimes readers can perform additional tasks such as 
filtering or aggregation of RFID data – a role which sees them remove duplicate 
records obtained in time windows to avoid overloading databases with data - 
however; these additional operations are not included here to ensure the model 
remains simple.  Sometimes these operations occur in other parts of the system – for 
example, Glover and Bhatt (2006) illustrated that filtering could occur in the 
middleware.  In general, a reader’s main operations are modelled, and other 
operations are left to future work.   
 
Figure 24 - Reader component 
 
To model the reader’s apparent duel role as the arbitrator of tag responses and a 
source of information for databases located in middleware, the reader has attributes 
which distinguish between these roles.  The reader_serial_number attribute 
identifies the reader from the other readers to which tags could interface when in 
range.  It could be that this identifier is also used to identify the reader on the 
network to databases.  The reader broadcasts signals at a particular radio frequency to 
identify tags of the same frequency.  News sources report that some modern readers, 
such as the ThingMagic Mercury, employ software defined radio capabilities and this 
means that some readers are more flexible in terms of the frequencies they can read 
(Collins 2004).  In such a case, this model would require additional fields, or a single 
field which signified the various frequencies across which these can operate.   
If the reader has the capability to distinguish several tags which are in its range 
simultaneously, then the reader will be using an anti-collision protocol (Glover and 
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Bhatt 2006).  The collision_avoidance_protocol attribute can be used to specify 
which algorithm is employed.  As a derivative of a reader’s anti-collision protocol 
and frequency, amongst other properties, the tag_read_rate attribute is the way of 
modelling the maximum number of tags that could potentially be identified within a 
time period by the reader.  It simplifies a series of complex operations, but would be 
a useful means of indicating a reader’s performance.   
The operations performed by a reader are contained in several relatively high level 
operations.  The check_if_tag_in_range operation represents the propagation of a 
carrier signal and capturing of tag responses.  Acquiring data from a tag is 
represented in the read_tag operation, as a tag could be powered, however, 
ultimately its appearance in a data log is at the discretion of the reader.  By no means 
does this capture the intricate set of steps which are performed by modern protocols 
such as the Class-One Generation-Two protocol (EPCglobal 2005); however, it does 
capture the final effect of a successful tag read, i.e. data is produced.   
The write_tag operation represents the act of transferring data to a tag.  To signify a 
reader’s ability to send any captured data from tags to the middleware, usually to a 
database, the append_data_to_database operation represents the act of transferring 
that data to a database.  Again, this could be a complicated process as databases 
could be located over vast networks like those which have been proposed in the 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) specification.  In this case, additional middleware 
services are involved, like the Object Name Service (ONS), in order for remote 
databases to be located, and EPC data records to be retrieved and updated.  The exact 
implementation of such operations is encodable in the operation, however, it remains 
hidden at this high level of abstraction.   
6.2.1.5 DATABASE 
The concept of a database (Figure 25) is the last component which has been 
modelled in the component partition.  It is perhaps the most abstract component, as it 
represents the repository of information which is produced from the RFID system.  
Databases can be complex components, however, in this model the role of the 
database is relatively simple – data flows into the database from the reader, and other 
components, perhaps those which exist in the middleware, retrieve data from the 
database.  This representation is taken from work by Glover and Bhatt (2006), which 
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modelled it as the destination of information flowing from tags and readers.  The 
difference is that this model does not discriminate where in the layers it may be 
located, as it could be at the RFID layer or the strategic layer depending on the level 
of information sharing in the system.   
 
Figure 25 - Database component 
 
As the model has assumed that a database is concerned with the storage and retrieval 
of data from RFID readers, readers must be able to be associated with a database.  To 
this end, the attach_reader operation is a way of connecting these components, while 
a detach_reader operation represents disconnection between these components.  
Sometimes these operations could be used by multiple readers as the database could 
be connected to multiple readers in a networked environment, for example.  To 
represent processes which could work on the data which is stored in a database, a 
delete_data operation and a run_query operation are modelled.  The exact nature of 
these operations is not specified as there could be any number of queries which could 
be performed.  Essentially these all represent ways in which information about the 
tagged entities in the real world by components above the database can be sourced.   
To summarise, this section has introduced a logical view of the major components 
which broadly constitute the component partition.  Using these generic object 
classes, depicted in UML, an RFID system could be modelled at a relatively high 
level.  The model focuses on standard operations as a way of describing what 
component functions are in a system.  This enables understanding about how 
interrelationships emerge when components initiate operations or interact with each 
other.  The next section considers the result of interactions in the logical view, which 
consequently, lead to RFID data being produced.   
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6.3 ASSOCIATIONS PARTITION 
The component partition contains the object classes from which components are 
instantiated.  The enumeration put forward in this chapter represents the objects as 
static constructs and consequently does not give any indication when these objects 
interact.  For RFID systems the concept of interaction between components is an 
integral process - interaction of tags and readers produces RFID data which is the 
basis for strategic level decision making.  It is the RFID data which is used by the 
system owner, e.g. a company, to determine if certain events have taken place in the 
real world.  However, before it is possible to think about what can be inferred from 
RFID data which has been produced when tags and readers have interacted, the next 
step is to consider the ways in which tag and reader components can interact.   
This section models the associations between tags and readers in the association 
partition.  It models potential ways in which associations may emerge at the RFID 
data layer, between RFID components.  As the data is generally assumed to be 
produced when a tag is at a reader, the associations which are modelled are 
representative of associations which have formed between a tag and reader, and at 
the layer below this, the real world layer, between entities which have tags and 
readers attached to them.  As the data is being modelled in an RFID database, this 
section applies the principles of entity-relationship modelling first expounded by 
Chen (1976) to model these tag/reader associations to define a data view.   
 
Figure 26 - RFID tag and reader associations 
These have been modelled using ERD multiplicity concepts.  A one-to-one (1:1) association is when 
one tag interacts with a single reader; other associations are built up from a 1:1 association when 
additional tags or readers are introduced or when anti-collision is used at a reader.  Thus, a 
hierarchical model is introduced to represent the ways that associations can form.   
 
Figure 26 introduces the concept of a taxonomy of tag and reader associations which 
can be found in RFID data which characterise underlying tag and reader 
relationships.  The rest of this section adapts the concept of multiplicity, in particular 
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the four standard multiplicity relationships (1:1, 1:M, M:1, and M:M), which exist in 
entity-relationship modelling, and shows that it is possible to model associations 
between tags and readers using the same multiplicity relationships.  The knowledge 
imparted through the use of these terms is a controlled vocabulary to describe RFID 
structures – a key concept useful in allowing end users to identify domain 
abstractions (Arango 1994).   
6.3.1 ONE-TO-ONE (1:1) ASSOCIATION 
A one-to-one (1:1) association, illustrated in Figure 27, is instantiated in RFID data 
when contact is made between one tag and one reader.  For example, a tag has 
responded to a reader’s read command, in which case, data has been obtained from 
the tag.  For the Mobilkom NFC payment system, which allows a mobile telephone 
to communicate with a single NFC-enabled cashier terminal to pay for goods 
(O'Connor 2005a), as the NFC-enabled telephone establishes a connection to only 
one cashier, and the cashier is capable of only one NFC telephone connection at a 
time, this is an example of a 1:1 association.  Each time an association is formed, in 
this case, an RFID data record containing a timestamp and the component serial 
numbers is instantiated at the reader.   
 
Figure 27 - One-to-one (1:1) association 
 
The rest of the associations build on the concept of a 1:1 association between a tag 
and reader, but introduce more facets of the system which are available to the 
database if it was to look across multiple data records and data sources.  
6.3.2 ONE-TO-MANY (1:M) ASSOCIATION 
A one-to-many association (1:M), illustrated in Figure 28, is instantiated in RFID 
data when a tag has made contact with several readers in sequence in the system.  
The tag has been read, for example, at a reader and has then moved to another reader 
which in turn has also read the same tag.  As these readers share a common database 
where they store their data, the database would be able to infer from the supplied 
data records, that the tag has been engaged with several readers over time.  
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An example of a 1:M association having been formed can be found in the 
Orlando/Orange County express way toll system which monitors vehicles via an 
RFID tag as vehicles travel along roadways which have readers mounted at certain 
locations (Swedberg 2004).  As a vehicle uses a tag, which contains a unique serial 
number, over time this tag would have appeared at several readers in sequence, as the 
vehicle travels along the roadway.   
 
Figure 28 - One-to-many (1:M) association 
 
In this association it is important to recognise that at each reader a 1:1 association is 
formed, however, from the perspective of the database which has knowledge of all 
the readers, a 1:M association can be inferred.  This is why the model shows 
associations in a hierarchical representation, as this representation depicts the 
concept that more complex associations are based on the basic 1:1 association. 
6.3.3 MANY-TO-ONE (M:1) ASSOCIATION 
Conversely, if a reader had several tags in front of it, and the reader is using an anti-
collision protocol – these enable multiple tags to be read simultaneously 
(Finkenzeller 2004) - then it is possible that a many-to-one (M:1) association is be 
formed.  This is illustrated in Figure 29.  The anti-collision protocol schedules each 
tag in the reader’s vicinity to respond according to a scheduled time (Aloha-based 
protocols) or when addressed individually through their tag serial numbers (Tree 
Walking based protocols).  Instead of every tag responding at the same time period, 
tags will respond according to how they have been scheduled, thereby avoiding 
collisions.  But the reader could examine all records within a time window at a reader 
to determine which tags were active, and hence, constitute a M:1 association.   
An example of this is the Dalsey Hillblom Lynn (DHL) Smart Box, which allows a 
physical entity to be identified via a tag when tagged entities are placed inside a 
container which contains a reader (Wessel 2007).  There are many tagged entities 
and only one reader in this example and is thus a M:1 association.   
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Figure 29 - Many-to-one (M:1) association 
 
As an anti-collision protocol allows many tags to communicate with a single reader 
at a time, conceptually, it is possible for a database to treat all tag data records as 
about a collection of tags, which in this section is termed a tag group.  The formation 
of a tag group could be considered to be random or non-random.  A random tag 
group is when an unrelated set of tagged entities arrives at a reader, such as when a 
group of vehicles congregate at a tollgate.  Conversely, a non-random tag group is 
formed when products are arranged purposefully, such as when products are 
arranged on a pallet or in packaging.  Recognising that tag groups are phenomenon 
reflected at the RFID layer through tag signals and also in RFID data, may allow for 
more effective recognition of groups in the real world.  
6.3.4 MANY-TO-MANY (M:M) ASSOCIATION 
A many-to-many association (M:M), illustrated in the full model in Figure 30, is 
instantiated in RFID data when a tag is read across several readers which are using 
anti-collision protocols, and thus, could have read other tags at the same time as this 
tag.  The M:M association subsumes all previous associations, and is thus, 
represented as the top-most association in the model.   
An example of where a M:M association can be found is in the International Paper 
RFID system which monitors physical entities when they are placed on a forklift 
(O'Connor 2005b); as there could be many tagged entities on a forklift and many 
forklifts with readers in warehouses, this is an example of a M:M association.   
 
Figure 30 - Many-to-many (M:M) association 
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A M:M association subsumes previous associations, while at the same time the 
structural properties of the system which have been built up can be decomposed to 
the most elementary 1:1 association.  At the elementary level each tag is 
communicating with a reader through a 1:1 association.  At the level of the M:1 
association, anti-collision places each tag into a collection of tags read 
simultaneously.  As a tag moves through a system, it could become a temporary 
member of tag groups at readers, or could already be in a fixed collection of tags.  
This movement through the system constitutes a 1:M association, while conformance 
to a collection of tags is a M:1 association.  At various times in the system, different 
associations are formed, and different information can be gleaned from tags.  The 
ability to glean such information is related to the system facilitating the 
establishment of these structures.   
Finally, within the taxonomy a controlled vocabulary has also emerged as a way of 
describing the clusters of object classes that can be identified.  Recall that Arango 
(1994) suggests that the derivation of a controlled vocabulary is beneficial to a 
domain model.  It assists one to understand the domain at an object and data level.  
The concept of having 1:1, 1:M, M:1, or M:M groups of tags and readers is 
supported by a description of how they are formed through spatial and temporal 
enablers.   
To summarise this section, what has essentially been described is a taxonomy of 
associations between tag and reader entities, enabled through the real world layer, 
but visible at the RFID layer in RFID data.  The taxonomy abstracts classes of 
entities, like that in an OOA diagram, as at one end very specific object classes can 
be identified, to the other end where very general object classes can be identified.  
These are visible at the data level due to the hierarchy and information flow in RFID 
systems.  These structures identify existing formations of tags and readers in systems 
- the advantage imparted here is the formalisation of these in a model.  Knowing 
these structures exist, and what they contribute, assists users in realising their effects 
in systems.   
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6.4 FEATURE PARTITION 
Having described the major components in the system, and the associations which 
can be formed between tags and readers from a database’s perspective, this section 
examines what information may be constructed from these associations.   
In this section features are derived for the above four tag/reader associations using a 
feature construction approach.  The approach taken can be likened to a knowledge 
driven approach (Wnek and Michalski 1994; Alfred 2008) where typically, features 
are formed on the basis of knowledge of associations between existing features.  As 
these approaches emerge from the machine learning domain, the term feature 
construction is maintained, although a systems analysis approach is taken here and 
the term is not necessarily common to this domain. 
In this section, the feature construction process begins when the simple RFID data 
features formed by a 1:1 association, are transformed into more complex features on 
the basis of associations built up from the 1:1 association.  For example, in a system 
which contains a 1:M association, whereby an instantiated tag is read across multiple 
readers, a feature which could be constructed is the speed at which the tag has 
travelled between these readers.  New features are constructed, and then they are 
inserted into the feature set for each association and used to construct further 
features.  The purpose of this is to expand the model of the domain in the standard 
operating partition’s data view.   
6.4.1 ONE-TO-ONE FEATURES 
Table 2 shows the elementary RFID data features common to tag and reader 
interactions (Finkenzeller 2004).  This thesis links these elementary features to the 
1:1 association as this association represents a single point of contact between a 
single tag and reader.  When a tag and reader have established a 1:1 association, 
these features would be instantiated with values for the tag and reader involved in the 
association.  Every time a tag is read, for example, a new tuple containing values for 
these features is instantiated inside a database for an RFID system.   
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Table 2  – Elementary features of a 1:1 association 
 
Feature Meaning 
tag_serial_number Serial number or identifier of tag such 
as its Electronic Product Code (EPC). 
reader_serial_number Serial number or identifier of reader 
session_timestamp Timestamp of when tag and reader 
interacted, such as through the read 
command. 
reader_operation The particular RFID reader operation 
performed on the tag such as a read or 
write. 
 
Table 3 shows the features which have been constructed when the elementary 
features of a 1:1 association are viewed from the perspective of a database.  As the 
database has a wider system view, it may aggregate individual data records to form 
new features.  For example, the total_number_of_tag_reads_at_reader feature could 
be constructed simply by counting the number of data records produced by a tag at a 
reader, although this would involve the database trawling its history of data records 
to achieve this goal.  Such a feature could be used to indicate the frequency of use of 
a particular tag at a reader.  These features pertain to an individual tag and reader 
instantiation and do not require any other component instances; therefore, they are 
still 1:1 features. 2 
Table 3 – Features of a 1:1 association 
 
Feature Meaning 
first_time_tag_seen First time the tag was read at any reader 
in the RFID data. 
total_number_of_tag_reads_at_reader Number of read operations, and hence 
data records produced, when tag and 
reader have interacted. 
session_duration A session could be a clear time frame 
when a tag was active at a reader. For 
example, all data records produced 
within a 10 second time window could 
constitute a session. 
time_since_last_seen_at_this_reader Time between successive data records 
being produced at same reader. 
 
As indicated in the association partition of the previous section, associations are 
hierarchical in nature which is why features which have been derived for subsequent 
associations from 1:1 associations.  These are discussed in the next sections, and are 
essentially compound features which arise when features are combined with spatial 
                                                 
2 Some of the feature tables here have been modified since their original publication in Mirowski, L., 
J. Hartnett and R. Williams (2009a). How RFID Attacks are Expressed in Output Data. Proceedings of 
the 10th International Symposium on Pervasive Systems, Algorithms and Networks (I-SPAN 2009), 
pp. 794-799. 
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or temporal characteristics made available by additions in the system such as the 
addition of different combinations of tags or readers, or anti-collision protocols – all 
of which are characteristics of the various associations. 
6.4.2 ONE-TO-MANY FEATURES 
Table 4 shows the features which have been constructed for a 1:M association.  From 
a database’s perspective, as it may have knowledge of a several readers, these 
features utilise its knowledge of the spatial distribution of readers in the system.  
Provided some data records have already been produced, the database could query 
the historical records to determine a tag’s speed.  To this end, several features which 
measure speed have been constructed.  The speed_of_tag feature for a tag would be 
calculated by calculating the time between two data records produced at different 
readers and dividing this value by the total distance travelled (provided this distance 
was known).  Another feature is the read_direction_of_tag feature.  If the sequence 
of readers is known in the system or the direction a tag can follow is directed, then it 
is possible to determine the direction value as forward or backward, for example.  In 
a supply chain, such a feature could be useful to indicate whether a tag, and hence 
the attached product, was moving in the correct direction.   
Table 4 - Features of a 1:M association 
 
Feature Meaning 
first_reader_tag_read_at Reader a tag first read at in the 
sequence of readers. 
current_reader_tag_at Reader a tag currently being read at 
time_between_all_readers_for_tag Time between tag read operations at 
first reader in the sequence of readers 
to the current reader.   
time_between_same_tag_at_different_readers The time between successive tag reads 
at current reader and a previous reader. 
E.g. subset of readers in the sequence. 
average_time_ 
between_readers_for_tag 
Average time between successive tag 
read operations at different readers. 
reader_order_for_tag Sequence of readers a tag was read at 
read_direction_of_tag Direction through a sequence of 
readers a tag travelled.  Either forward 
or backwards, provided the underlying 
application environment is directed. 
speed_of_tag Speed a tag travelled at, between 
current reader and a previous reader 
(assuming the distance travelled is 
known by the system). 
average_speed_of_tag Average speed tag travelled between 
current reader and a previous reader. 
total_distance_travelled_by_tag Total distance tag has travelled 
between a sequence of readers 
average_session_duration_ 
for_tag_at_all_readers 
Average duration of a read session 
across several readers 
previous_reader_tag_read_at The reader a tag was previously read at 
prior to this observation. 
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The above features introduce the concept that knowledge of the locations of readers 
by the database allows it to construct features about an entity’s movement in the 
system.   
6.4.3 MANY-TO-ONE FEATURES 
Table 5 shows the features which have been constructed for a M:1 association which 
is when many tags have been identified at a single reader at (effectively) the same 
time.  The group_read feature is the collection of tag_serial_numbers which are 
active at a reader within a time period.  The concept of the tag group emerges in this 
feature and members of the group are used to derive the other features.  Thus, 
group_number is a count of the unique tag_serial_number’s which are identified at a 
reader within a time period.  The group_first_tag is the first tag_serial_number, 
whereas the group_last_tag is the last tag to be identified.   
Table 5 - Features of a M:1 association 
 
Feature Meaning 
group_read The tag serial numbers of tags that 
appear within a time window at a 
reader. 
group_number Number of tag serial numbers found in 
a tag group. 
group_first_tag First tag in the group to be read at the 
reader. 
group_last_tag Last tag in the group to be read at the 
reader. 
difference_group_time A general category of features which 
could be derived by comparison of 
various features of tags in the group. 
 
As a M:1 association is made up of many 1:1 associations, in a time period, the 1:1 
features could be instantiated with values to compare tags within the tag group to 
each other.  For each tag to be compared, its 1:1 features are extracted and measured 
against those of its fellow group members.  This could indicate similarities or 
differences in how tags have interacted with readers in a system. 
6.4.4 MANY-TO-MANY FEATURES 
Up to this point, most features have been specific features which can be constructed 
from the individual 1:1 data records and associations.  As the concept of a M:M 
association subsumes all possible associations in an RFID system, likewise, the 
features of a M:M association subsume all previous features.  Consequently, to avoid 
Chapter 6 - The Standard Operating Partition and a Domain Model 
- 106 - 
repeating unnecessary information, Table 6 shows a single feature in a single general 
category of features. 
Table 6 - Features of a M:M association 
 
Feature Meaning 
difference_group_reader A general category of features which 
could be derived by comparison of 
tags in the system for all underlying 
association features. 
 
Table 6 shows a single feature, difference_group_reader, which represents a general 
category of features, which are constructed when many tags are active across many 
readers or in sequence, that use anti-collision protocols i.e. using all previously 
constructed features.  A tag could be identified at a reader whilst other tags are also 
being identified there, and then moved onwards to be identified at another reader that 
is also engaged in identifying tags.  In this way, features can be derived on tag 
groups at each reader and these tag groups can be compared to each other.   
To construct features within this general category of features, the requirement is that 
the underlying associations, and hence features, exist in the system.   
To summarise this section, the feature partition contains the features which 
characterise the associations between tags and readers.  From the tag and reader 
perspective, elementary data features are constructed.  The increasing complexity of 
associations, achieved through the addition of more varying tag and reader 
associations means that more complex features can be constructed from the 
perspective of a database.  These features characterise the underlying associations at 
the RFID layer, and hence it has been assumed, would exist at layers below this 
layer.  This suggests that the ability to construct new features depends on the 
underlying associations across the layers of the system, and ultimately, the inclusion 
of different combinations of tags and readers as the building blocks of the system.  In 
essence, this model has added context to the data view of the RFID domain model.   
6.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the standard operations for components which exist 
within the standard operating partition from the reference model, and has 
represented these in a domain model.  To constitute what is contained in minor 
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partitions, and across the layers, it was necessary to use a number of methods.  When 
these were applied to the structure of the reference model, they were systematised for 
RFID.  The resulting domain model is constituted by a logical and data view of the 
system, and its primary value is in forming a basis for understanding the 
interrelationships in systems, in addition to a controlled vocabulary for concept 
identification, ahead of analysing security ‘whole of system.’   
It is a general principle expounded in this thesis, that one should start with a robust 
view of ‘the system’ in deducing what is practicable for security.  The approach 
taken in this chapter, using a variety of analysis methods, from different sources, but 
integrated through the model, has resulted in a view of the ‘the system’ and its 
elements.  
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter a ‘whole of system’ approach is illustrated within the problem 
partition of the reference model when threats are analysed over system layers.  As 
the standard operating partition is layered, and attacks target the elements of these 
layers, analysing the problem partition considers attacks across the same layers.  As 
these two partitions are aligned to each other, and share common layers, it is possible 
to compare where in systems it is more effective to address attacks.  This next phase 
in ‘whole of system’ analysis, facilitated by the reference model, is depicted in 
Figure 31. 
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Figure 31 - Analysis of the problem partition 
This chapter illustrates how a systematic threat analysis over the layers assists in understanding where 
attacks in a system occur in addition to identifying more effective locations for solutions. 
 
Recall from Chapter 3 that previous work has analysed individual attacks but usually 
out of a system context.  These range from informal assessments (Juels 2006) to 
more formal threat analysis techniques (Thompson et al. 2006).  Work by 
Spiekermann and Ziekow (2005) illustrated that threats in RFID systems can be 
linked together, thereby showing how system goals can be invalidated by an attacker.  
However, when considering these examples, they do not appear to give explicit 
consideration to a system’s context, and hence, have not established whether attacks 
are feasible for various system types.   
Conversely, working from a system representation, some previous work has achieved 
some systematisation of threats (Rotter 2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010).  When 
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considering these examples, however, threats have appeared localised to system 
layers or a few parts of a system, which does not sufficiently reflect the feasibility of 
attacks.  Some threats may indeed be constrained to individual layers, but as RFID 
systems are hierarchical with related layers, attacks have interrelationships which 
should be considered.  The Texas Instruments Digital Signal Transponder (TI-DST) 
example from Chapter 2 showed that in this system, an attack involved a number of 
steps – reverse engineering of tags, reprogramming of obtained data, replaying of 
data, and physical interaction via simulators at a reader – in order for attacks to be 
enacted.  As the RFID system consists of synergistic effects and interrelationships, 
across layers, consideration should be given to how these influence attack 
implementation. 
To this end, in the problem partition here, attack sequences have been modelled over 
the system layers to develop An RFID Attacker Behaviour Taxonomy.  This focuses 
on the hardware layer components that are generic to most RFID systems, such as 
serial-number-only tags, whilst remaining generic across specific technological 
implementations like the Electronic Product Code (EPC) system.  As most attacks 
originate in the hardware layer and propagate into the higher layers, using the fact 
that these systems are hierarchical (see Chapter 2) the taxonomy models how attacks 
occur in a system, not where the system is physically located.  System context comes 
from this partition’s alignment with the standard operating partition. 
7.2 AN RFID ATTACKER BEHAVIOUR TAXONOMY 
In this section the concept of An RFID Attacker Behaviour Taxonomy is introduced 
to analyse the problem partition ‘whole of system’.  Attack trees (Schneier 1999, 
2004), are used to build the taxonomy to structure the attacks.  Attack tree nodes 
form the taxonomic units: the root node represents the attack goal (the attacker’s 
motivation or incentive for targeting a system), and sub-nodes represent the sub-
goals the attacker must achieve to attain that goal.  The interconnection between 
nodes constitutes a sequence that describes an attacker’s behaviour in a system. 
Depending on where they occur in the system determines where they have been 
modelled at the various layers.   
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As a basis for thinking about an attacker’s motivation when structuring attack 
sequences over layers, the classification of RFID systems by their information goals 
(Hassan and Chatterjee 2006) - typically, authorisation and monitoring – is used.  
Authorisation systems replace the more traditional approaches of granting a physical 
entity access to a particular zone, whereas monitoring systems establish a physical 
entity’s location in that zone.  Although their information goals differ, the underlying 
hardware is identical for both types of systems; consequently, attacks can be the 
same.  However, as attacker behaviour invalidates each subsystem’s information 
goals differently, a ‘whole of system’ approach to security considers these goals 
individually but models these at the strategic layer.   
With these system types in mind, an attacker’s behaviour invalidates an RFID 
system’s information goals through attack sequences.  As an RFID system consists 
of elements from the standard operating partition, attacking a system involves attacks 
against these elements.  Tag cloning (see Chapter 2) is one type of attack which has 
been considered, in addition to other types of attacks.  Also, some attack sequences 
do not involve tag cloning, but still achieve the same attack goal.  It is probable that 
new attacks would eventuate as developments in the field occur, and these attacks 
could form new nodes.  However, fundamentally, the core structures of these attack 
trees, at the higher layers, would be unlikely to change, and hence, attacker 
behaviour should remain fundamentally centred on a system’s information goals. 
Attacks propagating through the layers take on different forms.  In Chapter 2 the 
forms of cloning were presented as an example of this concept.  Modelling attack 
sequences across the layers means remaining constrained by the standard operating 
partition and its elements at respective layers.  For example, in the forms of tag 
cloning, requires access to a physical tag and would therefore involve attacking the 
real world layer as well as the RFID layer.  Thus, as the organisation of the layers is 
known, there is a distinct organisation in the way attacks can be sequenced together.   
Consequently, the taxonomy represents RFID attacker behaviour in the context of 
each RFID subsystem’s information goals.  As the goals define these subsystems, 
each attack tree’s goal is the invalidation of an information goal.  Two attack trees 
are presented - one for authorisation systems and the other for monitoring systems - 
to ensure that the taxonomy captures the depth of RFID system threats.  Although the 
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attack trees attempt to be as comprehensive as possible, specific system 
implementation details were omitted, so that the attack trees are generic and scalable.  
The major attacks were modelled; as new ones emerge, other security practitioners 
can add branches to these initial attack trees. 
Finally, as a way of demonstrating the specific adaptation of the generic taxonomy, 
an actual system is used as a recurring example.  RFID system security is important 
as some system owners, usually companies, use the information gleaned from this 
technology to make decisions about high-value entities. One such example stems 
back to 2004, when the US Food and Drug Administration recommended RFID for 
product authentication in an effort to eliminate counterfeit pharmaceuticals.  
Consequently, the drug maker GlaxoSmithKline began placing high frequency, 
13.56-MHz tags encoded with an Electronic Product Code (EPC), an industry-
standard tag serial number, on Trizivir bottles (O'Connor 2006) to authenticate the 
drug, which is used to treat patients diagnosed with the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV).  The RFID system’s ability to determine if a bottle of Trizivir is 
counterfeit - so that it does not pose a risk to patient health - ultimately depends on 
overall RFID system security.   
Although the standard operating partition has not been explicitly depicted in the 
diagrams, at this point in the thesis, it is sufficient to discuss these concepts during 
attack descriptions.  Later in Chapter 10, a much larger pharmaceutical supply chain 
example will be used to illustrate how all layers and partitions of the model can be 
completely engaged, but for the time being, this chapter limits the model’s depictions 
to the problem partition.   
Thus, when considering this example, it is evident that the association between 
attacks and the system should be established in a structured manner before 
appropriate security can be formulated.   
7.2.1 AUTHORISATION SYSTEM ATTACKER BEHAVIOUR 
Figure 32 depicts attacker behaviour in a generic RFID authorisation system, for 
example, introducing counterfeit pharmaceuticals into an RFID-enabled supply 
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chain.  The attacker’s goal, modelled here, is to give an unauthorised physical entity 
access to the system. 3   
This attack goal has three sub-goals.  The attacker starts by obtaining an authorised 
tag and then attaches it to the unauthorised physical entity that he or she wants to 
introduce into the system.  The final step is for the reader to be able to read the 
authorised tag attached to the unauthorised physical entity.  The reader authorises the 
physical entity based on its tag ownership and grants the unauthorised physical entity 
access to the system.  The process of carrying out this attack goal involves attacks 
across various layers in the system.   
The attacker’s primary task here is to obtain an authorised tag - either an original tag 
authorised in the system or an original tag’s duplicate, called a clone tag.  Such 
attacks work when the system authorises a tag solely on its serial number.  It can be 
seen that most work in these attacks occurs out of band i.e. not in range of an 
authorised reader.  It is only when these attacks are in band, and thus, in range of an 
authorised reader, that data is produced which will propagate to the higher system 
layers. 
 
                                                 
3 Since the IEEE publication of this diagram, the attack tree now depicts the node Obtain Tag # as 
occurring before Replay # node.  In both diagrams, layers have also been made explicit.   
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7.2.1.1 ORIGINAL TAG  
An attacker can obtain an original tag either legitimately or illegitimately depending 
on their intent.  Some legitimate means of obtaining an original tag would initially 
not break any laws.  A legitimate method would be to retrieve discarded tags from 
the company’s waste, or introduce a tag from a foreign RFID system that has 
allocated tags from the same serial number space.  These attacks can be implemented 
at the real world layer as they involve direct manipulation of an existing physical tag.   
Getting a job with the target company to gain physical access to its tag supply could 
be legitimate or illegitimate.  If the original tag is a tag which was assigned to the 
attacker as an employee then this is a legitimate attack, whereas if attaining 
employment was then used to steal tags, the node should be modelled in the 
illegitimate branch.   
Illegitimate means of obtaining an original tag include bribing a company insider 
into supplying a tag, impersonating a company insider and then stealing an original 
tag, or exploiting slap-and-ship systems.  In slap-and-ship systems, tags are attached 
to physical entities just prior to shipping in order for the company to meet the RFID 
mandates of downstream companies (Michael and McCathie 2005).  Usually there is 
minimal RFID infrastructure to monitor tags or tagged entities at this stage, thus, a 
malicious insider might supply an attacker with tags primed to compromise the 
system, and the system may not realise that tags are missing.  Alternatively, attackers 
might steal or use force to obtain a supply of original tags, removing them from a 
legitimate product and then using them on their own unauthorised physical entities.   
This branch of attacks is feasible when the RFID system authorises a physical entity 
based solely on a tag’s stored number.  The only limitation to the widespread use of 
these attacks is the number of original tags available.  Attacks like this are easy when 
physical security is weak. 
7.2.1.2 CLONE TAG 
Systems that authorise physical entities based on a tag’s serial number are also 
vulnerable to tag cloning.  The attacker obtains an authorised tag’s serial number and 
then replays it back to a reader, usually by writing the serial number to a 
reprogrammable tag or using a device that can simulate the tag’s radio signals.  
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These are usually engaged more at the RFID layer as they are relying on things like 
radio signals, anti-collision, and specific RFID system information for them to be 
implemented.   
An attacker can acquire an authorised tag serial number in several ways.  An 
existential cloning attack, for example, lets attackers guess an authorised tag’s serial 
number in the target system.  EPC tags are vulnerable to such attacks (Juels 2005), as 
is the human-implantable VeriChip (Halamka et al. 2006) which hospitals use to 
identify medical patients.  Randomly guessing tag serial numbers using the tag’s 
number space or sequentially working through the number space - called a brute 
force attack - might also provide an authorised tag’s serial number.   
Two examples highlight the weak security assumptions that so called uncloneable 
tags - tags protected by cryptography - rely on, showing their vulnerability to brute 
force attacks.  The 40-bit secret key of a Texas Instruments Digital Signal 
Transponder (DST) tag was recovered in less than one hour (Bono et al. 2005) and a 
MiFare Classic smart card secret key was retrieved within a few seconds (Garcia et 
al. 2008; Nohl et al. 2008; Courtois 2009).  More details of these attacks were 
discussed in Chapter 2.  When considering these examples, it illustrates how the 
disparity between onboard tag capabilities and readily accessible computer hardware 
is a problem for effective protection against such attacks at the tag. 
Moreover, attackers might have domain knowledge that assists them in determining 
an authorised tag serial number.  They might pay a company insider to reveal how 
the number space is populated with tag serial numbers, or they could perform a 
black-box attack, whereby they obtain a block of tag serial numbers to determine 
their commonality.  Sometimes it is not necessary to have any advanced domain 
knowledge, just access to an existing tag - for example, it was observed that some 
proximity cards print their serial number right on the card in case a security officer 
has to physically inspect a tag.  Likewise, an EPC number’s barcode representation is 
sometimes printed on the tag’s casing. 
Another way to obtain an authorised tag serial number is by coercing a tag into 
revealing its serial number.  Attackers might use an off-the-shelf RFID reader to read 
a tag’s serial number directly.  Alternatively, they can use a tag-cloning device to 
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capture tag radio signals and thus tag serial numbers, which they then store for later 
use.  Westhues (2005) reports that for less than US$100, attackers can build an 
electronic device to capture and replay tag radio signals.  This is substantially 
cheaper than purchasing a legitimate reader to achieve the same effect.   
Although tag cloning is typically the passive act of recording a tag’s serial number, 
tag relaying and tag radio frequency signal interception are active attacks that operate 
in real time to achieve the same effect.  Attackers can intercept tag radio signals 
while an authorised tag and reader are communicating, then reroute the signals so 
that they appear to be emanating from the unauthorised tag and physical entity 
(Hancke 2006).  These attacks demonstrate how tag-to-reader communications are 
not safe even at short distances. 
Thus, systematisation for these attacks reveals ways in which the attacker can 
sequence individual attacks over layers to invalidate a system’s goals.  
7.2.2 MONITORING SYSTEM ATTACKER BEHAVIOUR 
Attackers might also try to prevent monitoring systems from producing information 
used to track the location of physical entities - for example, to enable the removal of 
products from a supply chain without being detected.  Figure 33 illustrates attacker 
behaviour in a generic RFID monitoring system.  As the RFID layer is responsible 
for bridging the real world layer and the strategic layer, it is the most vulnerable 
layer to these sorts of attacks.   
Three ways which an attacker can use to achieve the attack goal of preventing an 
RFID monitoring system from working correctly were identified: prevent a tag from 
identifying itself to a reader; prevent a reader from identifying a tag; or prevent a 
database located in the RFID middleware from associating a tag with an authorised 
physical entity.  Each of these methods is now discussed in more detail. 
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7.2.2.1 DENY TAG IDENTIFICATION 
When attempting to deny tag identification, an attacker can exploit a blocker tag 
(Juels et al. 2003) which prevents readers from resolving individual tag serial 
numbers.  Conversely, attackers can use a Faraday enclosure to block an individual 
tag’s radio frequency signal.  A Faraday enclosure works by shielding a tag’s signals 
such that they cannot be detected by a reader (Hashemi 2009) and such an approach 
could be used by petty thieves in bypassing a store’s Electronic Article Surveillance 
(EAS) systems.   
If attackers have access to a tag, they might also modify it physically to prevent tag 
identification.  The Kill command is a built-in operation of EPC tags and, when 
issued, destroys a tag’s ability to be identified (Glover and Bhatt 2006).  Although 
access to the command is password protected, attackers have used power-analysis 
attacks to determine the secret kill password for UHF Class-One Generation-One 
EPC tags (Oren and Shamir 2007) which means that attackers can destroy tags if they 
can get close enough.  The household microwave oven is another effective way of 
destroying a tag; the heat damages a tag’s sensitive electronic components.  Collins 
(2006) reported that attackers can use a modified camera and flash just as effectively.  
In addition, the RFID Zapper device can emit an electronic pulse strong enough to 
deactivate tag electronics.  However, the simplest method of attack is removing a tag 
from its associated physical entity.  Clearly, this branch of attacks invalidates the 
security assumptions that tags always respond to readers and that tags and physical 
entities are inseparable. 
7.2.2.2 DENY READER  
As the reader is responsible for associating a tag with a physical entity, denying 
reader service would mean that the system cannot monitor tags and therefore 
physical entities.  Due to the anti-collision algorithms that most readers use, a tag 
typically communicates with only a single reader at a time (although some standards 
such as EPC Class-One Generation-Two (EPCglobal 2005) enable tags to interact 
with multiple readers simultaneously using sessions).  An attacker might exploit this 
and introduce his or her own reader to keep a tag in a temporary busy state, thus 
delaying or preventing it from communicating with legitimate readers.  Similarly, a 
Blocker Tag (Juels et al. 2003) keeps an authorised reader busy trying to schedule 
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tags to respond.  Of course system context is important here, as it is reported that the 
Blocker Tag is targeted at systems which use Singulation Tree Walking protocols to 
identify tags.  As the tag cannot identify itself, these attacks prevent the reader from 
associating a tag with a physical entity. 
7.2.2.3 DENY MIDDLEWARE DATABASE  
The last branch of attacks denies a monitoring service access to the database and its 
stored event information.  As a tag generates this information when a reader passes 
by, attacks against these components result in attacks against the middleware 
database.   
Rieback et al. (2006) have proposed the tag virus as a way of introducing malicious 
information into a database.  Attackers might construct a malicious data payload, 
such as a computer virus stored on a tag’s memory, to destroy critical data.  The 
attacker can transmit the virus to the reader during a tag read operation and then store 
it inside the database.  When the database executes the virus, it performs a malicious 
operation, such as deleting data records.  An administrator might need to take the 
database offline for repair, delaying new incoming tag information.   
News sources have reported cases in which attackers have successfully encoded a 
malicious payload onto a tag.  For example, one attacker encoded a payload in a 
JPEG-2000 image file on an electronic passport (epassport), which caused the reader 
to crash (Zetter 2007).  Specifically, the attacker embedded a buffer-overrun exploit 
in the JPEG-2000 file on the cloned chip containing the epassport photo (several 
airports around the world use RFID readers vulnerable to this type of attack).  
Although this attack targets readers, it proves that attackers can target tags and then 
execute their own instructions on the vulnerable computer and spread them to the 
middleware database.  Clearly, these attacks take advantage of the hierarchical nature 
of RFID systems (see Chapter 2).   
Some of the attacks which appear in Figure 32 have been appended to this branch of 
attacks – namely the tag cloning attacks. 
Attackers can also deny a middleware database or a monitoring service by changing 
the association between a tag and a physical entity - for example, by detaching a tag 
from a physical entity and attaching that tag to a completely different physical entity.  
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Dissociating a tag from its physical entity, also known as a change-of-tag ownership 
attack (Mirowski and Hartnett 2007) invalidates the information in the database.  
When an attacker swaps a tag from pallet A for a tag on pallet B, for instance, the 
database will record these events against the tag from pallet B when pallet A appears 
at a reader.  Likewise, when the reader locates pallet B, pallet A will be in its 
location.   
Finally, attackers might introduce clone or foreign tags into the RFID monitoring 
system, which modifies the association between tags and physical entities.  
Introducing foreign tags – tags which are active in a different RFID system – into a 
system where the same tag serial numbers are already active, is a form of cross 
contamination.  Cross-contamination allows foreign tags to achieve the same 
privileges as authorised tags (Heydt-Benjamin et al. 2006).  Any of the other ways 
clones can be introduced (see Figure 32) could also contribute to this attack goal.  As 
a clone is a duplicate of a tag serial number that is already active in a system, these 
attacks record information from several physical entities in the database against the 
same tag.  The system does not validate this information, so invalid information 
propagates up to the higher RFID layers. 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
While the taxonomy was developed to analyse the problem partition of systems 
‘whole of system’, this section demonstrates how it can be applied to a theoretical 
attacker scenario.  An attacker, Tyrell Corporation, manufactures a counterfeit 
version of the Trizivir drug, Nexus-6, and sells it to people diagnosed with HIV.  As 
the association between a tag and a Trizivir bottle indicates an authorised Trizivir 
drug, the attack goal is to gain access to the supply chain. 
The drug accesses the supply chain based on the tag’s serial number and its related 
records stored in the middleware database.  Invalidating the authorisation subsystem 
means invalidating the RFID information so that it reports the counterfeit drug as the 
authorised drug.  Therefore, the authorisation attack tree in Figure 32 is used to 
analyse the attack in this system context: 
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• Tyrell Corporation purchases a generic reader from an RFID manufacturer. 
• Tyrell scans a tag in the Trizivir supply chain by purchasing a bottle of 
Trizivir; alternatively, it scans a drug delivery truck as it passes by the reader. 
• Next, Tyrell obtains the tag identifier from a tagged Trizivir bottle and 
encodes it on a reprogrammable tag that it will replay later (this constitutes a 
clone tag).  As the system authenticates the tag, and hence the entity, based 
on serial number, Tyrell Corporation has effectively obtained an authorised 
tag. 
• It then attaches the clone tags to its bottles of Nexus-6 and introduces them 
into the supply chain, perhaps with a malicious insider’s assistance. 
• Finally, the Trizivir system reads the tags attached to the Nexus-6 bottles.  
The clone tag serial numbers correspond to authorised serial numbers in the 
middleware database.  As the tag is a surrogate for the drug, the drug is 
deemed authentic, giving Tyrell Corporation access to the system.  The 
counterfeit Nexus-6 drugs are now authorised and allowed into the system in 
place of the authentic Trizivir. 
Understanding this attack sequence is useful when deploying countermeasures as it 
helps to identify the types of attacks to which the RFID system is vulnerable.  In this 
scenario, the system is vulnerable to a tag-cloning attack as it is a serial-number-only 
system.  Attackers can duplicate tags if they obtain the authorised tag’s serial 
numbers.   
The RFID system’s security assumptions can also be identified.  In this scenario, the 
system assumes the physical entity to which a tag is attached is not counterfeit.  The 
system makes no attempt to authenticate the physical entity, simply choosing to 
believe the tag’s authenticity.  The system also assumes the tag’s serial numbers are 
all unique and not in use by multiple tags.  After a tag leaves the system, it assumes 
that the tag will not be reintroduced into the system for another drug to use.  
Furthermore, the middleware database assumes that the event-oriented information 
that the reader produced when reading the tags accurately reflects what has occurred 
in the real world.  (In Chapter 10, these concepts, which fit the standard operating 
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partition, will be made explicit in the specific example of a larger pharmaceutical 
supply chain case study).   
This knowledge can be used to determine where to place system security 
countermeasures.  In this scenario, the key vulnerability is that the drug is authorised 
based on the tag’s serial number.  Attackers can replace the original drug with a 
counterfeit drug without modifying the legitimate tag as nothing links the tag to the 
physical drug apart from information residing in the middleware database.  To 
improve security, the manufacturer could, for example, choose to include 
information on the tag to link it to the drug itself.   
As the attack trees indicate, entities may also be vulnerable to change-of-tag-
ownership.  Therefore, a more effective solution may be to implement an intrusion 
detection system.  In RFID, these solutions analyse the RFID data entities produce 
when their tags interact at a reader.  Mirowski and Hartnett (2007) report that a 
simple intrusion detection, which computes statistics on entity behaviour, can 
indicate when an implausibility has been detected.  This solution takes advantage of 
the RFID data attesting to entity behaviour throughout the system, meaning that even 
if tags change entities, these attacks could be detected.   
In essence, when the attacks in the problem partition are analysed across the layers in 
this partition, using a systematic method such as attack trees, it is possible to think of 
RFID security requirements with respect to the system’s context.   
7.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has illustrated the benefits of applying a ‘whole of system’ approach to 
threat analysis via the reference model.  It used the reference model’s problem 
partition to this end, and undertook threat analysis using the attack tree method.   
Attack trees formed a taxonomy which models attacks at various layers as attack 
sequences.  As these systems are layered, attacks were represented as sequences over 
the layers for authorisation and monitoring system types.  The attacker’s attack goal 
was the invalidation of a system’s information goal, while sub-goals represented 
ways of achieving the attack goal.  As an example of analysis of an attack which 
would benefit from systemisation, tag cloning attacks were placed in the context of 
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systems, and other attacks at different layers were used to show how these would 
support tag cloning.   
As a general principal of systematisation is advocated using layers in this partition, 
the use of systematic threat analysis, over layers, means attacks can be aligned 
against the standard operating partition to capture both generic and specific system 
properties.  Attack trees represent one such systematic threat analysis method.  
Others may also exist, and would therefore, also be relevant.  Systematic threat 
analysis has been shown to reveal the locations which can be targeted by the attacker 
to invalidate a system’s goals.  Thus, the recommendation is that solutions are 
located where they are more feasible in the system hierarchy.   
The knowledge imparted here is that applying a ‘whole of system’ approach to threat 
analysis, by considering attacks using a systematic method over system layers, leads 
to a more effective identification of which threats are feasible in a system context.   
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter a ‘whole of system’ approach is illustrated through analysis of the 
solution partition in the reference model.  The solution partition is the area where 
solutions, which can address attacks, are analysed in the model.  As the final major 
partition, this partition largely depends on the organisation of the elements of the 
standard operating partition in determining what solutions are practicable for systems, 
in addition to the threats in the problem partition, in identifying what threats warrant 
countermeasures.   
Consequently, as the partitions are aligned across system layers, this chapter considers 
how analysing solutions using a ‘whole of system’ approach, made possible by the 
reference model, can suggest practicable solutions.  The alignment of the partition 
explored in this chapter, in relation to the other partitions, is illustrated in Figure 34.  
This illustration emphasizes the need to define a system’s context, and the threats in that 
context, for solutions to be analysed.   
 
Figure 34 - Analysis of the solution partition 
This chapter illustrates how a ‘whole of system’ approach to security analysis can proceed in the solution 
partition by introducing a simulation model for this purpose.   
 
To this end, this chapter introduces the concept of an RFID simulator which has been 
validated for ‘whole of system’ analysis (see Appendix A).  It is based on the domain 
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model introduced in Chapter 6 and on agent based modelling and simulation (ABMS) 
concepts (Robinson 2004) and allows systems to be modelled and attacks introduced.  
The simulator is used to explore the problem of exposing clone tags in an RFID system, 
to demonstrate this approach to solution analysis.  The previously unexplored solution 
potential of system associations (see Chapter 6) to expose attacks in RFID is modelled.  
Output data is produced via the simulator and analysed for attacks.  Various associations 
and features which influence attack exposure are discussed.  This process represents the 
use of elements, integrated across a system, for solution analysis.  In exploring these 
factors in simulation, the benefits of approaching solution analysis through a ‘whole of 
system’ approach are made apparent.   
8.2 EXPOSING ATTACKS IN SYSTEMS 
In order to understand a solution, one needs to consider the threats and the system 
context, in addition to what parts of the system the solution is reliant upon.  The need for 
this approach to analysis is evident when considering the class of security solutions 
called Intrusion Detection.  Intrusion Detection can be separated into two sub-classes: 
plausibility checks, and anomaly detection.  These solutions, in general, rely on elements 
across system layers in order to identify attacks.  In developing these types of solutions, 
or deploying them, consideration must be given to the elements in various parts of the 
system.  Thus, briefly reviewing these will highlight the need to take a ‘whole of 
system’ approach to solution analysis.   
Plausibility checks formalise what constitutes an attack, using such things as rules or 
models, applying these to identify attacks in system data.  Koh et al. (2003) proposed a 
track and trace system whereby an audit trail is established containing a history of all the 
procedures a product has undergone at each stage in a supply chain.  In this approach, a 
user manually verifies whether a process is valid.  Conversely, an automated approach 
was proposed by Illic et al. (2009) relying on rules to check basic supply chain 
conditions as valid.  These rules include checks on: velocity; dwell-time; lifecycle; pair-
wise shipping and receiving; and transition probability.  In order for these solutions to 
be analysed they need to be placed into the context of an actual system where attacks are 
detected via these means.   
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Conversely, anomaly approaches automatically formulate a profile of normal activity 
and use this to determine what constitutes an attack.  In the area of clone tag detection 
several approaches exist.  Mirowski and Hartnett (2007) proposed a system that uses 
statistical anomaly detection to identify the behaviour of clone tags.  Lehtonen et al. 
(2007a) proposed two approaches for identifying anomalies in complete RFID traces 
which could be due to clone tags: a supply chain model (SCM) and a Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM).  Similarly, Lehtonen et al. (2009) applied intrusion detection approaches 
to single events instead of complete data traces.  A stochastic supply chain model was 
used to illustrate different real world problems in ‘location based’ product 
authentication.  Two probabilities for genuine tags were calculated: location-transition 
probability and time-transition probability.  Although profiles are learnt automatically, 
unless consideration is given to a systems design, then the right data may not be 
instantiated such that the solution exposes attacks.   
When considering the above examples, it seems likely that careful consideration must be 
given in order for attacks to be exposed by these solutions.  To analyse these solutions, 
the influences of the system need to be considered, and this would mean placing these 
solutions into a system.  The next section shows how applying a ‘whole of system’ 
approach can analyse such solutions using a simulation model.   
8.3 ANALYSING A SOLUTION ‘WHOLE OF SYSTEM’ 
This section illustrates how a ‘whole of system’ approach in the solution partition 
occurs.  It uses the problem of exposing clone tags in RFID data to consider how a 
system’s associations influence the possibility of detection.  To facilitate this 
investigation, an RFID simulator is introduced, and the results generated using it, are 
presented as the basis for analysis of the solution’s effectiveness.  In exploring this 
example, the approach towards solution analysis in this partition is illustrated.   
The reference model promotes the concept that solutions can be dealt with at various 
layers. The segment of a layer selected here, a combination of associations and features, 
is where it may first be apparent that cloning attacks could have arisen in RFID data.  
The exposing of clones here relies upon the occurrence of multiple tags which contain 
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the same serial number in the system.  When such tags are prevalent, the method 
identifies their occurrence through the implausibilities they produce in the constructed 
features and associations.  Such attacks would be suitable for detecting tag cloning and 
pseudo-cloning (see Chapter 2) as in these attacks usually the original tag is also active 
in the system.  Therefore, rather than explore the same problem across all parts of the 
model, the reference model suggests this is perhaps the first place cloning can be 
addressed in data.   
8.3.1 RFID SIMULATOR 
The software based simulator for RFID systems is based on the domain model in 
Chapter 6 and has been validated for preliminary analysis tasks.  It fills a gap in RFID 
security research whereby researchers would like to investigate attacks in actual 
systems; however, these actual systems, and systems with attacks in them, are not 
available.  In addition, sometimes it is also not feasible to begin research in an actual 
system, as the researcher can have less control over the behaviour of components or the 
speed in which systems elicit information useful to investigations.  This section provides 
a brief overview of the simulator and more information can be found in Appendix A.   
The simulator uses agent based modelling and simulation (ABMS) principles (Macal 
and North 2005; Korth 2006) and was implemented in software using an existing ABMS 
toolkit called MASON (Balan et al. 2003; Luke et al. 2004).  In the simulator, a user 
builds up an RFID system using the controlled vocabulary from the domain model.  To 
enable this, an application programming interface (API), (a set of commands related to 
domain concepts), is engaged to compile a script.  The script indicates how the system 
should be designed, and the starting conditions for all components.  Execution of a 
scenario results in an animation being run on screen, which enables the user to visualise 
the system output as if it were actually built.  Another output is data which attests to tag 
and reader interactions.  Completion of a simulated scenario results in information 
useful to the researcher, which would be similar to that produced by an actual system.   
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In this chapter, the simulator is used to encode a theoretical cloning scenario, and the 
results are presented around the discussion on the ‘whole of system’ approach to 
solution analysis through tag and reader associations as a solution.   
8.3.2 SIMULATED SCENARIO: OVERVIEW AND SETTINGS OF 
TAG CLONING ATTACK 
The simulation facilitates a solution to be examined across layers for a scenario.  To this 
end, a tag cloning scenario is introduced.  Its settings in the simulator are described for 
the intended goal of examining how clone tags are expressed in output data.  In the 
modelled system containing clone tags, clone tags interact with readers at different 
times, and RFID data is produced.  Complicating the scenario is the presence of non-
clone original tags which bear the same tag serial number.  The results of simulation are 
presented, and a discussion on solution feasibility (how the system influences attack 
exposure through several system layers) is analysed.   
The settings for the simulated scenario are now explained.  The simulated system can be 
defined as a many-to-many (M:M) configuration as any type of association could 
emerge (see Chapter 6).  All of the associations take place in a single zone which 
measures 50 centimetres (cm) cubed.  In this environment three readers are located in 
sequence: reader_1 is positioned at 10 cm from the origin (0, 0, 0) in the zone, reader_2 
is positioned at 20 cm, and reader_3 is positioned at 30 cm.  These readers are located 
over the route which tags were instructed to follow.  There are two types of tags: 
originals and clones.  The originals, of which there is one, has the tag serial number: 
tag_1_(tag_1).  The clones, of which there are two, have the tag serial numbers: 
tag_2_(tag_1) and tag_3_(tag_1).  The name in brackets signifies a tag’s public name 
which is the serial number that real systems obtain when a tag is read, whereas the name 
external to the brackets is a tag’s private name used to identify it within the simulation.  
It can be seen that the clones are duplicating tag_1.  In real systems this differentiation 
in serial numbers is not possible, hence, the need for intrusion detection systems.   
The components have been instructed to move within the zone and their interactions 
lead to output data.  Tag_1_(tag_1) moves from position 0 cm to position 50 cm at a 
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speed of 5 cm per second.  Tag_2_(tag_1) moves from position 0 cm to position 50 cm 
at a speed of 1 cm per second.  Tag_3_(tag_1) moves from position 50 cm to position 0 
cm at a speed of 5 cm per second.  The tags move along the route covered by the read 
range of the three readers.  As some of these components move in different directions, 
different speeds, and at different times, it results in different associations, and hence 
values, arising in the system.  Consequently, some of these behaviours have been 
identified as implausible, and linked to the existence of clone tags.  The use of public 
and private names made it possible to differentiate these records by the user in addition 
to visualising the animation.   
The results which were generated in the simulated scenario are now presented in figures 
and a table.  The figures (Figure 35 to Figure 40) represent the simulated scenario 
animation at discrete time steps.  They illustrate the various components on screen such 
as tags and readers.  Conversely, the table (Table 7) contains the raw data values for the 
simple and constructed features which were first proposed and described in Chapter 6, 
and adapted for use in this scenario.  Subsequent sections of this chapter will provide 
further explanation of these simulation results.   
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Figure 35 – Simulation Step 0 
No tags have interacted with readers, thus, the system has no record of system activity.  
 
 
Figure 36 – Simulation Step 2 
Tag_1_(tag_1) interacting with reader_1 as it travels to its destination. 
 
 
 
reader 1 reader 2 reader 3 
tag_2_(tag_1) 
tag_1_(tag_1) 
tag_3_(tag_1) 
Step 2 
tag_3_(tag_1) 
reader 1 reader 2 reader 3 
tag_1_(tag_1) 
tag_2_(tag_1) 
Step 0 
tag_3_(tag_1) 
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Figure 37 – Simulation Step 4  
Tag_1_(tag_1) interacting with reader_2, and tag_3_(tag_1) with reader_3 simultaneously.  The readers will report 
tag_1 as having been read.   
 
 
Figure 38 – Simulation Step 8 
Tag_2_(tag_1) and tag_3_(tag_1) interacting with reader_1 much faster than normal for a single tag, and also after 
tag_1_(tag_1) has already been seen at reader_2 and reader_3.   
 
 
reader 1 reader 2 reader 3 
tag_2_(tag_1) 
tag_3_(tag_1) 
tag_1_(tag_1) 
Step 8 
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tag_3_(tag_1) 
Step 4 
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Figure 39 – Simulation Step 10 
Tag_2_(tag_1) interacting with reader_1 still, which contradicts reader_2 and reader_3 as having already seen this 
serial number. 
 
 
Figure 40 – Simulation Step 38 
All tags have finished interacting with readers, the last reader interacted with was reader_3. 
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Table 7 depicts the features which have been constructed from the associations 
which arose during the simulation of the scenario.  These have been instantiated 
using the raw data produced when tags and readers interacted which has been 
illustrated in Figure 35 to Figure 40.  The elementary features constructed are: 
tag_serial_number, reader_serial_number, reader_operation, and time_stamp (date 
and time).  For plausibility checks, this data is the source of information about the 
simulation events which have been visualised in the animation’s graphical user 
interface (GUI).  As associations arose between the tags and readers, more complex 
features were derived.  The full range of associations emerged at various stages of 
the simulation from one-to-one (1:1) associations through to many-to-many (M:M) 
associations.   
To this end, these features and the data in them are now examined in an attempt to 
identify implausibilities which may expose clones.  These implausibilities are due to 
the various associations permeating through the system layers to the data layer.   
8.3.3 SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
The first indication of ‘whole of system’ analysis comes from directly using the 
simulation model for solution exploration.  A benefit of analysing the solution 
partition through a simulator is that multiple outputs are available.  In this case, both 
animation and raw data of a simulated RFID system can be used to analyse 
simultaneously.  The rest of this section uses the simulator features, and shows how 
the layers and features arose, to illustrate this approach to solution analysis.   
The total_number_of_tag_reads_at_reader feature is the number of data records a 
tag serial number has produced at a reader.  Session_number 2 indicates that the 
original tag, tag_1_(tag_1), has been read at reader_1 twice (that is, in actual 
systems, at least the original tag serial number).  Session_number 3 indicates that 
tag_3_(tag_1), a clone tag, has been read at reader_3 a single time.  This suggests 
that a clone tag is present as no records were produced at reader_2 which should 
have been activated in order for a tag to have been read at reader_1 and reader_3 – it 
does not however indicate which tag is actually a clone.  This feature exposes a clone 
tag when a tag produces an unexpected number of output data records at a reader.  
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The total_tag_reads feature is the total number of data records produced by all tags 
at all readers.  When used in conjunction with the 
total_number_of_tag_reads_at_reader feature, inconsistencies due to the system’s 
sequential ordering of readers are apparent.  Session_number 3 indicates when 
tag_3_(tag_1) is read, overall three reads have occurred in the system; however only 
one read has occurred at the current reader, which is reader_3.  Two reads remain 
unaccounted for.  This suggests that this tag serial number has been active at readers 
other than reader_3.  This can be seen in session_number 1 and session_number 2 
which were produced by the original tag, tag_1_(tag_1).  Thus, a lack of activity at 
reader_2 is evidence to suggest a clone is present.  These features expose a clone tag 
when an unexpected number of output data records when compared to each reader in 
a system are identified.   
The time_since_last_seen_at_this_reader feature is the time in seconds between 
successive tag reads at the same reader.  There are a number of instances where the 
delay between a tag having been read in successive times at a reader is 0 seconds.  
This can be seen in session_number 11.  The reason for the very low response is that 
tag_2_(tag_1) is also being read at this reader, as seen in session_number 10.  It can 
also be seen that this occurs at session_number 3 and session_number 4 for other 
tags.  However, this is as it is the first time the tag serial has appeared at these 
readers, which would mean other features would be needed to make an accurate 
identification in these cases.  However, in general, there should be a delay between 
successive reads of the same tag at a reader, on the basis that anti-collision 
introduces strict scheduling between successive reads of the same tag serial number 
(this is further explored in Chapter 9).  This feature exposes a clone tag when the tag 
responds to a reader request faster than would be expected for the reader to handle 
such requests.   
The time_between_same_tag_at_different_readers feature is the time between a 
tag’s successive reads at different readers.  It can be seen that there are a number of 
instances where the delay between a tag’s successive reads at different readers is 1 
second or less.  It is reasonable to assume, for the simulated system, that it would 
take at least 1 second to travel between different readers in this simulation given the 
physical distance between them.  Session_number 9 indicates a delay of 0 seconds 
for the original tag, tag_1_(tag_1), appearing at reader_3.  This is due to a clone tag, 
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tag_3_(tag_1) being read at reader_2 at the same time in session_number 8.  
Furthermore, session_number 12 indicates a delay of 2 seconds between 
tag_2_(tag_1), a clone tag, being read at reader_1, and the same tag serial number 
being read at reader_3, 2 seconds prior in session_number 9.  It can also be seen that 
no data records were produced at reader_2 during the 2 second time period, as the tag 
serial appeared to have travelled from reader_3 to reader_1.  This feature exposes a 
clone tag when a tag has been read at different readers faster than expected for the 
physical ordering of readers.   
Finally, the previous_reader_tag_read_at feature is the reader a tag was previously 
read at.  In this simulation there is a strict ordering of how tags can travel between 
readers: reader_1, reader_2, reader_3 – or vice versa.  Therefore, a tag should travel 
according to this ordering.  It can be seen in session_number 4 that tag_1_(tag_1) is 
read at reader_2 and the feature indicates it was previously read at reader_3.  This is 
due to session_number 3 having been produced by a clone tag, tag_3_(tag_1).  This 
suggests that the tag is travelling backwards, from reader_3 to reader_2.  However, 
further examination of the data records shows that the tag was previously seen at 
reader_1 prior to this record which raises questions about how it appeared at 
reader_3 – clearly there must be another tag in the system using the same tag serial 
number.  This feature exposes a clone tag when a tag travels in an unexpected 
direction across readers or misses readers which it should have been read at in an 
ordered set of readers. 
To summarise, the example above illustrated how the presence of clone tags could be 
exposed in the features constructed from the underlying tag and reader associations.  
In order for these implausibilities to be apparent in the data, however, the 
associations between tags and readers clearly needed to exist at various system 
layers.  Having formalised that there was a link between associations and the way 
attacks were exposed, it may now be possible to identify which RFID systems have 
these structures, and hence, are conducive to these checks.   
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8.4 DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the implications for solution analysis, in the context of the 
above example, and makes clear the benefits of this approach by comparing it to 
those taken by previous work.   
The scenario was encoded into the simulation using its application programming 
interface (API) and executed to produce animation and output data, which provided a 
repeatable means of analysis.  The API enabled the disassembly of a system into its 
constituent parts to be represented as agents.  This imparted the advantage of having 
one think more clearly about the narrative of attacks in systems, and hence, where 
particular architectures may reveal attacks.  Executing the script led to an animation 
on screen which depicted the interaction of components at various stages.  While it 
was a simplified view of the system, it did communicate points in the timeline when 
and where certain associations may form e.g. M:1 association.  These were cross-
checked with the output data which was a record of component interaction.  Whereas 
previous work on intrusion detection (Koh et al. 2003; Lehtonen et al. 2007a; 
Mirowski and Hartnett 2007) had to examine their solutions in actual system 
contexts, the benefit here was that analysis proceeded through multiple-facets of the 
reference model, e.g. layers and a controlled vocabulary, which were instantiated in 
the simulator.   
The simulator enabled the examination of an attack scenario and insertion of 
associations from which features were instantiated.  The associations represented 
concepts proposed in Chapter 6, and this chapter took steps towards illustrating their 
relation to information characterisation.  It was seen in the above analysis that attacks 
could be identified quite easily through these simple features and without the need 
for additional systems context.  From the analysis has come knowledge that systems 
need to be designed to be conducive to attack detection.  Approaching analysis by 
considering multiple system layers, albeit through simulation, facilitates the 
identification of when and where in the system it is feasible to identify attacks.   
Thus, the ‘whole of system’ approach, made possible by the reference model, lends 
itself to suggesting ways in which analysis can move from a conceptual model to a 
system which is simulated.  The next chapter will build on this process of analysis by 
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taking some of the results suggested by simulation and apply these using actual 
RFID hardware.   
8.5 SUMMARY 
The focus of this chapter was a ‘whole of system’ approach to analysis of solutions 
in the solution partition.  To this end, a software program for the simulation of RFID 
systems was introduced (see Appendix A) to encapsulate this approach.  It was then 
used to explore a simple solution to exposing clone tags in RFID data – illustrating 
the use of various associations in RFID systems between tags and readers for clones 
to be exposed.  This approach to analysis when compared to previous examples, 
offers an alternative to analysing a solution in an actual system.  Whole of system 
analysis to solutions means examining solutions across system layers in addition to 
considering the relationships between other partitions.   
The above scenario, examined a location in a system suggested by the reference 
model as feasible: when tags and readers have interacted to allow for the 
instantiation of values into constructed features.  This location was chosen as it 
would appear to be the first appropriate place where such attacks could be examined 
in data.  The finding was that simple implausibilities in constructed features may 
expose attacks such as cloning and pseudo-cloning but that this is reliant on the 
occurrence of various associations.   
The next chapter will use some of the results suggested from this analysis of 
solutions, to explore practical solutions to the exposure of clones in a M:1 
association.  The results of that chapter will further reinforce the findings made in 
this chapter.   
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores how a ‘whole of system’ approach to analysis facilitates the 
exploration of security in actual systems.  The previous chapter illustrated how, 
having built up a framework around security, it is possible to do solution analysis in 
a system context in simulation.  This illustrated how the standard operations, 
identified in the domain model, influence attack exposure in a theoretical cloning 
scenario.  The results suggested from the previous chapter are explored through 
laboratory experiments to illustrate the model’s role in achieving practical security 
outcomes.   
 
Figure 41 - Experimentation facilitated by the reference model 
Simulation results which suggested clones could be identified in a M:1 association have given impetus 
for exploring the detection of attacks at a reader.  The area explored is essentially a segment of the 
reference model.   
Rather than explore all of the simulated results, the results which suggested that was 
it possible that a segment (illustrated in Figure 41) of the reference model, the M:1 
association, may be a suitable location for attack exposure are explored.  Simulation 
suggested that a many-to-one association (M:1) – when many tags are in front of a 
reader, and using a anti-collision protocol – may facilitate the detection of clone tags.  
Examining each tag’s time_since_last_seen_at_this_reader feature in RFID data, 
implausibilities arose when values were zero.  
In exploring this scenario through laboratory experiments, this chapter illustrates that 
results suggested by the reference model can be confirmed as practical in actual 
systems and as an additional security solution to RFID.   
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9.1.1 ACTUAL SYSTEM CONTEXT 
In order to explore the simulated results in an actual system context, Electronic 
Product Code (EPC) Class-One Generation-Two hardware will be used to define a 
system context.   
The significance of this hardware usage was first discussed in Chapter One, and will 
be refreshed briefly in this section.  EPC Class-One Generation-Two UHF RFID 
standard (EPCglobal 2005), is of importance as, in 2004, it was ratified by the major 
RFID standards body known as EPCglobal (Roberti 2004).  Generation-Two is seen 
as a significant RFID milestone, as a number of existing standards converged into a 
single design, enabling manufacturers to produce a globally interoperable technology 
(ISO 18000-6c), which is seen as the standard expected to become most used in 
industry.  Since then, the surge in item-level tagging, predominantly driven by 
developments in the apparel industry, has fuelled unprecedented growth in sales of 
RFID passive UHF EPC Generation-Two integrated circuits (Swedberg 2010b).  One 
of the big retailers, Wal-Mart, has largely been responsible for this increase in sales, 
and this is a factor seen as continuing to drive growth in EPC Generation-Two UHF 
tags into the future.  This standard may therefore contribute to the eventual 
widespread adoption of RFID in other industries.   
Consequently, a solution which may expose clones in systems that rely on this 
hardware, would offer an additional security solution.   
Work has already been undertaken on examining security in EPC Class-One 
Generation-Two equipment for the purpose of preventing tag cloning and that work 
is used as a basis for comparison with the work in this chapter.  Juels (2005) defined 
the problem of tag cloning in technology as the duplication of a tag’s EPC stored in 
tag memory, which is recoded onto another tag that is field-programmable.  In the 
EPC Class-One Generation-Two specification (EPCglobal 2005), an EPC is the 
number which identifies the entity, to which the tag is or will be attached.  It is stored 
in EPC memory on a tag.  It is this data which is obtained off a tag and is stored in a 
database as a record of which entity was identified at a reader.  Consequently, it is 
this data which is stored in a database after the tag has been identified, attesting to 
the enity’s last known location in the system.   
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Unfortunately, limited security exists on this type of tag to prevent cloning.   
“…EPCglobal standards prescribe no mechanism for EPC readers to authenticate the validity 
of the tags they scan.  An EPC tag emits its EPC promiscuously, i.e., to any querying reader.  
Readers accept the validity of the EPC’s they scan at face value.”  (Juels 2005) 
Consequently, Juels (2005) proposed that EPC Class-One Generation-Two RFID 
tags could be reprogrammed to be able to be authenticated by a reader.  The idea was 
that EPC tags, which possess some features toward privacy protection and access 
control (e.g. the Kill command and password), could utilise these existing functions 
to construct authentication protocols for tag-to-reader authentication.  This would 
ensure that not only the EPC but also the correct PIN would need to be supplied by 
an EPC Class-One Generation-Two tag to be authenticated by a reader.  This would 
be a deterrence to cloning attacks in these systems.   
Whereas Juels (2005) reprogrammed the tag, this chapter will introduce the concept  
of reprogramming the reader as a possible way of exposing clones.   
9.2 BACKGROUND TO CLASS-ONE GENERATION-
TWO ANTI-COLLISION PROTOCOL 
The operational characteristics of the EPC Class-One Generation-Two standard is 
reviewed in this section, and following this, a way of exposing clones at the reader, 
using the reader’s anti-collision protocol is introduced.  It focuses on the anti-
collision scheme used by the reader to identify multiple tags in the field, as this is the 
basis for the many-to-one (M:1) association which was examined in simulation in the 
previous chapter.   
Anti-collision is used by a reader to differentiate between signals received from 
multiple tags simultaneously (Glover and Bhatt 2006).  Tags which use an anti-
collision scheme facilitated by the reader ‘know how to wait their turn when 
responding to a reader’.  Whereas Singulation is about identifying individual tags, 
anti-collision is about regulating the timing of tag responses.  (Glover and Bhatt 
2006).   
The EPC Class-One Generation-Two standard specifies a protocol called the 
Generation-Two protocol which facilitates anti-collision.  During the inventorying 
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stage of this protocol, the reader uses the Slotted Random Anti-Collision (SRAC) 
method (EPCglobal 2005) and this aspect of the Generation-Two protocol is now 
reviewed to establish how a reader may expose clone tags.   
9.2.1 SLOTTED RANDOM ANTI-COLLISION (SRAC) 
This section explains the SRAC method which is used by the Generation-Two 
protocol to identify tags in the field.  This is a relatively brief overview and more 
information can be found in EPCglobal (2005).   
Inventorying is the process of identifying all physical tags in a reader’s field 
(EPCglobal 2005).  A single inventory cycle results in the obtaining of each tag’s 
EPC, however, as will be discussed, the EPC is tangential to the actual identification 
of tags, and under this relationship, clone tags may be identified, through 
implausibilities which arise in the inventory process.  It is worth noting that tags can 
support inventorying by up to four readers simultaneously through the use of 
sessions.  However, the process undertaken by each reader, (and the states 
maintained by each tag in a session), is essentially the same.  Thus, this section just 
explains how tags are inventoried in a single session.   
During a session, tags maintain an inventoried flag for an inventory cycle, which can 
have a value of A or B.  At the beginning of every inventory cycle, a reader chooses 
to inventory tags which are in either the A or B state.  After obtaining the EPC of a 
tag, the reader issues a command that causes the tag to invert its inventoried flag for 
that cycle – preventing it from responding until the next inventory cycle.  The 
process of identifying a tag population is complete once all tags in the field have 
been transitioned to the inverse state they began in.  For example, all tags which 
started in state A are moved into the B state, and the next round, by the same reader, 
will begin in the B state until all tags are moved into the A state.  For a tag, this 
process is repeated until it moves out of range or the reader is instructed to stop 
inventorying the field.  Thus, once a tag has been identified in an inventory cycle, it 
should not respond until the next inventory cycle, provided the reader has been setup 
for this purpose.   
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Figure 42 - Reader and tag interactions, and tag states 
The process of reader and tag interaction indicates a fixed ordering of steps which result in a tag’s 
EPC data being released during an inventory cycle.  (EPCglobal 2005) 
During the inventory process, when a tag is moving from the A to B state, or vice 
versa, a reader proceeds through a series of states to obtain a tag’s EPC and these 
states are now reviewed.  The process is highly complex and many of the tangential 
issues leading up to the release of EPC data, such as how tags contend for slots in the 
protocol, are given brief treatment.   
When a tag is first energised by a reader’s signal, it enters the ready state.  This state 
is a holding state for tags that are neither killed nor currently participating in an 
inventory round.  When a tag, in the ready state receives a Query command from a 
reader, it will draw a q-bit number from its random number generate (RNG), load 
this number into its slot counter, and transition to the arbitrate state if the number is 
nonzero, or to the reply state if the number is zero.  In the reply state, it can respond 
with its EPC.  Conversely, in the arbitrate state, a tag decrements its slot counter 
every time it receives a QueryRep command, transitioning to the reply state when 
this counter reaches zero.  Figure 42 illustrates the sequence of states a tag and reader 
can move through.   
Once in the reply state, illustrated in Figure 43, a tag will backscatter a 16-bit 
random number (RN16) to the reader.  If the tag receives a valid acknowledgement 
(ACK) from the reader, the tag will transition to the acknowledge state.  If the tag 
does not receive an ACK, it will transition back to the arbitrate state, whereby the 
process of counting down starts over.   
Having received an ACK, in the acknowledgement state, the tag will backscatter its 
EPC data.  Also from this state, the tag can move into any other state except killed.  
If for example, the tag has a password set on the Kill command, the tag can transition 
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into the open state which will subsequently allow additional commands to be issued 
to the command.   
 
Figure 43 – The ‘reply’ state for a tag 
In the reply state, a tag will firstly establish a relationship using an RN16 value before a tag releases 
its EPC.  (EPCglobal 2005) 
Critically, however, this is the point at which the tag has released its EPC to a reader.  
It is also at this point, where the reader may instruct the tag to invert its inventoried 
flag, for example from A to B, or B to A, to prevent further communication for this 
inventory cycle.  In Figure 43, the T=>R Signalling states are important as they 
illustrate that a tag will firstly establish a connection to a reader based on its RN16 
value, generated by its RNG on its integrated circuit, then the tag will release its EPC 
value.  Thus, it seems likely that each response in an inventory cycle pertains to a 
physical tag, and the EPC value is tangential to the data recorded about this 
association.   
9.3 EXPOSING CLONE TAGS 
When considering the above process of inventorying tags, it seems likely that; if 
every tag responds only once per inventory cycle, and a tag response is linked to a 
tag’s RN16 value generated by its RNG, then a reader should know exactly how 
many physical tags are in the field.   
Therefore, it seems that identification of a clone is possible by examining all of the 
EPC’s obtained from all tags in a single inventory cycle.  If each response obtained 
correlates with a physical tag, then determining whether an EPC is a clone, is a 
matter of simply determining if the same EPC value is recorded in a single inventory 
multiple times.   
The annotated version of this assumption, which will be explored in the laboratory, is 
illustrated in Figure 44.   
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Reader Tag-1
P+Query
P+RN16
FS+ACK
P+PC+EPC+CRC16
Tag-2
P+Query
P+RN16
FS+ACK
P+PC+EPC+CRC16
Inventory Cycle
Invert A/B Flag
Invert A/B Flag
Tag-1 supplies this EPC value: 
E200 3412 DC03 0117 5523 9646
Tag-2 supplies this EPC value:
E200 3412 DC03 0117 5523 9646
Clone tags are exposed
when the same EPC value is 
recorded in a single inventory cycle.
 
Figure 44 – A single inventory cycle where tags are supply clone EPC values 
The clones are exposed when the same EPC value is recorded more than once per inventory cycle, as 
seen in the above depiction of inventorying multiple tags, adapted from EPCglobal (2005).   
 
The next section sets about determining whether this assumption is correct by 
undertaking experimentation using EPC Class-One Generation-Two equipment.   
9.4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND METHOD 
The experimental setup was designed to see if a reader, programmed to undertake 
and record data from just a single inventory cycle would record data that would 
allow the existence of clone tags to be easily identified.   
To control the reader, commands were issued to it via its application programming 
interface (API) using a computer attached to the reader.  If the reader had allowed for 
direct manipulation, it would have been possible to reprogram the reader to 
undertake clone exposure directly at the source of data.  For example, by examining 
responses between the RN16 value and EPC data on the reader.  Consequently, 
readers could be configured during manufacture to use the following approach to 
expose clones. 
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9.4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
The equipment was configured inside a laboratory environment.  In an actual system, 
these experiments would be performed with less of a guarantee of obtaining a 
response from every physical tag.  Thus, this setup may have obtained more effective 
responses from tags and readers than would be achievable in an actual application 
environment, in which case, results presented should be treated as optimistic.   
9.4.1.1 EQUIPMENT 
RFID equipment manufactured to the specification of the Electronic Product Code 
(EPC) Class-One Generation-Two standard was used for experimentation.  The 
manufacturer of this equipment is Alien Technology; the reader was an ALR-9650 
and the tags were Higg-3 tags (AlienTechnology 2007, 2008a, b).  This particular 
equipment operates at 902.75 to 927.25 MHz.  As this equipment is Class-One 
Generation-Two, the reader and tags communicate using the Slotted Random Anti-
Collision (SRAC) protocol.  The tags are programmable, with a 96-bit memory bank 
for the tag serial number, which was used when tags were reprogrammed to contain 
clone EPC’s.   
9.4.1.2 LABORATORY ENVIRONMENT 
The laboratory environment, illustrated in Figure 45, was where the experiments 
were performed.  As the equipment is susceptible to radio frequency interference 
from surrounding devices, its usage was restricted to a Faraday enclosure, built to a 
similar specification as that reported by Hashemi (2009), increasing the level of 
control over radio frequency signals in the laboratory.  The enclosure was made from 
a disused metal filing cabinet, and lined with several layers of aluminium foil.  This 
was intended to provide some basic protection from external radio frequency (RF) 
interference.   
The main goal in using a Faraday enclosure for RFID was to isolate tags from 
external interference.  However, Hashemi (2009) reports that this enclosure design is 
susceptible to internal interference, whereby internal signals will interfere with one 
another.  However, this problem was assumed to be less of a concern than external 
interference, outside of the Faraday enclosure.   
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Figure 45 –Laboratory and Faraday enclosure 
The enclosure was a metal filing cabinet lined with aluminium foil, to isolate the equipment from 
external RF interference and maintain a controlled test environment. 
9.4.1.3 EQUIPMENT USAGE 
Figure 46 illustrates how tags were positioned inside the Faraday enclosure.  The 
most appropriate alignment of tags was found, through trial-and-error, to be a 
horizontal alignment with a tag’s antenna facing forwards in the enclosure.  The most 
appropriate spacing of the tags was found to be two columns, of ten tags, on a single 
cardboard sheet.  As the number of tags in the enclosure changed, more or fewer 
sheets of cardboard, which the tags were mounted on, were used.  Additional arrays 
of tags, on cardboard sheets, were found to operate more effectively when they were 
3cm apart, at a height of 3cm off the cabinet’s surface, and aligned at alternating off-
centre positions.   
The Faraday enclosure’s ability to isolate the equipment from external interference, 
whilst the equipment was in the enclosure, was established during a calibration 
phase.  This involved two simple tests.  Firstly, the reader was put into its on state 
and the enclosure was shut.  Some tags were placed on the outside of the cabinet in 
close to the reader.  Secondly, the inverse of this scenario was tested: the reader was 
mounted on the outside of the cabinet while tags were located in the draw.  The 
outcome was that the reader was unable to read the tags.  As no tags were read by the 
reader in either case, it was assumed that the tags were immune to signals which 
could disrupt production of data at the reader.  However, as no specialist RF signal 
monitoring equipment was used to gauge potential interferences or dead spots within 
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the Faraday enclosure, it was not possible to say that interferences within the 
enclosure did not occur.  However, assuming interferences inside the enclosure did 
occur, as the configuration was consistent for every experiment, the same potential 
for error would have been consistent across all results.   
 
Figure 46 - The Faraday enclosure was lined with aluminium foil 
The foil reinforced the prevention of RF interference emanating outside of the enclosure.   
 
Over such a short distance it was assumed that no apparent difference would occur 
due to tag positioning.  However, in a real system, the prevalence of physical entities 
to obscure the propagation of tag signals, for example, could interfere with tags. It 
would be equally applicable to both originals and clones, and thus, not a parameter in 
allowing clones to be detected.  The only way to establish this with certainty would 
be to examine far more configurations of hardware.       
While the above configuration was implemented inexpensively, it provided a 
reasonable amount of control over external interferences to the RFID equipment, as 
well as control of the experimentation process.   
9.4.2 EXPERIMENTAL METHOD 
In designing the experimental method to facilitate the derivation of results, illustrated 
in Figure 47, consideration was given to the following factors: scalability of results, 
positioning and usage of tags, experimental repetitions, and formatting of result data.   
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Scalability of the results considered the size of the tag populations which were used.  
It is generally accepted that the more tags in front of a reader, the longer it will take 
to identify all tags due to anti-collision scheduling.  In addition, as more tags are 
introduced, space becomes a limiting factor in situating tags.  Consequently, 
experimentation was conducted using only four different sized tag populations: 1, 10, 
50, and 100 tags.  Within this range of tags, the derived results can be interpreted as 
reliable.  A summary of the experimental method is illustrated in Figure 47.   
 
Figure 47 – General overview of the experimental process 
The method could easily be adapted for actual systems by simply reprogramming a reader or some 
other connected component to examine data obtained per inventory cycle. 
 
The software used for this method to select which tags were used, and to control the 
reader can be found in Appendix B.  It utilises the application programming interface 
1. Experimentation begins when the user initiates the software program on the computer. 
2. Software undertakes y iterations for current experiment e.g. 15 iterations for tag 
population of 100 tags. 
a. For iteration n of y iterations e.g. 5 of 15 iterations 
i. Software instructs user to configure tags in the Faraday enclosure to 
correspond to the random selection of tags and tag positions it has 
selected. 
1. User configures the tags in the Faraday enclosure then 
confirms to software that tags are ready to proceed.   
ii. Software instructs reader via its API to clear all previously held states 
and settings. 
1. Reader is reset and a new configuration is written to the reader. 
iii. Software instructs the reader via its API to issue a single inventory 
command over the air.  The software enters a waiting loop, while the 
reader obtains tag responses.   
iv. Software assumes, after a five second wait time, no more responses will 
be supplied by the reader for this inventory command.  The software 
terminates, which terminates the connection to the reader.  
b. Software writes the results for iteration n to disk for manual processing.   
3. Experimentation ends when y iterations are complete. 
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(API) of the Alien Technology hardware which was used.  More information on this 
hardware can be found in AlienTechnology (2008a) and AlienTechnology (2007).   
An experiment consisted of 15 repetitions and in each repetition; software randomly 
selected a subset of different tags from a group of tags.  This process was designed to 
select which tags were used and where these were to be positioned.  As some tags 
may have been damaged, manufactured differently, or placed in a different part of 
Faraday enclosure, selection and positioning took steps to ensure results were 
collected across a variety of different tags.  In the results, the selection of tags and 
positioning is identified at the top of the result set.  Of course this process would not 
actually be undertaken in an actual system where clones were expected to be exposed 
– this process is only for experimentation purposes.   
Recall that commands were issued to the reader via its API on an attached computer.  
This has the distinct drawback of requiring additional equipment for 
experimentation; however, if it was possible to directly manipulate reader firmware, 
then it may be possible to configure a reader during manufacturing to expose clones.   
The results for an experimental iteration were recorded by the software.  The 
software did not aggregate the results across all repetitions, instead choosing to 
present the raw stream of data, so as not to obscure the relationship between a 
physical tag’s response, an inventory cycle, and the reader.   
Thus, in an actual system, a reader would assess the validity of tag responses when 
tags were active in front of the reader but consideration should be given to influences 
which may be detrimental to results collection.   
9.5 RESULTS 
The results which suggest that tag responses obtained in an inventory cycle are 
associated with physical tags and independent of EPC values are now presented.  On 
the basis of these results, a way of exposing clones in an inventory cycle is 
presented.  The full set of results can be found in Appendix C.  In each set of results, 
the following details are listed: repetition number, which physical tags were in the 
field and where these were positioned, the issuance of the inventory command (get 
TagList), the results of the first tag stream (which is always the reader’s network 
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information), and finally, the responses obtained from tags.  Some limitations on the 
collection of these results are highlighted and left to be examined in further work.   
9.5.1 RESULTS SUGGESTING RESPONSES IN AN 
INVENTORY CYCLE CORRESPOND TO PHYSICAL 
TAGS 
This section presents results which suggest an association between physical tags and 
responses recorded by the reader in a single inventory cycle exist.  Establishing this 
relationship is needed in order to realise the implausibility produced when multiple 
physical tags respond with the same EPC value in a single inventory cycle.   
 
Figure 48 – Response from one physical tag in the field with a unique EPC 
 A single response is obtained following the issuance of a single inventory command.   
Figure 48 illustrates the result of issuing a single inventory command when one 
physical tag was in the field.  This tag, labelled number [94] in the laboratory, and 
configured with the EPC E200 3412 DC03 0117 5523 9281, provided a response.  
The tag response was received at 09:26:18.095 in tag stream one.  The fact that a 
single response was obtained at the reader, is consistent with one physical tag known 
to be in the field.     
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Figure 49 – Response from ten physical tags in the field with unique EPC’s 
Ten responses are obtained which suggest each response came from a physical tag in the field. 
 
Figure 49 illustrates the result of issuing a single inventory command when ten tags 
were in the field.  The arrangement of the tags in the filing cabinet, as multiple tags 
were in use, matches the illustration, thus, [59] [88] were positioned at the top of the 
array in the Faraday enclosure and so forth.  This maintains a record of where in the 
Faraday enclosure each physical tag was positioned.  It can be seen that following 
the issuance of the inventory command, ten unique EPC’s were obtained at the 
reader.  These responses span two tag streams, most likely, as the software received 
the data from the reader in different threads.  The fact that ten responses were 
received is consistent with ten tags being known to be in the field.   
In each of these examples a single inventory command was issued and the results 
collected.  For the same tag population, multiple issuances of the inventory command 
were not applied.  That is, this process - an inventory command followed by results 
collection, then followed by another inventory command and results collection – was 
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not performed.  This would have been a more robust process but was not undertaken 
as, most likely; it would have illustrated the same associations.   
In some examples in Appendix C, it is apparent that the tag populations of sizes 50 
and 100 tags have missing physical tags in the results.  In some iterations, fewer tags 
then in the population responded to the issuance of a single inventory command.  For 
example, 90 tag responses rather than the full 100 tag responses.  This may be due to 
interference in the Faraday enclosure, for example.  In these cases, it would have 
been useful to issue multiple inventory commands on the same population for a 
nominal time period, e.g. 3 seconds, to see whether the reader could detect any 
additional tags which were not recorded in the first instance.  Alternatively, 
additional RFID readers or antennas could have been used in the same field to 
increase coverage of the tags, thereby, increasing the likelihood that all tags would 
be read in the first command issuance.  The fact that some iterations produced less 
than the actual number of physical tags, however, is not perceived to be an issue in 
this chapter.  The data obtained still establishes the association between those 
physical tags which did respond to a reader’s acknowledgement (ACK) command, 
and the obtaining of EPC values.   
Thus, when considering the above examples, it seems likely that the responses 
obtained during a single inventory cycle are associated with the physical tags which 
are in the field.  These responses will be confirmed as independent of the EPC’s in 
the next section, and therefore, these responses can be to expose clone tags in a M:1 
association.   
9.5.2 RESULTS SUPPORTING THE EXPOSURE OF CLONE 
TAGS IN AN INVENTORY CYCLE 
The results which expose implausibilities in tag responses, and therefore suggest the 
occurrence of physical tags with clone EPC values is reported in this section.  In the 
following examples, the experiments were conducted using populations of: 1, 10, 50, 
100 tags (results of which appear in full in Appendix C).  In these experiments tags 
were configured with the same (0102 0304 0506 0708 090A 0B0C) and therefore, 
tags responded with the same EPC value to the reader during the inventory cycle.  
On this basis they constitute clone tags under the definition proposed by Juels 
(2005).   
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Figure 50 – Responses from ten physical tags in the field 
The results suggest that obtainment of the same EPC in a single inventory cycle are indicative of 
clones in the field.   
Figure 50 and Figure 51 both illustrate responses captured by the reader, following 
the issuance of a single inventory command on a population of ten physical tags 
which contained the same EPC value.  The results support the associations found 
above: that responses are associated with physical tags as ten responses were 
collected.  The fact that these responses all use the same EPC value does not appear 
to have influenced tag identification at the reader.  When considering these 
examples, it seems likely that responses obtained by a reader, in a single inventory 
cycle, are independent of the EPC value – which is as should be expected following 
the operation of the protocol (EPCglobal 2005).   
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Figure 51 - Ten more physical tags in the field as clones 
The additional repetitions confirm that, indeed, clones can be revealed when duplicate EPC’s are 
observed in a single inventory cycle.   
Consequently, when considering the relationship between responses and physical 
tags; clone tags are trivially evident on the basis that multiple EPC’s of the same 
value were obtained in a single inventory cycle.  It is not possible that the same 
physical tag could have solicited the same EPC value multiple times in a single 
inventory command.   
Thus, to expose the existence of clones in the field, a reader need only check to see if 
multiple instances of the same EPC are obtained in each inventory cycle.   
9.6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter has considered the reprogramming of a reader via its application 
programming interface (API) on a computer for exposing clones.  This approach is 
compliant with EPC Class-One Generation-Two UHF RFID equipment.  The process 
was shown to work for a many-to-one (M:1) association, when many tags are active 
in front of a reader which uses the Slotted Random Anti-Collision approach.  As the 
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work was suggested by the reference model, and visualised in simulation results, the 
implications of these findings for a ‘whole of system’ approach to security are briefly 
discussed.   
Whereas Juels (2005) illustrated that the reprogramming of read-to-tag protocols of 
authentication protocols can be achieved, the approach proposed in this chapter does 
not authenticate tags to a reader – rather it exposes clone tags after these have been 
cloned and introduced back into the system.  In the proposed approach, a reader 
validates the authenticity of a tag on the basis that its EPC data is not already in use 
by another tag at the reader at the same time.  Clone tags which are active in the 
same field at the same time are therefore revealed to the same end that an 
authentication protocol would identify the duplicity of EPC’s amongst a group of 
tags.  Thus, clones which are travelling in a group, which appear at a reader, could be 
exposed by this method, providing an additional security solution to that proposed by 
Juels (2005).   
A potential limitation on this approach working is that clones need to appear in the 
same tag group, and at the same reader in time.  Consequently, consideration should 
be given to what constitutes the ‘tag group’ and the ‘read zone’.  The Class-One 
Generation-Two standard supports tags interacting with up to four readers at a time 
via sessions, thus, a relatively large perimeter could be defined using multiple 
readers spread out over a large physical area to define a large M:1 zone.  Moreover, 
other natural areas in which many tagged entities are likely to be in close may be 
candidate areas for the validation of EPC data.  For example, the recursive M:1 
structure which may be prevalent on palletised products, tagged to the item-level 
comes to mind.  In Chapter 6, the advantage of having identified and modelled this 
association, in addition to putting into the vocabulary, is that it is now possible to 
identify it in systems.   
The investigation into exposing clones at a reader was suggested by simulation work 
conducted in the previous chapter.  Having looked at the problem of cloning ‘whole 
of system,’ simulation suggested the possibility of examining data directly at the 
reader.  This was a different approach when compared to work on intrusion detection 
systems by Mirowski and Hartnett (2007) which had previously attempted to look for 
implausibilities using historical data, and data collected throughout different 
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locations.  When this example is considered, it seems likely the M:1 approach has the 
advantage of not requiring any additional context for attack exposure.   
Looking at the method ‘whole of system’ suggests that filtering of data may 
influence how successful this method is.  In the results it is apparent many data 
records are obtained in a few milliseconds per inventory command.  The usual 
tendency would be to filter out all records which pertain to a single EPC to reduce 
the amount of data entering a database.  However, this would mean that clones would 
not be detected if these individual records were aggregated or filtered out.  This 
suggests the need to perform plausibility checking prior to data filtering.   
In essence this chapter has been about how a ‘whole of system’ approach to analysis, 
made possible by the reference model, helps in identifying practical security.  When 
layers and partitions are considered, and analysis occurs through these using 
systematic methods, where it was feasible to reprogram a system to expose clone 
tags was identified.  Simulation assisted the search towards this discovery, and 
experimentation confirmed the results.  This solution location was reached when the 
problem was approached through the reference model.   
When considering the above outcomes, facilitated ‘whole of system’ via the 
reference model, the advantages which this analysis approach imparts in encouraging 
the exploration of practical security are evident.   
9.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter began with an exploration of results suggested by simulation work 
reported in the previous chapter, and proceeded to confirm these results as a solution 
to tag cloning exposure using EPC Class One Generation Two hardware.  The work 
completed here serves to confirm the reference model’s ability to suggest practical 
security results while also introducing an important additional solution to clone tag 
exposure in systems 
The simulation results indicated that in a M:1 association, when multiple tags were 
active in range of a reader, anti-collision may expose the implausibility of tags which 
contain duplicate EPC values.  The simulation model was based on the domain 
model which was enumerated in Chapter 6, and experimentation was examining 
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associations of the model which were containing cloned tags.  Upon the finding that 
clones could be identified in a M:1 association, experimentation commenced with 
EPC Class-One Generation-Two hardware as this is reported as increasingly 
widespread in industries (Swedberg 2010b).  A cloning solution here may assist limit 
clones in these systems.   
The solution which was explored in this chapter has the advantage of being relatively 
simple, and potentially implementable on existing hardware.  It could be an addition 
to existing solutions which operate within this part of an RFID system, making it an 
important contribution to RFID security.   
When considering the process of arriving at the solution reported above, these results 
would not have been evident if a ‘whole of system’ approach had not been applied.  
Having explored the ‘solution partition’ through the simulation model in Chapter 8 
the search for a means of exposing clones via tag and reader associations was 
identified.  This exploration process improved the search for this solution through 
animation and output data, along with various concepts contained in the model.  The 
relationships between layers and partitions led to the identification of a potential 
location for attack exposure: the reprogramming of a reader to expose clones.   
This chapter ends with the thought that architecture based solution development, 
which is what reference models encourage (Mišic and Zhao 2000; Fettke and Loos 
2003), discussed in Chapter 4, has been illustrated in this chapter through the 
contribution of a practicable solution for EPC Class-One Generation-Two systems 
which was arrived at through the reference model.   
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, a ‘whole of system’ approach to security analysis is illustrated by 
applying the complete reference model, illustrated in Figure 52, to the specific 
example of a pharmaceutical supply chain, and the results are compared with those 
which may be derived using previous work which took a more localised approach 
(Rotter 2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010).   
Pharmaceutical supply chains are complex systems in which RFID is integrated 
across a number of locations called custodians.  RFID is used for the purpose of 
producing information suitable for electronic pedigrees which are essentially 
documents each containing a history of a drug’s movement through a supply chain, 
and are used to validate the drug as authentic (or for recall purposes).  In examining 
the security requirements of this specific example, the reference model’s ability to be 
used for security analysis ‘whole of system’ is revealed.   
 
Figure 52 - Validation of the complete reference model via a case study 
By applying the reference model to the specific example of a pharmaceutical supply chain, this 
chapter illustrates the benefits of the ‘whole of system’ approach via the reference model. 
Recall from Chapter 4 that validating a reference model via a case study is a 
appropriate approach to take (Fettke and Loos 2003).  In order to illustrate the rigour 
with which the analysis of the model will be scrutinised via a case study, one should 
understand the complexity of pharmaceutical supply chains.  A brief background is 
now provided for this purpose, before outlining the organisation of this chapter.   
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Since the United States Federal Drug Administration (FDA) recommended the use of 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in their 2004 report, Combating Counterfeit 
Drugs (FDA 2004), pharmaceutical supply chains are increasingly using RFID as a 
source of data for electronic pedigrees.  Electronic pedigrees try to prevent the 
introduction of counterfeit drugs and diversion of legitimate drugs.  These are two 
ongoing problems for pharmaceutical supply chains (Howe et al. 2007).  As the 
RFID system is integrated with the pharmaceutical supply chain to support the 
information goals of the electronic pedigree, it is important that the data sourced 
from the RFID system is valid. 
The importance of treating RFID security requirements using a ‘whole of system’ 
approach is apparent, when considering the RFID system trialled by the prescription 
drug manufacturer Purdue Pharma.  Their system was one of the earliest known 
RFID-based electronic pedigrees.  News sources report that the Purdue Pharma 
electronic pedigree matched each bottle of the drug OxyContin, a popular painkiller, 
with a corresponding electronic record detailing the drug’s movement through a 
pharmaceutical supply chain to form an electronic pedigree (Wasserman 2005).  
News sources report that the Purdue Pharma electronic pedigree sourced its data 
from an existing RFID system which was monitoring OxyContin that was shipped to 
the drug wholesaler H.D.Smith (O'Connor 2007).  This RFID system allowed 
H.D.Smith to authenticate the drug by authenticating electronic pedigree information 
using digital signatures; making sure a bottled drug’s pedigree serial number 
matched the corresponding Electronic Product Code (EPC) on the bottles tag.   
When considering the above example, two issues highlight the need for ‘whole of 
system’ analysis: 
• As an electronic pedigree is a data file (Grasso and Cole 2006), changes in 
different parts of the system, such as those stemming from cloning, can affect 
RFID data, and hence, the accuracy of the pedigree.  Thus, these changes 
need to be controlled to ensure accurate pedigree data.   
• As an electronic pedigree should exist for each individual drug bottle, rather 
than an entire batch of drugs, RFID will need to maintain its operational 
advantages when compared to the barcode.  For example, the ability to 
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identify individual tags and tags through packaging - without slowing down 
the supply chain.  In Chapter 2 it was established that the choice and 
implementation of security has ramifications throughout the RFID system.  
Thus, where security is located is of importance in achieving a balance 
between RFID and security.   
In accepting that a pharmaceutical supply chain is a complex system, applying a 
‘whole of system’ approach to analysis of security in this system should allow the 
extent of the model’s capabilities to become evident during the deliberation process.   
To this end, the chapter presents an analysis of security in the specific example of a 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  Background information which provides a systems 
context has been first reviewed, which suggests that this system is relatively 
complex, and therefore, has the potential to utilise all facets of the model.  It also 
provides a system context for analysis in the problem and solution partition.  
Following this, each partition of the reference model is used to analyse this system.  
Elements relevant to the analysis are encoded inside a partition, and later, all of the 
partitions are integrated.  During this analysis comparisons are made between the 
outcomes achieved and those which would be achieved if previous work was applied 
to the same problem.  The deliberative process of analysis illustrated in this chapter 
is the basis for validating the model’s usage for complete systems.   
10.2 ANALYSIS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY 
CHAIN 
In this section, the reference model has been adapted for operational use.  To this 
end, the operational use of the problem partition and solution partition are overlayed 
on top of the domain partition using the system layers.  Overlaying attack sequences 
over the domain partition depicts the underlying context needed to realise where in 
the system pharmaceutical systems are vulnerable to attack.  Similarly, the solution 
space is overlayed against the problem space to illustrate its relation to attacks.  
Essentially, the same model, just used slightly differently when compared to 
previous chapters. 
While the elements which are instantiated into each partition of the reference model 
are generic, to show how an actual RFID system in a pharmaceutical supply chain 
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can be discussed through the reference model, the RFID system trialled by Cardinal 
Health is applied as the specific case study example.  News sources report that 
Cardinal Health trialled the use of RFID starting in June 2006, to track and trace 
items in its pharmaceutical supply chain (Bacheldor 2006b).  Cardinal Health 
manufactures pharmaceuticals for nine of the world’s top ten drug companies and 
distributes one-third of all pharmaceutical, medical, lab and surgical products in the 
United States.  Item-level tagging for an electronic pedigree was trialled to help 
improve the safety of medicine and other health-care products as they move through 
the supply chain in this system.  More information about this specific example will 
emerge in conjunction with generic pharmaceutical supply chain conditions in the 
following analysis sections.   
The reference model is now used to analyse this system with the outcomes of a 
‘whole of system’ analysis presented for each partition.   
10.2.1 STANDARD OPERATING PARTITION 
In pharmaceutical supply chains, the RFID system can be thought of as a series of 
interconnected RFID systems. Each subsystem is situated within a custodian’s 
location, to act as a source of part of the information for an electronic pedigree.  In 
this section how the layers and partitions assist in encapsulating relevant information 
for analysis is illustrated.   
To make a distinction between this work and previous work by other authors; 
previous work has organised the elements of systems into layers (Mitrokotsa et al. 
2010) or has appeared to provide a mutually exclusive view of domain structures 
using several system properties (Rotter 2008).  These appear to capture a system’s 
static elements; however, they overlook the influences of system elements on the 
integration of attacks throughout the system.   
Conversely, the reference model organises components across the layers of the 
reference model and illustrates their interconnections.  The pharmaceutical supply 
chain is modelled at the real world layer, the RFID system at the RFID layer, and the 
electronic pedigree at the strategic layer.  The reference model abstracts, from these 
layers, components into the partitions; the associations between these components, 
and the information which can be inferred from their associations.  The difference 
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from previous work is that the layers and partitions will be shown to lead to a more 
effective view of the system - from the real world layer’s most concrete elements, to 
the strategic layer’s most abstract elements - allowing for a system’s nuances to be 
taken into consideration in analysing security in the next two partitions.   
Figure 53 depicts two custodian locations using the reference model within a generic 
pharmaceutical supply.  These generic custodians are: a chemical company, and a 
drug manufacturer (Koh et al. 2003).  To show that these RFID systems are related, 
these share the common real world for interconnection – the physical world where 
products are distributed via shipping and receiving methods.  At the real world layer 
for interconnection, product exchanges can involve various types of shipments such 
as the products to be distributed from the chemical company, to the drug 
manufacturer.  Other custodians can be modelled, but for brevity, only two have been 
depicted.  Also, the data flows between elements have not been modelled as these 
can become very complex.  The rest of this section will discuss how the layers and 
partitions enable a effective view of the system’s standard operations. 
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10.2.1.1 STRATEGIC LAYER 
The strategic layer contains the electronic pedigree which establishes a secure chain 
of custody of pedigree documents shared between custodians in the pharmaceutical 
supply chain.  A design for an industry-wide electronic pedigree has been advocated 
by the Drug Security Network (DSN) and furthered by EPCglobal’s Healthcare and 
Life Sciences Pedigree Task Force (Inaba 2008).  This design is modelled at the 
strategic layer as it captures the use of RFID as a source of information for pedigree 
information goals in the enterprise.   
This electronic pedigree uses three elements: pedigree data format, pedigree 
processing, and pedigree information transmission mechanisms (Inaba 2008).  These 
elements have been modelled in the respective partitions at the strategic layer of the 
reference model depending on whether these are: standalone components; involve 
several components by association; or are inferred from data from component 
associations.  These are now briefly explained to justify their inclusion in the 
standard operating partition.   
The pedigree data format represents the physical entity’s information, such as the 
drug, in a format which can be distributed amongst custodians (Inaba 2008).  It has 
supply chain wide scope which allows custodians in remote locations, or across 
countries, to understand and interpret information about entities.  Digital signatures 
are used by the format to ensure the integrity and non-repudiation of data, and also 
that it complies with legislation and the need for governments to audit such data.  As 
the format has been incorporated into a de-facto industry-wide specification, now 
essentially a superset of several formats complying with the electronic pedigree laws 
introduced by the National Association of board of Pharmacy (NABP) and the US 
states of Florida and California (Inaba 2008), it has been modelled as a component at 
the strategic layer in the reference model.  
Electronic pedigree processing authenticates an electronic pedigree document, 
validating the transactions of previous custodians from the document before the 
product arrives (Inaba 2008).  When physical products arrive, pedigree processing 
verifies that the products match the electronic pedigree document; and prior to 
shipping a product, pedigree processing is used to sign the outgoing pedigree, and 
transmit the pedigree to the next custodian.  Pedigree processing is a strategic layer 
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component which starts at the second custodian’s location as this is the first place 
where pedigree information would be verified.   
The transmission mechanism of electronic pedigrees is used to transfer data to 
custodians (Inaba 2008).  This can happen in two ways: the propagating document 
approach or the fragmented data approach.  The propagating document approach 
represents pedigree data into a single document which is appended, re-signed, and 
forwarded by each successive custodian in the supply chain.  As each custodian 
appends and re-signs the document, a new layer is added to the document, 
effectively, creating a link between all custodians which can be unwrapped to verify 
a product’s point of origin, thus, it depends on associations forming between 
custodians.  In this case, one-to-many (1:M) associations would be formed as the 
document is read in sequence between custodians which is why it is in the 
association partition of the strategic layer.   
Conversely, the fragmented data approach allows custodians to retain electronic 
pedigree information for a document in their own database or a third-party database, 
rather than propagating it down the supply chain (Inaba 2008).  Although this 
produces smaller pedigree documents, it increases the amount of network traffic to 
source pedigree information.  It also means that a custodian could modify data after 
the product has been shipped.  When considering this, as a custodian participates 
with each other through the database, different associations are formed, for example, 
a 1:M if documents are read in sequence, or one-to-one (1:1) if a single custodian 
examines a document in time.  Effectively these belong to the strategic layer’s 
association partition.  
As products may be assembled or aggregated in the real world layer, individual 
pedigree documents are combined into a Pedigree Business Document (Inaba 2008).  
As the Pedigree Business Document serves as a wrapper to consolidate the individual 
pedigree records, it is an inferred information structure, so it has been modelled in 
the strategic layer’s feature space.  These wrappers specify information unique to 
each pedigree document (identifier, version of format, timestamp); and information 
unique to the product package (drug name, manufacturer/distributor, object 
identifier, National Drug Code (NDC), manufacturing date, expiry date, dosage 
form, strength, container size, lot number, parent package object identifier).  This 
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information attests to a component i.e. a drug.  However, as additional information is 
added to the Pedigree Business Document prior to it being transmitted to the next 
custodian - information about the shipper; and transaction data (sale invoice number, 
date of purchase, quantity by lot number), belongs in the strategic layer’s feature 
space.  This information is derived when several entities in the real world layer are 
associated with each other – such as through aggregation.   
Finally, the custodian that is shipping a product, and hence, a business document as 
well, has to sign the document.  Upon receipt of the goods and documents, the 
receiving custodian validates the digital signature (authentication) and after matching 
the received products with the pedigree document (verification), they then sign the 
pedigree to confirm receipt (confirmation).  As the underlying movement of these 
aggregated products may happen repeatedly along the supply chain - the process of 
transmission, signing, and retransmission at the aggregated form gets repeated 
multiple times, which is why these elements are modelled in the strategic layer’s 
association space.   
To understand how the strategic layer works in an actual pharmaceutical supply 
chain that uses RFID systems, the Cardinal Health system is now considered.  
Having trialled the use of RFID at the item-level, Cardinal Health was readying their 
Sacramento California distribution centre (DC) for California’s upcoming 
pharmaceutical electronic pedigree requirement (Bacheldor 2007).  Having sourced 
information from the RFID layer, they were preparing to collect RFID data for drugs 
they receive from manufacturers and distribute to customers.  They were also going 
to purge the serial numbers from any pharmaceuticals that were returned to its 
Sacramento distribution centre and that data was to be used in an electronic pedigree, 
to document product return, prior to the drug being returned to the manufacturer.  As 
these procedures would be occurring above the RFID layer, in the enterprise, these 
would be considered at the strategic layer in the reference model.   
10.2.1.2 RFID LAYER 
The RFID layer contains the RFID system which is a source of information for 
electronic pedigrees.  There are two sides when considering the RFID system: the 
lower technology elements (which are physical linkages or interfaces to a custodian’s 
location and products); and the upper data elements (derived from the physical 
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components which interface to the electronic pedigree).  In the case of Electronic 
Product Code (EPC) based systems, these elements have been standardised, 
however, other proposals for the design of these elements exist, and therefore, a 
mixture of both are presented in the reference model.  These depict how RFID is a 
source of information for the electronic pedigree.  These elements are now explained 
in order from the most abstract to least abstract following the principle of abstraction 
expounded in Chapter 5.   
RFID data can be distributed between custodians using various infrastructures.  One 
such infrastructure is the EPC Infrastructure, proposed by the Auto-ID Labs, and 
now advanced by EPCglobal as the EPC Network.  This infrastructure specifies a 
global schema for the distribution of data through components and associations 
(Staake et al. 2005).  The main components of the infrastructure are: object name 
service (ONS), EPC discovery service (EPCDS), and the EPC information service 
(EPCIS).  These elements are now listed:   
• The ONS is a multi-layered directory service – containing root and local 
services - which locate information about tag EPC’s in a similar manner to 
that of the internet’s domain name service (DNS).  The root ONS is the 
authoritative directory of manufacturers offering information about their 
products on the EPC network, whereas a local ONS is a directory for 
individual products of a specific manufacturer.  (Staake et al. 2005).   
• Next, the EPCIS is used by trading partners, such as custodians, to store and 
provide access to product information.  (Staake et al. 2005).   
• Finally, the EPCDS is a directory of addresses for other EPCIS servers to 
locate data about an EPC, to be located across several databases in order for 
track and trace to operate.  (Staake et al. 2005).   
As these components are networked components, most likely accessed over the 
internet, custodians would associate to these using remote database queries to derive 
RFID data for their electronic pedigrees, which is why this has been modelled in the 
association partition of the RFID layer.   
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On the lower side of the RFID layer, the organisation of RFID components can be 
reflected in RFID data stored in databases (Agrawal et al. 2006).  The associations 
which arose at the component level, such as when a particular reader has read data 
from a tag can be inferred from the RFID data, and can be transformed into a 
movement graph of associations.   
In a movement graph, the physical associations are depicted in the data as entity 
types: object, location, and organisation (Agrawal et al. 2006).  A relationship 
‘belongs to’ defines the association a location in the physical world has with a 
custodian.  To represent RFID events, other relationship types exist, such as: 
observed, assembled, and disassembled.  The observed relationship represents an 
event of when an object was seen at a particular location at a certain time and 
represents the edges of an object movement graph – a trace of where an object has 
moved.  This relation type, together with the relationship type ‘belongs to’, 
represents the edges of a traceability network, and hence, the associations between 
custodians.   
Associations within a custodian location and the entities it produces can also be 
represented at a logical data layer as well.  The assembled and disassembled 
relationships capture associations which have formed between objects - such  as 
hierarchical associations in packaging, for example, packaging of drugs in 
pharmaceutical supply chains. This is why these have been modelled in the RFID 
layer’s feature space. (Agrawal et al. 2006). 
It is possible to build up a data view of the underlying RFID hardware – this was 
illustrated in a similar manner in Chapter 6 when associations and features were 
modelled. 
Having defined the traceability network’s data and logical views in the data, it is then 
possible to infer new features from these structures by performing traceability 
queries (Agrawal et al. 2006).  A pedigree query could be used to reconstruct the 
complete history of an object, whereas a recall query, issued to detect the current 
location of an object, and a bill-of-material query asks for everything that is 
contained in an object in instances of assembly or disassembly.  That is why these 
queries have been modelled in the feature partition of the RFID layer.   
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Ultimately these logical associations and features arise from the underlying 
traceability network which is made up of all the RFID sensing locations containing 
RFID readers (Agrawal et al. 2006).  Sensing locations within a custodian’s location 
are equipped with RFID readers which produce events that represent the state of an 
object at a certain time.  As sensing locations are organised in sequence, and entities 
move in sequence along these locations, an object movement graph can be defined as 
the derivation of data records in sequence – essentially a history of the entity’s 
movement along a particular part of the RFID system.  As each custodian has an 
RFID system which may be contributing to a centralised data repository, each 
location is effectively contributing a subset of the overall associations within the 
object movement graph, and hence, the overall entity trace.   
However, as object movement and related data can be valuable business information 
which custodians may be reluctant to share, a system which maintains sovereignty of 
each query may be restricted.  Agrawal et al. (2006) have proposed a query engine to 
support information sharing across multiple organisations at the traceability network 
layer.  Provided the custodians run the query engine platform, they can run global 
traceability queries; the query engine rewrites the request to obtain data which is 
available to the custodian, complying with permissions in place at custodian gateway 
query engines.  This shows that in the RFID layer’s association partition, even 
though a physical association may exist between components, not every feature can 
be inferred by a custodian. 
The above examples conclude the upper side of the RFID system in the reference 
model’s depiction of standard operations.  Now the lower RFID side is discussed.   
In order for these higher RFID concepts to be supported, the radio frequency of tags 
and readers will influence the establishing of associations and features at the RFID 
layer’s lower side.  The Pharmaceutical Benchmark has examined the use of the 
three RFID frequency types in pharmaceutical supply chains (Howe et al. 2007).  
High-Frequency (HF) can be used close to liquids such as a vaccine vial, while far 
field Ultra High Frequency (UHF) cannot.  However, UHF has a much longer reach 
than HF, as beyond 12 inches HF does not function, whereas UHF is effective up to 
36 inches.  In addition, UHF is more sensitive to the orientation of the chip relative 
to the antenna and is, consequently, a more appropriate technology for capturing tag 
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data from cartons arranged on a pallet.  Finally, Near Field UHF has been proposed 
as replacing HF and UHF, but is still under development.  Thus, the choice of radio 
frequency will impact on the granularity of tag reads on associated entities in the real 
world layer.  Further complicating matters is the influence the physical contents of 
the entities has, as mentioned above; some frequencies are impacted by water and 
metals. As will be discussed, frequency will influence how deeply within an 
assembled package the reader will be able to identify tags, and hence, infer the 
contents of the assembled product in containing physical entities such as drugs.  
Consequently, this impacts on what is inferred in the association and feature space of 
the data layers of the RFID layer.  In essence, radio frequency emanates from 
readers, antenna, and tag components to enable associations being formed – which is 
why it has been modelled in the RFID layer’s association space, while components 
appear in the RFID layer’s component partition. This analysis via the reference 
model illustrates the model’s ability to capture these elements.   
In the Cardinal Health system a single radio frequency has been used.  Alien 
Technology 915 MHz Class-One Generation-Two tags have been attached to 
individual packages of all brand-name and generic prescription drugs as opposed to 
using several different frequencies (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  This shows that even 
though a variety of tag frequencies exist and for different purposes, some companies 
have found that a single radio frequency can read tags across several physical layers 
of packaging, and also across the entire pharmaceutical supply chain. 
The adoption of RFID within pharmaceutical supply chains determines the horizontal 
production of data – between custodians – and the vertical production of data – 
within a custodian’s location (Bapat and Restivo 2005).  RFID deployment also 
occurs in phases.  In Phase One, a custodian may conduct a closed-loop pilot to 
derive a business case for widespread adoption of RFID.  By applying tags to a 
limited number of product pallets, the mandates of downstream custodians may be 
achieved.  In Phase Two, there would be an increasing level of integration of RFID 
into the custodian’s business operations, where the technology may be pushed 
outwards and into upstream or downstream custodians.  It may also include 
increasing the level of granularity of tagging, to the item-level or into production 
processes, incorporated into a company Manufacturing Execution System (MES), 
thereby extending RFID onto the plant floor.  The effect would be an increase in the 
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identification granularity to a point at which raw materials can be tagged, and the 
integration of several raw ingredients to form new products could be recorded.  This 
would provide a record of product formulation.  As various interactions could be 
recorded under such a scheme – raw ingredient interaction through to ingredient 
interaction with plant equipment or custodian locations - this could all be reflected in 
the electronic pedigree at the strategic layer.   
Thus, modelling the RFID layer between the strategic layer and real world layer, 
enables the interrelationships (which influence the configuration of this technology 
and which will shortly be illustrated as influential in security analysis) to be 
considered.   
10.2.1.3 REAL WORLD LAYER 
The real world layer contains the pharmaceutical supply chain’s physical 
components and processes.  These enable the movement of drugs between all 
custodians to deliver the drug all the way to the consumer.  This layer is interfaced to 
the RFID layer by the physical tags and readers when they are associated with 
different physical entities in the real world layer association partition.  The degree of 
integration of RFID technology into the physical world is dependent on the level of 
integration enabled by the phases of RFID deployment, in addition to the physical 
components and processes.   
A product’s form can change over the pharmaceutical supply chain.  A drug product 
can begin life as an active raw ingredient in a chemical plant.  The chemical plant 
ships the ingredient in barrels to the drug manufacturer.  The drug manufacturer 
processes the active ingredient, perhaps transforming it into a solid drug, such as a 
tablet or pill, at a manufacturing plant.  The manufacturing plant may aggregate 
many individual drug products using layers of packaging or containers, in which 
event new associations are formed between individual products to derive aggregated 
products.   
The manner in which RFID is integrated with the physical layers which shape 
aggregated products impacts on the derived data for the electronic pedigree.  
However, what can be inferred at the strategic layer’s feature partition of an 
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electronic pedigree’s documents ultimately may depend on the configuration of 
entities that interact in the real world layer’s association partition.   
An example of this multi-layered association and how it influences what can be 
inferred by the electronic pedigree can be seen in the Cardinal Health system, when 
the assembly of packages and products varies.  Products can be assembled into: foils, 
blister packs, bottles, liquids, and solids – and at different points along the 
pharmaceutical supply chain (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  Accordingly the RFID 
technology is integrated into this physical structure as follows:   
• The RFID tags are embedded into printed labels at Cardinal Health’s Printed 
Components facility in Moorestown New Jersey.  The RFID labels are then 
transferred to the company’s Philadelphia packaging plant, to be 
automatically applied to the individual product items and encoded with 
unique serial numbers.  Labels are automatically applied to the individual 
product items and cases, and manually applied to pallets.  (Bacheldor 2006a, 
b).   
• Cardinal Health installed RFID interrogator antennas on packaging lines and 
RFID portals at dock doors at both the Philadelphia plant and a distribution 
centre in Findlay, Ohio.  RFID interrogators at the DC read the tags as the 
drugs were received and shuffled through picking and packing processes.  
(Bacheldor 2006a, b).   
• Finally, tagged unit-level drugs mixed in totes with non-tagged items were 
sent to a pharmacy in the Midwest, where an RFID portal at the store’s dock 
door scanned tags as products moved into the facility.  (Bacheldor 2006a, b).   
Thus, aggregation of entities can change throughout this pharmaceutical supply chain 
with entities exhibiting different layers of association with each other at different 
locations – ultimately this integration starts in the real world layer. (Bacheldor 
2006a, b).   
Although the physical form of products can change throughout the supply chain, an 
association still exists for all raw materials into end products in the manufacturing 
processes through the integration of raw ingredients.  The requirement is to ensure 
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that the manufacturing processes can be reflected in the RFID system, in this case, 
through the integration of RFID technology with entities (Koh et al. 2003).  
Conceptually there are at least two information links which need to be available in 
the RFID system: data aggregation and data inheritance (Inaba 2008).  Data 
aggregation is the logical equivalent of item aggregation or assembly, whereas data 
inheritance is the history of the parent data, whereby it is possible to reconstruct the 
history of an item including any transformations it has undertaken.  Aggregation at 
the logical layer allows a tag associated with an entity which aggregates other 
smaller entities, at the real world layer, to infer that small entities are also present.   
Consequently, these information links occur at the real world layer.  The concept of 
data aggregation and inheritance allows a single tag, fixed to a pallet to be read, for 
details about each product on the pallet.  Associations can be formed sequentially as 
entities move between custodians, when ingredients are integrated to form a new 
product, or through the assembly of entities using packaging.  Recall, these 
associations are easier to establish in RFID systems as RFID does not require line of 
sight contact for identifiers to be exchanged with the company (Inaba 2008). 
In the Cardinal Health system, trying to read tags on individual items, to depict 
aggregated associations of many products packed in cases on pallets to a single 
packaging entity (a kind of many-to-one (M:1) association in the real world) was 
found to be very unreliable (Bacheldor 2006a, b) at some custodian locations.  Item-
level read rates were very low – between 7.8 percent and 14.3 percent as the radio 
frequency was not able to reach all the tags in a pallet.   
To resolve this problem, a process called inference assumed the initial read was 
accurate, and that nothing had happened to change the status of the pallet or cases.  
With inference reading, Cardinal Health had an electronic record of all those 
individual item-tag numbers, which become part of the Advanced Shipping Notice 
(ASN) for that pallet and its cases.  The ASN was held in a database and correlated 
with the tag numbers for the items on that pallet.  Inference was used to avoid the 
problems that resulted if a read at subsequent points in the supply chain was not as 
accurate as the first read.  The process worked internally but externally it was limited 
as not every custodian received an item-level ASN.  Thus, using the reference model, 
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an ASN has been modelled in the real world layer feature space as it can be inferred 
through physical inspection of the assembled entities.  (Bacheldor 2006a, b) 
This illustrates that what can be inferred in the electronic pedigree ultimately 
depends on different layers and consideration needs to be given to the 
interrelationships which occur throughout these layers.  This emphasises the need to 
think ‘whole of system’ when developing a model of a system’s standard operations.   
10.2.2 SUMMARY 
This section has defined the ‘system model’ in which RFID for electronic pedigrees 
are situated.  While the layers and partitions are static or declarative constructs, the 
elements within these are not static; at custodian locations, and depending on which 
custodian is modelled, different elements are instantiated.  This shows that the 
concept of context, at least for pharmaceutical supply chains, is not a static concept; 
rather, it is necessary to realise that context changes throughout a pharmaceutical 
supply chain.   
To reiterate the distinction made from previous work, Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) have 
localised security to each layer, and Rotter (2008) has localised security to two 
system properties, this section has highlighted the interrelationships which occur 
throughout a system, and in doing so, broadened what can be considered in security 
analysis.  As it occurs across horizontal system layers, and between elements of each 
layer, security needs to consider these effects in order to draw security analysis for 
actual systems.   
In the next sections, this will be shown to be the essential basis for a ‘whole of 
system’ approach to security in this RFID system.   
10.2.3 PROBLEM PARTITION 
RFID systems that operate in pharmaceutical supply chains are vulnerable to a 
variety of attacks.  As RFID is integrated within pharmaceutical supply chains, the 
pharmaceutical supply chain influences the configuration of the RFID system.  
Therefore, a ‘whole of system’ approach will now be illustrated to facilitate 
consideration of threats in relation to actual system elements.   
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Previous work has examined threats at a single layer or at a single RFID component 
(Mitrokotsa et al. 2010), and other work has suggested that attacks can impact other 
components indirectly (Rotter 2008).  Previous work, has however, appeared to 
overlook how the attacker would need to attack different elements of a system to 
attain their attack goal, whilst conforming to the system’s context.   
In this section, the reference model uses the system context to situate attack 
sequences from Chapter 7.  It builds on this work which has illustrated how 
systematising attacks imparts knowledge of which solutions are more effective for a 
system’s context.  In adapting this work, some changes have been made to the way 
attack trees are organised.  Whereas the attack trees originally appeared as a 
hierarchical structure, these now appear across the layers and partitions depending on 
where certain elements were situated in the context of the domain partition.  For 
example, an attack against a tag is modelled in the RFID layer component partition, 
whereas an attack against the radio frequency signal between the tag and reader is 
modelled in the RFID layer association partition.  Thus, attacks are now aligned to 
the system context using the same layers.  This improves on previous work which 
was reviewed in Chapter 3, which did not appear to make explicit the relation of 
attacks to the synergistic effects or interrelationships in systems in an individual 
model.   
A number of assumptions have been made here, affecting the way an attack could 
arise in a pharmaceutical supply chain RFID system, and these are listed: 
• An attack goal is only attained when the attacker has engaged a number of 
attacks across different layers and partitions.  The domain partition exists 
across all layers and partitions; consequently, attacking the electronic 
pedigree would involve attacking the pharmaceutical supply chain as well as 
the RFID system.  Thus, the strategic layer is generally indirectly targeted by 
an attacker.   
• As an RFID system in the pharmaceutical supply chain is contained within 
each custodian’s location, the attacker has been contained to within a 
custodian’s location.  Attacks between custodian locations can arise but are 
not modelled for brevity.   
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• In chapter 7 the attack trees were originally organised by system type – 
authorisation system and monitoring system – and with each system having 
different attack goals as their information goals are different.  This RFID 
system distinction is maintained to show that pharmaceutical a supply chain 
exhibits characteristics of both authorisation and monitoring systems, 
depending on how data is used.   
A detailed explanation of how various attacks work can be sourced from Chapter 7. 
10.2.3.1 AUTHORISATION SYSTEM ATTACKER BEHAVIOUR 
In Chapter 7, the attack tree depicts attacker behaviour in a generic RFID 
authorisation system where the attacker’s goal is to introduce an unauthorised 
physical entity into a system controlled by RFID.  The adapted attack tree appears in 
Figure 54.   
The attack goal considered here, in a pharmaceutical supply chain, is the introduction 
of counterfeit drugs.  To pass counterfeit drugs off as legitimate drugs, the drugs 
would need to be assigned an authorised tag - a tag that contains an authorised tag 
serial number.  The drug itself is confined to the pharmaceutical supply chain, and 
applicable to the underlying manufacturing and distribution processes in place.  
These would be represented in the real world for interconnection as ultimately the 
movement of drugs is a process which occurs between custodians.  Depending on 
whether the raw ingredients are counterfeited, the actual drug product, or the 
different packages which contain the drug – at some point along the pharmaceutical 
supply chain, the counterfeit will need to be introduced into the supply chain.  The 
counterfeit then proceeds along the pharmaceutical supply chain and through 
custodian locations towards the consumer.   
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The attack goal is in the strategic layer feature partition as gaining access to the 
pharmaceutical supply chain would involve generating false electronic pedigree 
documents for a counterfeit drug.  The data instantiation for these documents, 
however, occurs as a result of the attacker having obtained an authorised tag, having 
attached it to a drug entity, and having introduced it at locations along the 
pharmaceutical supply chain, ensuring that the tagged drug has been presented to 
readers.  Obtaining the strategic layer goal involves attacks across multiple layers 
and multiple partitions of the system. 
The attacker has to obtain an authorised tag for the counterfeit drugs.  As a tag is a 
component it means the attacker must attack the tag in the RFID layer component 
partition.  An authorised tag has to be obtained in order for a legitimate identity to be 
associated, in the association partition, with the physical drug product - rather than at 
a later stage spoof a tag’s identity to a reader – such as by using a relay attack 
mounted near the reader (as these attacks are usually performed using specialised 
cloning devices).  A relay attack (Kirschenbaum and Wool 2006) would not be 
practical as the attacker would not be in possession of the drug.  At the point that the 
drug enters the pharmaceutical supply chain the attacker loses ownership of the drug, 
and hence tag, which means that the clone tag identity needs to travel with the 
counterfeit drug.   
If the authorised tag is an original tag then the attacker will need physical access to 
the pharmaceutical supply chain to obtain it.  The reason is that original tags would 
either be attached to drugs already, or in storage and ready to be used on drugs.  In 
either case, physical access to the tags is constrained by the real world layer.  
Therefore, obtaining access to original tags may mean: getting a job with a 
custodian; or reusing discarded tags or using foreign tags e.g. cross-contamination 
(Heydt-Benjamin et al. 2006).  Whereas these place the attacker at risk of getting 
caught, the attacker could proxy out the attack to an insider, who already has access.  
The attacker could bribe an insider or social engineer an insider; into supplying them 
with original tags.  These all require physical access at the real world layer to 
components.   
Obtaining a physical tag in the Cardinal Health system may not be straightforward 
(Bacheldor 2006a, b).  There are three points where this could be possible – at the 
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place where they are printed, the Printed Components facility in Moorestown New 
Jersey; or where they are applied to products, the Philadelphia packaging plant; or 
while the tags are transferred between these locations.  However, it is not until the 
Philadelphia packaging plant that authorised EPC’s are encoded onto the tags which 
mean that the sequencing of authorised tag serial numbers to be associated with 
drugs is time and location sensitive.  These are not enabled until the point at which 
the tags are about to be applied to the products.  Also, in the case of the system 
deployed out of Sacramento California, there is a clear process in place to purge the 
serial numbers from any pharmaceuticals that are returned in addition to returning 
the drug back to the manufacturer, making it difficult to reuse tag serial numbers.  
Thus, a benefit of a ‘whole of system’ approach, applied to this scenario, is that such 
interrelationships can easily be considered during analysis.  
Obtaining a clone tag may require encoding an authorised tag serial number onto a 
reprogrammable tag once the attacker has obtained a valid tag serial number.  As the 
tag serial number, in most cases, is not physically associated with the component, 
such as being encoded onto the packaging, the attacker can obtain the tag serial 
number in the association space or feature space at the RFID layer.  In the 
association space the attacker can coerce an authorised tag into revealing its 
authorised tag serial number using a generic reader.  The attacker could also intercept 
transmission between the authorised tag and a reader if they are in close physical 
proximity. 
In the Cardinal Health system, the possible locations of attacks in the supply chain 
depends on limitations on tag read range and the way that packaging constrains read 
performance.  A complication arises if tags on the entities are to be cloned as item-
level read rates in the scenario vary.  It is reported that items in totes – plastic 
containers filled with drugs - had a read rate of 99 percent to 100 percent, whereas 
individual items packed into cases on pallets were very unreliable – item-level read 
rates were between 7.8 percent and 14.3 percent (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  Totes were 
used in the distribution centre (DC) whereas pallets were used prior to the DC.  This 
means that the attacker would need to target tags at the tote level in the DC to obtain 
tag data, thereby, reducing the entry point of their counterfeits to later in the supply 
chain, and hence, production of valid pedigree data to validate their counterfeits as 
legitimate.   
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Conversely, the attacker can obtain an authorised tag serial number from the RFID 
layer’s feature space, taking advantage of associations which are inferred in the data.  
While the association space represents the link between components, as the tag serial 
number is not physically attached to a tag component, or the association which arises 
between tags and readers, the attacker could infer the tag serial number in the feature 
space at the RFID layer.  Existential cloning attacks (Juels 2005) are modelled in the 
RFID layer feature space as they take advantage of the association between a tag 
component and the data on the tag.  Guessing a tag serial number can be a matter of 
making a random guess in the number space or brute forcing the number space by 
iteratively attempting individual tag numbers to determine if they are valid in the 
system.  Another way to obtain a tag serial number in the feature space is by having 
some knowledge of the tag serial numbers which are authorised in the first place.  An 
insider may be bribed into revealing tag serial numbers or if previous tag serial 
numbers are known, then existing numbers may be easily guessed.   
To complete the attack sequence, the attacker has to take an authorised tag and attach 
it to a counterfeit drug, and then introduce this tagged drug into the pharmaceutical 
supply chain.  Therefore, attaching the tag to the entity and presenting the entity to 
the reader are modelled in the association space of the real world layer as they 
require physical access to the system and they modify the association between 
entities.   
Depending upon the stage at which the attack takes place, in the pharmaceutical 
supply chain, the depth of counterfeiting, and the extent of RFID in the supply chain, 
will all influence the degree to which associations in the real world layer need to be 
modified by the attacker.  If every layer of packaging is tagged to the item-level, then 
the attacker will need to modify each layer, whereas tagged pallets mean the attacker 
only has to modify the pallet’s tag if the entire pallet is counterfeited.  If the entity is 
assembled then it may mean disassembling the entities for the introduction to take 
place, and then reassembling the package.  Once the counterfeit drug has been placed 
into a packaging configuration – package, carton, and pallet – the underlying 
pharmaceutical supply chain will move the drug through successive custodian 
locations onwards to the consumer – in which case, the overall attack goal has been 
obtained as a valid electronic pedigree would be derived. 
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For the Cardinal Health system, this would mean the counterfeit drug and tag 
(whether cloned or original) would need to be inserted amongst legitimate drugs.  
The insertion would need to occur in sequence to comply with the ordering of the 
movement of drugs through custodians; at the correct deployment times as tags get 
enabled at the various custodian locations; and also complying with the correct 
arrangement of other tag serial numbers – if EPC tags are used and assigned in 
sequence, then nearby tagged entities may be assigned serial numbers within a 
certain number range.   
Thus, the insertion of a counterfeit drug using attacks propagated through the RFID 
system would appear to be highly involved as RFID is deployed to varying degrees 
at different layers, and in different custodian locations.  This complexity only 
becomes apparent when consideration is given to attack sequences in actual contexts 
– the reference model makes this analysis possible.  Therefore, when considering 
previous work (Rotter 2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010) it seems less likely one would 
arrive at this same conclusion as only a few system properties can be considered in 
these approaches.   
10.2.3.2 MONITORING SYSTEM ATTACKER BEHAVIOUR 
The chapter on attack trees (see Chapter 7) depicted the attacker behaviour in a 
generic RFID monitoring system where the attacker’s goal was to prevent 
monitoring systems producing data used to track the location of entities.  The 
adapted attack tree appears in Figure 55.  
The attack goal considered here, for pharmaceutical supply chains, is to remove 
products from the supply chain without the theft being detected.  While this at first 
seems counterintuitive with the overall information goal of an electronic pedigree; 
denying the monitoring service may be necessary to ensure legitimate drugs and tags 
do not conflict with counterfeits.  As the attacker would need to perform a number of 
interrelated attacks to remove products, these attacks would occur through the layers 
and partitions of the domain partition.   
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The real world for interconnection depicts that the pharmaceutical supply chain is 
responsible for the manufacturing and distribution of drugs between custodians and 
onward to the consumer.  Thus, the goal to remove products, by first denying the 
monitoring service from some tags, would occur at the pharmaceutical supply chain 
layer prior to the introduction of the counterfeit drugs.  To this end, the attack goal is 
in the strategic layer feature partition, as denying the monitoring service of RFID 
systems, means preventing information being derived between the tag and entity.  
The severance of the link between the legitimate tag and entity, and any of the 
successive layers or partitions, would serve to attain this attack goal. 
There are a variety of ways the attacker could achieve the attack goal of denying 
monitoring service.  The most obvious way would be to target the tag or reader 
components, directly in the RFID layer component partition.  Denying tag 
identification would be an attack against the tag component, of which there are 
several ways of achieving this.  The attacker could block a tag’s radio frequency 
(RF) signal using a Blocker Tag (Juels et al. 2003) or by enclosing the tag inside a 
Faraday enclosure.  Either of these would prevent a valid RF signal from reaching 
the reader as collisions may occur.     
However, as the Cardinal Health system uses EPC Generation-Two tags, the chances 
of a Blocker Tag working may, theoretically, be limited.  In Chapter 9, it was 
explained that Class-One Generation-Two uses the Slotted Random Anti-collision 
(SRAC) (EPCglobal 2005) whereas the Blocker tag (Juels et al. 2003) is proposed to 
be used with the Singulation Tree Walking protocol.  The former initiates tag and 
reader transmissions using random numbers, whereas the latter relies on EPC values.  
Thus, in the Cardinal system, a Blocker tag may be obvious if a reader was 
reprogrammed to identify the implausibility of the same serial number in multiple 
inventory cycles (see Chapter 9).   
Destroying the tag using the Kill command or by Zapping (Collins 2006) would also 
be ways of preventing the tag from responding.  Removing the tag from the entity 
would be an attack against the association between the tag and entity at the real 
world layer as the physical entity, the drug, is involved in the attack.  If the entity 
does not have a tag on it then locating the tag would not locate the entity, therefore, 
this attack is in the association space of the real world layer.   
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For the Cardinal Health system, performing denial of service attacks in this manner, 
may have limited success.  The tags at the item-level are difficult to read when they 
are encased into cases on pallets e.g. item-level read rates were between 7.8 percent 
and 14.3 percent (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  It is not until the drugs are encased into the 
totes, that they can be instructed through an RFID protocol – which is necessary in 
triggering the Kill password – as read rates are 99 percent to 100 percent at this 
point.   
Moreover, the resultant reduction of missed tag reads due to denial of service attacks 
from this point forwards appears to be minimised due to the increase in physical 
system complexity, and hence, added context.  The process of inference to determine 
which tags are in range is no longer used, and is replaced with closer-contact tag 
reads, to the point at which, long-distance reads which were used for efficiency, such 
as bulk reading of tags in totes, is most likely now one-to-one (1:1) contact to 
identify tags (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  This means that the chances of a tag not being 
read without the physical presence of the entity or the tag responding, would be 
noticeable.  This demonstrates the benefits of a ‘whole of system’ approach to 
security in RFID systems – the reference model enables the consideration of system 
context in determining which threats are actually relevant.   
Attacks on the middleware database, which is a component in the RFID layer, can 
occur across several partitions and layers.  The attacker could use a tag to introduce a 
virus into the middleware (Rieback et al. 2006).  As the tag and middleware database 
are both components necessary to deliver and execute the attack, these attack 
sequences are modelled at the RFID layer component partition.  A less sophisticated 
attack would be to target the association between the tag and entity at the real world 
layer association partition.  Detaching a tag from an authorised entity, and 
reattaching it to a different entity would sever the physical association and also 
invalidate the association maintained in the database.  When the database was 
queried to locate an entity as the association has changed in the real world layer, the 
database will be pointing to a different entity.   
Contaminating the pharmaceutical supply chain with clone or foreign tags, which 
share tag serial numbers with authorised tags in the system, would be another way of 
attacking the middleware, but through the real world layer association space.  As the 
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tag serial number is a pointer to an object in the real world, a reader that had updated 
the database with an observation for an entity based on the reading of a tag 
associated with the entity, may invalidate the databases data with false reads – as the 
authorised entity is not actually associated with the clone or foreign tag.  In this 
sense, the layered nature of systems facilitates attacks at the lower layers to 
invalidate high layer goals; however, as will now be illustrated, this is also where 
attacks can be revealed.   
For the Cardinal Health system such attacks may be constrained by the strict 
adherence of when and where tag serial numbers are activated.  Authorised tag serial 
numbers are not activated in the system until the Philadelphia packaging plant, at a 
time when the items are about to be shipped (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  As points 
forward from this location are relying on inference to determine what items are on a 
pallet, if some of these tags were foreign tags, these would not actually produce data 
until the tote level where pallets are disassembled.  This means that foreign tags may 
not impact on the system until later in the supply chain, at which point, their 
presence may be noticeable due to: the occurrence of the legitimate tags, non-
activation of the serial numbers, or association of tag serial numbers which were not 
shipped together (specified in the ASN or pedigree data documents).   
Finally, the attacker could target the association between the tag and reader in the 
RFID layer association partition by using a rogue reader or Blocker Tag (Juels et al. 
2003).  Either of these components, if used, could interfere with the obtaining of tag 
data.  A rogue reader may cause the tag to be preoccupied in responding to its 
requests thereby preventing it from responding to the authorised reader, whereas the 
Blocker Tag would respond to the requests emanating from the authorised reader 
thereby causing it to traverse its binary tree of tag addresses to exhaustion.  However, 
this may not work as EPC Class-One Generation-Two uses anti-collision and not 
Singulation to identify tags (as discussed above).   
In the Cardinal Health system, either way, the ability to associate authorised tags and 
readers, to establish an association to the entity, may have limited success.  There are 
multiple custodians which are reading tags, and within custodian locations, readers 
deployed throughout the manufacturing processes, to allow for many potential 
associations to be formed between tags and readers – thus, ‘whole of system’ 
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analysis reveals that these attacks which have been considered to be widespread 
threats, seem relatively ineffective when considered in the context of this case study.    
10.2.3.3 SUMMARY 
This section has used the standard operations of systems, in addition to layers, to 
organise attack sequences against the RFID system.  Depending upon the elements 
contained at different custodian locations, across the layers and partitions, attack 
sequences vary in terms of the attacks which were sequenced.  As domain context 
can change, at least for pharmaceutical supply chains, so too can attack sequences.  
This means that different threats will arise at different places as the context varies.  
Thus, this section has illustrated that not only is a ‘whole of system’ approach to 
attacks beneficial in exposing unwarranted risk of some threats, but also realisation 
of which parts of a system may be more at risk.   
This is in contrast to Rotter (2008) which seems to suggest that a system faces a 
single risk rating, rather than varying degrees of risk rating depending on standard 
operations and which threats are feasible.  Moreover, it is an improvement imparted 
over Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) as they suggested security attributes like cost or 
potential damage were localised to a particular layer.  The analysis reported above 
suggests that as system context varies so will the security requirements vary.   
10.2.4 SOLUTION PARTITION 
In order to understand which solutions may be practicable for this system, ‘whole of 
system’ analysis made possible by the reference model is applied to the solution 
partition.  It builds on various analysis outcomes contributed above which have 
modelled a systems standard operations and attacks.  Thus, a robust basis for 
concluding various solutions is made available.   
Conversely, previous work appears to suggest that a direct association between 
threats and solutions should be followed.  Mitrokotsa et al. (2010) suggest that a 
threat is addressed at the layer at which it occurs, which has the disadvantage of 
incurring the related attribute values, e.g. cost, at the same layer.  Similarly, by 
localising security analysis to two system properties, Rotter (2008) appears to 
suggest that systems are limited to being as secure or insecure if they are of a 
particular system type.  That is, most industry applications demand low to medium 
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security.  In this section, when all of the above analysis work is taken into 
consideration, the fact that security requirements vary in different parts of the system 
will illustrate that actual system analysis is less suited to localised analysis – and this 
is apparent when security is considered through the reference model.   
In this section, continuing a ‘whole of system’ approach, the reference model is used 
to examine:  
• How applying ‘whole of system’ analysis assists in identifying solutions as 
feasible. 
• How the reference model exposes areas of the system which may be 
supportive of solutions which do not incur the penalties associated with tag 
based security. 
• How a number of solutions can be implemented to achieve robust defence in 
this specific system context.   
To examine these three areas, RFID intrusion detection techniques, which look for 
anomalies in RFID data, are examined.  Other solutions could have been examined, 
however, such an in-depth examination of solutions is not needed to illustrate that a 
‘whole of system’ approach is effective at handling such a complex and broad 
analysis problem.   
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As counterfeit drugs may use RFID tags – whether clones or originals – to gain 
access to an RFID system, and hence the pharmaceutical supply chain, to claim the 
identity of a legitimate drug, a problem to consider is detecting invalid track and 
trace data from end-to-end of the pharmaceutical supply chain.   
A solution could be the Supply Chain Visualiser (Illic et al. 2009), a software 
program which tries to detect counterfeits using plausibility checks, using EPCIS 
event data and a shipping and receiving model.  The plausibility checks are: velocity 
(tag speed is valid); dwell-time (tag has not remained idle); lifecycle (tag has a 
logical start and end point); pair-wise shipping and receiving (atomic transactions 
when tag enters/leaves location); and transition probability (tag routing fits product 
histories).  Detection starts at each root of a product flow and checks each of the 
currently enabled rules for each time-ordered pair of events, with detected conflicts 
highlighted as hot spots using a colour coding scheme over a map of the supply chain 
where rule inconsistencies have occurred.  As an end-to-end view of the supply chain 
is taken, this solution would begin in the strategic layer feature space.  To show that 
several custodians would be needed to derive data for the approach, in Figure 56, it 
has been modelled in the second custodian’s framework.  This is not to say that a 
later custodian could not access the solution, it would just require data from several 
locations before it was useful.   
However, to define plausibility checks, elements throughout the domain partition are 
required.  This solution, is therefore not confined to a single layer or partition.  The 
Supply Chain Visualiser relies on EPCIS features which are instantiated through the 
EPCIS specification.  These features are: epcList, eventTime; action; bizStep 
(shipping, receiving, internal); and bizLocation.  As the bizStep feature indicates that 
an object was received by a custodian, and read at a specific location, a serialised 
global location number (SGLN) can be resolved into a physical location through geo-
mapping coordinates with latitude/longitude values.  In addition, plausibility checks 
rely on other constructed features during a pre-processing stage.  Grouped epcList 
events are split into single events to create chronologically ordered lists for an 
individual item’s flow - identified by its EPC.  Time differences, distances, and the 
movement velocities are then calculated.  The derived data from the pre-processing 
stage forms the basis for the analysis process.  Clearly without elements from these 
layers and partitions, the Supply Chain Visualiser would fail to detect counterfeits. 
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In the Cardinal Health system, consideration would need to be given to the duration 
of tags on entities which were monitored by the Supply Chain Visualiser.  In the real 
world layer, entities are assembled at different stages, with tags accordingly applied.  
At the Philadelphia packaging plant, tags are attached to pallets, cases, packages, and 
individual product items (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  At different stages, entities are 
removed from these layers of packaging at different points.  At the DC entities, for 
example palletised products, are disassembled and placed into totes.  This may mean 
that the top-level continuum of monitoring the pallet level tag is broken as the pallet 
is no longer used at this point.  The level of granularity in monitoring tagged entities 
changes throughout the supply chain, affecting the system’s ability to have a 
continuum in the security solution.  This may mean that the system’s ability to detect 
counterfeits may vary depending upon the point in the supply chain which is under 
treatment.  This becomes apparent having used the layers and partitions of the 
reference model to consider the whole system. 
As tag cloning may arise at intermediate points along a supply chain, instead of 
presenting a sequence of anomalies across several custodian locations, a complete 
track and trace history may not be available.  Consequently, Lehtonen, Michahelles 
et al. (2007a) proposed techniques to use incomplete location information to 
authenticate products that flow in a supply chain.  Assuming that detection of 
counterfeits is easy if the location of the genuine product is known, conversely, the 
identification of the counterfeit grows increasingly more difficult as the time since 
the original observation of the genuine item was made.   
Two solutions are possible at intermediate custodian locations: a stochastic supply 
chain model (SSCM) approach and a hidden Markov model (HMM) approach 
(Lehtonen et al. 2007a).  These solutions both calculate a transition probability to 
signify the likelihood that a genuine product made a transition defined by two events 
recorded in RFID track and trace data.  If the transition probability is above a 
threshold value, the second event is likely to be generated by a genuine tag.  As these 
approaches are taking a partial view of the supply chain, relying mostly on local 
RFID data sourced by a custodian, these have been organised into the RFID layer’s 
feature partition – but would also require elements from other areas at or below this 
partition and layer.   
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For attacks to be detected, training data from a pharmaceutical supply chain was 
required (Lehtonen et al. 2007a).  In their work, it was simulated but in actual 
systems it would be sourced from the system.  Also details are required for the 
simulation of the supply chain’s underlying physical operational characteristics.  For 
example, to simulate incomplete data, the probability that an observation was 
generated when a product enters a data sharing node was set to 98% and it was 
assumed that 50% of products that entered the final node were observed, 
corresponding to capturing and sharing the point-of-sales and point-of-use data.  A 
period of four months needed to be simulated for the distribution of 30,000 genuine 
products and 900 counterfeits.  For an actual deployment of these approaches, this 
would mean obtaining data from actual custodians to configure the rules.  (Lehtonen 
et al. 2007a) 
Consequently, for the Cardinal Health system, calculating a transition probability 
may be a relatively straightforward matter as it appears as though the pharmaceutical 
supply chain, and hence RFID system, is relatively sequential from end-to-end 
(Bacheldor 2006a, b).  Although the underlying dynamics of the product flow may 
vary based on supply and demand, overall, there may be little variation in the way 
products move in sequence.  Thus, anomalies may be quite obvious provided a 
suitable layer of traceability data was derived from the pharmaceutical supply chain.  
This realisation comes from ‘whole of system’ analysis. 
Missing RFID data can be caused when interference occurs at the real world layer 
due to: too short reading times; collision in the air interface; or conductive materials 
that absorb radio waves.  In other causes, the middleware can fail to listen to 
antennas which are producing data, or discovery services at the application layer may 
not return 100% of the data – perhaps some custodians do not share all of their data.  
All of these issues will influence how well solutions operate in this context.   
In response, Lehtonen et al. (2009) proposed a filtering based technique which 
corrects incomplete RFID data traces and verifies this filtered data for anomalies.  
However, to obtain good results, the approach relies on the precise modelling of the 
physical supply chain.  The filtering algorithm is used to correct detected missing 
reads by adding in assumed locations.  Reliable detection results were obtained from 
the simulation of a pharmaceutical supply chain but false alarms were apparent.  The 
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detection rates at the zero false alarm rates were less than 30%, whereas a 95% hit 
rate at below 0.2% false alarm rate was achieved, however, as the missing reads 
increase, more training data was required.  The work shows that even though missing 
reads do occur in RFID systems, the use of filtering algorithms can correct erroneous 
data, meaning these are not as significant a problem as previously thought for 
detection approaches.  Clearly, however, an understanding of the physical 
pharmaceutical supply chain is needed in order for this approach to work.  Thus, 
reinforcing the starting point for these approaches as the RFID layer’s feature 
partition as seen in the reference model.   
As some tags have limited capability to use encryption and also existing intrusion 
detection or plausibility checking techniques can sometimes function poorly when 
supply chain visibility is low – perhaps as custodians fail to share data or RFID is not 
deployed widely – there can be custodian locations where plausibility checks have 
limited use.   
A solution may be to use a Synchronised Secrets approach (Lehtonen et al. 2007c).  
In this approach, EPC Class-One Generation-Two tags store a random number that is 
changed every time the tag is read by a reader.  Every time a tag is read, the back-end 
first verifies a tag’s static identifier (which could be a cloned tag serial number).  
Clearly, this is a one-to-one (1:1) interaction between a tag and reader at the real 
world layer.  If this number is valid, the back-end then compares the tag’s 
synchronised secret to the one stored for that particular tag.  If these numbers match, 
the tag passes the check, otherwise an alarm is triggered.  After the check, the back-
end generates a new synchronised secret that the reader writes on the tag.  The 
plausibility check can determine if a tag has an outdated synchronised secret, in 
which case, either the tag is genuine but it has not been correctly updated 
(desynchronised) or someone has obtained and written an old secret to the genuine 
tag, or the genuine tag has been cloned and the cloned tag has been scanned by the 
legitimate reader.  (Lehtonen et al. 2007c) 
Although this check occurs at a single location, an anomaly arises if several tags with 
the same serial number have been read across the entire system (Lehtonen et al. 
2007c).  Thus, an outdated synchronised secret is evidence to suggest a tag cloning 
attack has occurred, but not which tag is the clone tag.   
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As the exchange of synchronised secrets is monitored by the back-end, a cloning 
attack could be identified to a time window and location window in a custodian’s 
location.  In effect, this is validating the sequential reading of tags at readers in the 
supply chain, which clearly shows that the underlying success of this approach 
depends on the organisation of readers in sequence at the real world layer and RFID 
layer.  As the approach relies on associations between tags and readers, it has been 
modelled in the RFID layer’s association space.  Therefore, to show that such an 
approach could begin at the first custodian, it appears in the first custodian’s 
framework in Figure 56.   
In the Cardinal Health system the item-level tag synchronisation may have limited 
use early on in the supply chain.  When individual items are on pallets, the read rate 
is between 7.8 percent and 14.3 percent; however, the inference process allows 
custodians to assume all the items are on a pallet (Bacheldor 2006a, b).  Thus, it may 
not be possible to validate synchronised secrets until the tote level.  However, at the 
same time, the attacker’s ability to clone tags prior to this point by obtaining data 
from tags which are active may not be possible given the low read rate performance.  
Thus, the solution may have limited relevance at this stage in the pharmaceutical 
supply chain – evident as a result of having applied a ‘whole of system’ approach to 
analysis. 
Finally, a problem may arise when in the last phase of a pharmaceutical supply chain  
a manufacturer sells a product to a retailer via a number of shipping agencies, and the 
retailer clones the tag and attaches it to counterfeits (Staake et al. 2005).  Provided 
the counterfeiter does not update the database, nor does the customer register the 
deal, other customers may query the database, receiving a plausible history.   
It is at this stage, the last custodian, that the concept of secure authentication could 
be applied as a solution.  The EPC Product Authentication Service (Staake et al. 
2005) uses cryptographic algorithms on tags to verify tag authenticity.  A tag 
contains an identification number, a secret key, and a cryptographic support.  
Somewhere in the network is a device, a cryptographic unit (CU), responsible for 
authenticating the tag.  Authentication occurs when a tag communicates its serial 
number to the CU whereby, the CU responds with a challenge back to the tag.  The 
tag encrypts the message with its secret key and sends it back to the CU.  The CU 
Chapter 10 - An Application of the Reference Model: A Case Study 
- 199 - 
verifies the response by checking it with the key stored in the database.  An 
unauthorised tag would be detected when it fails to provide the correct response.  
(Staake et al. 2005) 
Clearly in order for an EPC Product Authentication Service to operate, not only 
would the tag component need to support the required functionality, but the back-end 
would also need to support the management of secret keys, and this would need to be 
standardised across the entire system.  As the approach relies on component 
functionality, it has been modelled in the RFID layer’s component partition, even 
though it would also require elements from other places in the reference model.   
For the Cardinal Health system (Bacheldor 2006a, b), such an approach may make 
sense to be deployed at the last phase of the pharmaceutical supply chain.  It is at this 
point that tags on drugs are the most exposed as read rates of individual tags are 
highest at the pharmacy and customer level – having been disassembled from the 
layers of packaging.  It is at this point that an attacker could easily gain physical 
access to a tag to obtain its serial number to be used in future tag cloning attacks, to 
facilitate future counterfeiting of products.  However, it is at this point that a 
complete track and trace history of a tagged drug would have been established, 
meaning plausibility checks should have already verified whether counterfeits were 
in the system.  Consequently, this may reduce the need to use encryption at this stage 
in the pharmaceutical supply chain.   
10.2.4.1 SUMMARY 
This section has used the reference model to organise some security solutions which 
could mitigate attacks in pharmaceutical supply chains, thereby, finalising a ‘whole 
of system’ approach to analysis of this specific case study.  It was shown that a 
number of detection solutions would be required, at least for pharmaceutical supply 
chains, to address attacks across the entire system.   
At the stages of deployment for these solutions, these solutions were shown to be 
taking advantage of certain underlying contexts in the domain space.  For example, 
the Supply Chain Visualiser made use of the known location of custodians and 
physical constraints to determine what would constitute implausibility in an entity’s 
movement.  However, the way these solutions detect anomalies, shows that these 
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solutions do not exist at a single layer.  Solutions require elements across the layers 
and partitions of the domain space, whether in one custodian location or across 
several custodian locations, to operate effectively.   
Thus, a ‘whole of system’ approach to analysis, facilitated by the reference model, 
enables one to take into consideration; how a system’s standard operations and 
attacks will influence one’s recommendation that a system implement certain 
solutions.  The outcome is a more practicable set of security requirements which take 
advantage of what the system has to offer, rather than what the system should be 
offering in order to support various solutions which are proposed.   
In contrast to previous work (Rotter 2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010), which has 
localised security analysis, the suggestion in this chapter is that ‘whole of system’ 
analysis, once performed, leads to more effective security.   
10.3 OVERALL SUMMARY 
This chapter has used the relatively complex example of RFID in a pharmaceutical 
supply chain to illustrate the effectiveness of approaching security ‘whole of system’ 
by way of the reference model.   
During analysis, using the model, crucial influences leading to the derivation of 
security requirements were considered.  RFID has been used in pharmaceutical 
supply chains to form an electronic pedigree.  To this end, in order to produce 
information which suitably creates a history of a product, RFID has to be integrated 
in the system.  This integration involves not only RFID but also real world and 
strategic elements.  The underlying system was characterised by: a variety of 
custodian locations which had implemented RFID in different ways and to different 
extents; limitations on tag reading at different stages; product assembly/disassembly 
complicating tag reads and also which entities were monitored; and when various 
identifiers in the system were enabled/purged.  The reference model was illustrated 
as capable of capturing these elements. 
The main analysis outcomes, having deliberated through the model, appear to be 
practicable security requirements.  As the system model encapsulated the elements 
which influenced RFID implementation, threat analysis, using attack trees, indicated 
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that only a limited number of threats were relevant.  On that basis, some solutions 
were suggested as effective when integrated in this context.  Thus, the model enabled 
consideration of synergistic effects and interrelationships which influence security. 
When the examples of previous work are considered (Rotter 2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 
2010), which have taken a relatively localised view of security, it seems likely this 
alternative approach leads to a more effective understanding of security 
requirements.   
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11.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis began as an exploration of potential avenues for improving Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) security.  The example problem used was that of tag 
cloning.  In addressing this aim, the work considered RFID security using a ‘whole 
of system’ approach.   
Thus, the principal focus of this thesis was the advantages that can be gained from 
applying a ‘whole of system’ approach to RFID.  The major contribution made in 
this area was: 
• A reference model which facilitates such a ‘whole of system’ approach.  The 
structure of the model is made up of integrated layer and partition properties.  
When existing methods, which exhibit systematic qualities, were integrated 
into this reference model, the results suggested that greater insight into RFID 
security could be achieved when compared with existing models described by 
Rotter (2008) and Mitrokotsa et al. (2010). 
Using this reference model, that facilitates a ‘whole of system’ approach to the 
analysis of security in RFID systems, five major contributions were made: 
• To make possible a ‘whole of system approach’, a domain model was 
introduced that defines some of the fundamental properties of RFID systems.  
The model comprises a logical view: components, attributes, operations, and 
relationships.  In addition, it included a data view: associations and features.  
These have resulted in a controlled vocabulary which was illustrated as 
suitable for the identification and description of RFID domain constructs. 
• Results from building and validating a simulator, based on the domain model, 
suggested that the domain model is suitable for ‘whole of system’ analysis.  
Moreover, the simulator based on this model, was demonstrated as useful for 
solution analysis when applied to the problem of exposing clone tags.   
• Attacks which were modelled as sequences over system layers formed an 
RFID attacker behaviour taxonomy.  The taxonomy modelled attacks in two 
system types: authorisation and monitoring.  It was illustrated that good 
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locations for solutions in these systems could be identified when this 
systematic approach was followed.   
• Experimental work, which was suggested by the reference model, illustrated 
that a ‘whole of system’ approach to RFID security can make possible the 
identification of previously unexplored attack interception points.  In this 
case, reprogramming an RFID reader via its application programming 
interface (API) to expose clone attacks in data.  This suggests that security 
solutions can be found between the reader output and the filters in the 
middleware.   
• Finally, the reference model was validated using the specific example of a 
pharmaceutical supply chain.  The model was illustrated as capable of a 
‘whole of system’ approach to security requirement elucidation.  This also 
derived support for the model’s potential use in more general cases as the 
system examined exhibited some generic system properties. 
The following sections further expand upon the contributions of this thesis and 
describe in more detail the conclusions that can be drawn from them.   
11.1.1 INDIVIDUAL METHOD CONSIDERATIONS 
This section briefly considers how individual methods integrated into the reference 
model impart results across the whole model.  These methods, which came from a 
variety of sources, when integrated into the reference model, made clear specific 
RFID information.  This has an advantage when compared to previous work (Rotter 
2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010), as it is possible to utilise any analysis method to the 
problem of security in RFID systems provided it is systematic in its approach.   
In addressing specific analysis requirements, existing methods were applied over the 
layer and partition properties.  Domain modelling approaches described the 
fundamental properties of RFID systems.  Agent based modelling and general 
simulation principles demonstrated the feasibility of analysing systems through a 
domain model.  The attack tree method organised attacks as sequences, over layers, 
to derive attacker behaviour taxonomy.  Experimental work, demonstrated the 
benefits of beginning from a model, and then exploring the suggestions through a 
simulator.  Using this process, analysis was improved, and thus, the finding that a 
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reader could be reprogrammed via an application programming interface (API), to 
detect attacks, was a relatively straightforward task.  Using existing methods, 
integrated into the reference model’s structure facilitates more effective systems 
analysis.   
While the application of individual methods in the reference model validates the 
model’s constituent partitions; it has been shown that the integration of these 
partitions over layers validates the ‘whole of system’ approach.  This was 
demonstrated in the specific example of a pharmaceutical supply chain, when the 
whole model combined individual analysis methods.  The ability to integrate 
individual analysis outcomes, discussed in previous chapters, but used here with the 
reference model structure for a complete and specific example, illustrates that the 
reference model does enable a ‘whole of system’ approach. 
11.1.2 REFERENCE MODEL CONSIDERATIONS 
This section briefly considers how the reference model makes possible a ‘whole of 
system’ approach by applying individual methods integrated using a layered and 
partitioned structure. 
To facilitate a ‘whole of system approach’, the first step was to produce a domain 
model.  The possibility of using layer and partition properties for this step was 
explored and illustrated to be of benefit by creating a logical view of the domain.  
This logical view defined the components, their attributes and operations.  
Conversely, a data view defined the associations and features which constituted the 
interactions which take place between components but which are reported in RFID 
data.  Although the domain model is relatively modest, its level of abstraction 
demonstrates that it is sufficient to derive an understanding of any particular system.  
Further to this, the model is extensible, and therefore, future work may consider 
further domain analysis to achieve more detail.  This contribution was reported by 
Mirowski et al. (2009c).   
The task of showing the domain model to be suitable for representing systems at its 
level of abstraction was investigated from the perspective of Agent Based Modelling 
and Simulation (ABMS).  A simulator that facilitates system and attack modelling 
was presented and was validated to be capable of predicting RFID data that is 
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sufficiently close to data from actual systems.  Although it is a simplification of 
actual systems, it has been illustrated to be close enough to be useful in facilitating 
preliminary investigations in a ‘whole of system’ manner.  The use of this simulator 
was illustrated to give impetus to experimentation with actual systems when results 
suggested by the simulator were examined in a laboratory.  This contribution was 
reported by Mirowski et al. (2009c).   
Taking a ‘whole of system’ approach to security means examining security 
throughout the layers of the system.  Attacks, one part of security, were examined in 
the ‘whole of system’ approach using attack trees (Schneier 1999, 2004).  Although 
attack trees were used, this thesis recommends any threat analysis method provided it 
can be applied systematically.  Examining attacks from a systems perspective was 
illustrated to increase the understanding of where in a system it would be more 
beneficial to locate security solutions.  This contribution was also reported by 
Mirowski et al. (2009b). 
A scenario where many tags, some of which were clone tags, were in front of a 
reader was considered in a ‘whole of system’ approach.  The finding was that the 
simple reprogramming of a reader can enable the exposure of clone attacks without 
requiring additional context.  Provided an RFID system has the ability to be 
reprogrammed, it may situate security at these locations, where it is more cost-
effective, and thus, prevent data from attacks entering the middleware.   
The individual methods used for each part of this thesis are not specifically 
recommended for use; rather the notion that methods are integrated into layer and 
partition properties, to achieve integrated analysis, which can account for the 
synergistic effects and interrelationships in RFID, is what has been illustrated to be 
of benefit.   
If the approach to RFID security requirements occurs ‘whole of system’, then the 
security understanding gained is likely to be improved, when compared to previous 
work (Rotter 2008; Mitrokotsa et al. 2010), and hence the security developed should 
be more effective.   
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11.1.3 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Central to this work is a desire to emphasise the exploration of improving the 
security of RFID systems using a ‘whole of system’ approach.  Generally, RFID 
security has been examined using localised approaches.  The advantage of a ‘whole 
of system’ approach to RFID security requirements is that a wider view of a system 
can be taken, thus, more components can be incorporated into the security analysis.  
This thesis has illustrated that in the specific example of a pharmaceutical supply 
chain, a ‘whole of system’ approach leads to a more effective understanding of 
security requirements.  As layer and partition properties are non-prescriptive in terms 
of the specific analysis methods to be used, and layer and partitions are properties 
applicable to most systems, it should be possible to apply the reference model to 
most systems.   
Another key property of this work is the modular approach taken to reference model 
development.  The methods which have been demonstrated as effective, over the 
model, can be replaced by other methods which could be applied across the layer and 
partition properties such that they are applicable to the modelling requirements 
which are under consideration at each partition.  This modularity permits methods 
familiar to the user or most relevant to the modelling task to be selected.   
Moreover, depending on the system under consideration, the number of layers and 
partitions can be varied.  In some cases it could be more appropriate to analyse only 
one partition, whereas in other cases, additional layers or partitions may be needed to 
attain greater understanding.  The modularity of the reference model allows it to be 
targeted to different problems.   
11.2 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Several major directions for future work arise from this research.  Perhaps the most 
obvious is evaluating the generic applicability of the layered and partitioned 
reference model.  Clearly this would be a major undertaking, as some systems, like 
supply chains, consist of different types of layer and partition properties at different 
stages.  In undertaking this work, one could look towards the generic properties 
which form in systems, such as the associations between components. 
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Related to this, is the possibility of deriving more generic ‘whole of system’ models 
over the layer and partition properties.  The attacker behaviour taxonomy was 
developed for attack goals which pertain to two specific system types; however, a 
complete enumeration of how attacks could be combined in systems was not 
explored.  Future work here may consider identifying generic attack branches, and 
establishing reusable attack sequences for various system types.   
In considering the completeness of the reference model, there are additional layer 
and partition properties which could be included in future versions.  Fortunately the 
model follows an extensible design philosophy.  There could be additional 
abstractions of the domain that encourage the addition of more partitions, and there 
could be enhancements to the ways in which RFID as a technology abstracts the real 
world.  This may require the addition of further layers.  One could look to including 
those layer or partition properties which would remain generic – like those included 
in the original version here – thereby leaving the minor properties which could vary 
between systems to system specific extensions.   
Beyond this, another obvious avenue for improvement is to further automate 
methods for requirements analysis, perhaps by using the simulator that was 
developed.  As it stands, the software can model simple system designs to visualise 
system activity and predict RFID data.  Also, currently attack detection is a manual 
process, however, one which could be automated by utilising existing intrusion 
detection methods such as those put forward by Lehtonen et al.(2007c) or Mirowski 
and Hartnett (2007).  In the future, it could be possible to automate the derivation of 
attack signatures for modelled systems, or the derivation of trusted system designs 
that take advantage of solution libraries accorded for the architecture of the 
underlying system.  This would account for the nuances which arise as analysis 
moves closer to the actual application environment.  In effect, the software platform 
could become an RFID system security prototyping tool.   
Finally, the potential for architecture based security development could be further 
explored.  This approach, which this thesis has taken the first steps in exploring, 
could be continued by others to expand the reference model to further enable the 
selection of security solutions in response to specific threats in different parts of an 
RFID system.  Once a system has been modelled through the reference model, a 
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security pattern consisting of those solutions that are more effective in addressing 
threats given domain constraints, could be established.  This reference model could 
become a general foundation for a ‘whole of system’ approach to RFID security 
analysis.   
11.3 SUMMING UP 
There is an abundance of existing research in RFID security which is applicable to 
the security of the components.  Indeed, a significant amount of previous research 
exists on applying methods to securing RFID tag components.  Rather than 
attempting to develop new methods to secure a particular component, the idea 
employed within this work has focused on a ‘whole of system’ approach to the 
analysis of security in RFID facilitated by a reference model.  
This thesis has illustrated that by systematising the approach to RFID security 
through system layers, more effective analysis can be performed.   
RFID technology is nearly always deployed with a ‘whole of system’ purpose in 
mind, and the ways in which systems are deployed are complex.  As is often the case 
with complicated systems, various methods will exist for securing systems which 
will try to address various parts of a problem.  If RFID technology history is 
anything to go by, it is nearly guaranteed that a single solution will not be developed 
that will resolve all potential threats in the near future; nor is it the case that a single 
system design will prevail such that it is possible to apply the same security strategy 
to all systems.   
Thus, this thesis concludes with the point that practical results will be maximised by 
employing a range of individual analysis methods that are integrated through a 
‘whole of system’ approach.   
 
  
 
 
 
References 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12  
References 
- 211 - 
Agrawal, R., A. Cheung, K. Kailing and S. Schonauer (2006). Towards Traceability 
Across Sovereign, Distributed RFID Databases. Proceedings of the 10th 
International Database Engineering and Applications Symposium, pp. 174-
184. 
Alfred, R. (2008). "Dynamic Aggregation of Relational Attributes Based on Feature 
Construction " Advances in Databases and Information Systems 5207, pp. 2-
13. 
AlienTechnology (2007). Reader Interface Guide: All Fixed Readers, September 
2007, Alien Technology. 
AlienTechnology (2008a). Alien Technology Java Developers Guide: September 
2008, Alien Technology. 
AlienTechnology (2008b). ALR-9650 Hardware Setup Guide, Alien Technology. 
Arango, G. (1994). A Brief Introduction To Domain Analysis. Proceedings of the 
ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 42-46. 
Avoine, G. and P. Oechslin (2005). "RFID Traceability: A Multilayer Problem " 
Financial Cryptography and Data Security 3570, pp. 125-140. 
Bacheldor, B. (2006a). "Cardinal Health Deems RFID Pilot a Success."   Retrieved 
25/01/2010, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/2838/. 
Bacheldor, B. (2006b). "Cardinal Health Readies Item-Level Pilot."   Retrieved 
09/02/2010, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/2838. 
Bacheldor, B. (2007). "Cardinal Health Deploying Drug E-Pedigree System."   
Retrieved 19/06/2009, from 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/3295/1/1/. 
Bagui, S. and R. Earp (2003). Database design using entity-relationshp diagrams, 
Auerbach. 
Balan, G. C., C. Cioffi-Revilla, S. Luke, L. Panait and S. Paus (2003). MASON: A 
Java Multi-Agent Simulation Library. Proceedings of the Conference on 
Challenges in Social Simulation. 
Bapat, V. and G. Restivo (2005). "Reaping The Long-Term Benefits Of Integrating 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Into Pharmaceutical Manufacturing." 
Pharmaceutical Engineering(3), pp. 32-44. 
Benyon, D. (1997). Information and Data Modelling, McGraw Hill. 
Bonabeau, E. (2002). Agent-Based Modeling: Methods And Techniques For 
Simulating Human Systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Science of the United States of America, pp. 7280-7287. 
Bono, S., M. Green, A. Stubblefield, A. Juels, A. Rubin and M. Szydlo (2005). 
Security Analysis Of A Cryptographically-Enabled RFID Device. 
Proceedings of the 14th USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 1-15. 
Bruegge, B. and A. H. Dutoit (2004). Object-Oriented Software Engineering: Using 
UML, Patterns, and Java, Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Chen, P. P.-S. (1976). "The Entity-Relationship Model - Toward A Unified View Of 
Data." ACM Transactions on Database Systems 1(1), pp. 9-36. 
Collins, J. (2004). "New Embeddable RFID Readers."   Retrieved 18/07/2010, from 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1114/1/1/. 
Collins, J. (2006). "RFID-Zapper Shoots to Kill."   Retrieved 10/09/2007, from 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/2098/1/1. 
Courtois, N. T. (2009). The Dark Side Of Security By Obscurity And Cloning 
MiFare Classic Rail And Building Passes Anywhere, Anytime. Presented at 
the Workshop on RFID Security. 
References 
- 212 - 
EPCglobal (2005). EPC™ Radio-Frequency Identity Protocols Class-1 Generation-2 
UHF RFID Protocol for Communications at 860 MHz – 960 MHz Version 
1.0.9, EPCglobal. 
FDA (2004). Combating counterfeit drugs: a report of the food and drug 
administration, U.S. Food and drug administration. 
Fettke, P. and P. Loos (2003). Multiperspective Evaluation Of Reference Models – 
Towards A Framework Proceedings of the ER 2003 Workshops, Springer-
Verlag, pp. 80-91. 
Finkenzeller, K. (2004). RFID Handbook, Wiley. 
Garcia, F. D., G. d. K. Gans, R. Muijrers, P. v. Rossum, R. Verdult, R. W. Schreur 
and B. Jacobs (2008). Dismantling MIFARE Classic. Proceedings of the 13th 
European Symposium On Research In Computer Security, Springer-Verlag, 
pp. 97-114. 
Garfinkel, S. and H. Holtzman (2005). Understanding RFID Technology. RFID: 
Applications, Security, and Privacy. S. Garfinkel and B. Rosenberg, Addison 
Wesley: 15-36. 
Garfinkel, S. and B. Rosenberg (2005). RFID: Applications, Security, and Privacy, 
Addison Wesley. 
Gilbert, N. and S. Bankes (2002). "Platforms And Methods For Agent-Based 
Modeling." Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United 
States of America 99(3), pp. 7197-7198. 
Glover, B. and H. Bhatt (2006). RFID Essentials, O'Reilly. 
Grasso, A. R. and P. H. Cole (2006). Definition Of Terms Used By The Auto-ID 
Labs In The Anti-Counterfeiting White Paper Series, Auto-ID Labs White 
Paper  
Halamka, J., A. Juels, A. Stubblefield and J. Westhues (2006). "The Security 
Implications Of VeriChip Cloning." Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association 13(5), pp. 601-607. 
Hancke, G. (2005). A Practical Relay Attack On ISO 14443 Proximity Cards: 
Technical Report, University of Cambridge. 
Hancke, G. P. (2006). Practical Attacks on Proximity Identification Systems (Short 
Paper). Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 
328-333. 
Hashemi, K. (2009). Faraday Enclosures: Technical Report, Open Source 
Instruments Inc. 
Hassan, T. and S. Chatterjee (2006). A Taxonomy For RFID. Proceedings of the 39th 
Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences, pp. 1-10. 
Heydt-Benjamin, T., D. Bailey, K. Fu, A. Juels and T. O'Hare (2006). Vulnerabilities 
in First-Generation RFID-enabled Credit Cards, University of 
Massachuesetts. 
Howard, M. and D. LeBlanc (2003). Writing Secure Code, Microsoft Press. 
Howe, N., S. Goldner and C. Fennig (2007). "Drug Pedigrees: Your Supply Chain 
Needs Them. Are You Ready?" Pharmaceutical Engineering 27(6), pp. 1-5. 
Illic, A., T. Andersen and F. Michahelles (2009). EPCIS-Based Supply Chain 
Visualization Tool: Technical Report, Auto-ID Labs. 
Inaba, T. (2008). EPC System For A Safe And Secure Supply Chain And How It Is 
Applied. Networked RFID Systems and Lightweight Cryptography. P. H. 
Cole and D. C. Ranasinghe, Springer: 191-210. 
Juels, A. (2005). Strengthening EPC Tags Against Cloning. Proceedings of the 4th 
ACM Workshop on Wireless Security, pp. 67-76. 
References 
- 213 - 
Juels, A. (2006). "RFID Security and Privacy: A research survey." IEEE Journal on 
Selected Areas in Communications 24(2), pp. 381-394. 
Juels, A., R. L. Rivest and M. Szydlo (2003). The Blocker Tag: Selective Blocking 
of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy. Proceedings of the 10th ACM 
conference on computer and communications security, pp. 103-111. 
Kasper, T., M. Silbermann and C. Paar (2010). All You Can Eat or Breaking a Real-
World Contactless Payment System. Financial Cryptography and Data 
Security 6052, pp. 343-350. 
Kfir, Z. and A. Wool (2005). Picking Virtual Pockets Using Relay Attacks On 
Contactless Smartcard Systems. Proceedings of the 1st International 
Conference on Security and Privacy, pp. 47-48. 
Kirschenbaum, I. and A. Wool (2006). How To Build A Low-Cost, Extended Range 
RFID Skimmer. Proceedings of the 15th USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 
43–57. 
Koh, R., E. W. Schuster, I. Chackrabarti and A. Bellman (2003). Securing The 
Pharmaceutical Supply Chain: White Paper, Auto-ID Center. 
Korth, A. (2006). Modeling And Simulation With Agents. Computer Science 
Seminar, ACM. 
Landt, J. (2005). "The History of RFID." IEEE Potentials 24(4), pp. 8-11. 
Law, A. M. (2005). How To Build Valid And Credible Simulation Models. 
Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference, pp. 24 - 32. 
Lehtonen, M., F. Michahelles and E. Fleisch (2007a). Probabilistic Approach for 
Location-Based Authentication. Proceedings of the 1st International 
Workshop on Security for Spontaneous Interaction. 
Lehtonen, M., F. Michahelles and E. Fleisch (2009). How to Detect Cloned Tags in a 
Reliable Way from Incomplete RFID Traces. Proceedings of the IEEE 
International Conference on RFID. 
Lehtonen, M., N. Oertel and H. Vogt (2007b). Features, Identity, Tracing, and 
Cryptography for Product Authentication. Proceedings of the 13th 
International Conference on Concurrent Enterprising, France, pp. 
Lehtonen, M., D. Ostojic, A. Ilic and F. Michahelles (2007c). "Securing RFID 
Systems by Detecting Tag Cloning." Pervasive Computing 5538, pp. 291-
308. 
Luke, S., C. Cioffi-Revilla, L. Panait and K. Sullivan (2004). MASON: A New 
Multi-Agent Simulation Toolkit. Proceedings of the Eighth Annual Swarm 
User/Research Conference. 
Macal, C. M. and M. J. North (2005). Tutorial On Agent-Based Modeling And 
Simulation. Proceedings of the Winter Simulation Conference, pp. 2-7. 
Maciaszek, L. A. and B. L. Liong (2005). Practical Software Engineering, Pearson 
Addison Wesley. 
Michael, K. and L. McCathie (2005). The Pros And Cons Of RFID In Supply Chain 
Management. Proceedings of the International Conference on Mobile 
Business, pp. 623-629. 
Mirowski, L. and J. Hartnett (2007). "Deckard: A System to Detect Change of RFID 
Tag Ownership." International Journal of Computer Science and Network 
Security 7(7), pp. 89-98. 
Mirowski, L., J. Hartnett and R. Williams (2009a). How RFID Attacks are Expressed 
in Output Data. Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on 
Pervasive Systems, Algorithms and Networks (I-SPAN 2009), pp. 794-799. 
References 
- 214 - 
Mirowski, L., J. Hartnett and R. Williams (2009b). "An RFID Attacker Behavior 
Taxonomy." IEEE Pervasive Computing 8(4), pp. 79-84. 
Mirowski, L., J. Hartnett and R. Williams (2009c). Tyrell: an RFID Simulation 
Platform. Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Intelligent 
Sensors, Sensor Networks and Information Processing, pp. 325-330. 
Mirowski, L., J. Hartnett, R. Williams and T. Gray (2008). A RFID Proximity Card 
Data Set: Technical Report, School of Computing and Information Systems, 
University of Tasmania. 
Mirowski, L. T. (2006). Detecting Clone Radio Frequency Identification Tags: 
Thesis. School of Computing. Hobart, School of Computing, University of 
Tasmania. 
Mišic, V. B. and J. L. Zhao (2000). Evaluating The Quality Of Reference Models. 
Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling 
pp. 484-498. 
Mitrokotsa, A., M. Beye and P. Peris-Lopez (2010). Threats to Networked RFID 
Systems. Unique Radio Innovation for the 21st Century: Building Scalable 
and Global RFID Networks. D. Ranasinghe, M. Sheng and S. Zeadally, 
Springer-Verlag: 39-63. 
Mitrokotsa, A., M. Rieback and A. Tanenbaum (2008). Classification Of RFID 
Attacks. Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on RFID 
Technology, pp. 73-86. 
Mitrokotsa, A., M. Rieback and A. Tanenbaum (2009). "Classifying RFID Attacks 
and Defenses." Information System Frontiers 12(5), pp. 491-505. 
Nohl, K., D. Evans, Starbug and H. Plötz (2008). Reverse-Engineering A 
Cryptographic RFID Tag. Proceedings of the 17th USENIX Security 
Symposium. 
O'Connor, M. C. (2005a). "French NFC Payment Trial Kicks Off."   Retrieved 
18/08/2009, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1943/1/1. 
O'Connor, M. C. (2005b). "Smart Packaging Sells Forklift Readers."   Retrieved 
18/08/2009, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1465/1/1. 
O'Connor, M. C. (2006). "GlaxoSmithKline Tests RFID on HIV Drug."   Retrieved 
22/09/2010, from http://rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/2219/1/1. 
O'Connor, M. C. (2007). "Purdue Moving OxyContin RFID Pilot to Full 
Production."   Retrieved 20/10/2010, from 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/3043. 
O'Connor, M. C. and M. Roberti. (2005). "Impinj Announces Gen 2 Tags, Reader."   
Retrieved 05/07/2008, from 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/1482/1/1. 
Oren, Y. and A. Shamir (2007). "Remote Password Extraction from RFID Tags." 
IEEE Transactions on Computers 56(9), pp. 1292-1296. 
Peris-Lopez, P., J. C. Hernandez-Castro, J. M.Estevez-Tapiador and A. Ribagorda 
(2006). "RFID Systems: A Survey On Security Threats And Proposed 
Solutions " Personal Wireless Communications 4217, pp. 159-170. 
Pressman, R. S. (2000). Software Engineering: A Practitioner's Approach, McGraw 
Hill. 
Prieto-Diaz, R. (1987). Domain Analysis For Reusability. Proceedings of the 11th 
Computer Software & Applications Conference, pp. 23-29. 
Ranasinghe, D. C. and P. H. Cole (2008). Networked RFID Systems. Networked 
RFID Systems and Lightweight Cryptography. P. H. Cole and D. C. 
Ranasinghe, Springer. 1: 45-58. 
References 
- 215 - 
Ranasinghe, D. C., D. W. Engels and P. H. Cole (2004). Low-Cost RFID Systems: 
Confronting Security And Privacy. Proceedings of the Auto-ID Labs 
Research Workshop. 
Ranasinghe, D. C., M. Harrison and P. H. Cole (2008). EPC Network Architecture. 
Networked RFID Systems and Lightweight Cryptography. P. H. Cole and D. 
C. Ranasinghe, Springer: 59-78. 
Reid, J., J. G. Nieto and T. Tang (2007). Detecting Relay Attacks with Timing-Based 
Protocols. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM symposium on Information, 
Computer and Sommunications Security ACM, pp. 204-213. 
Rieback, M., B. Crispo and A. Tanenbaum (2006). Is Your Cat Infected With A 
Computer Virus? Fourth Annual IEEE International Conference on Pervasive 
Computing and Communications: 169-179. 
Roberti, M. (2004). "EPCglobal Ratifies Gen 2 Standard."   Retrieved 15/10/2010, 
from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1293/1/1/. 
Robinson, S. (2004). Simulation: The Practice of Model Development and Use, 
Wiley. 
Rotter, P. (2008). "A Framework For Assessing RFID System Security And Privacy 
Risks." IEEE Pervasive Computing 7(2), pp. 70-77. 
Sarma, S. (2001). Towards The 5-cent Tag: Technical Report, MIT Auto-ID Center. 
Sarma, S. E., S. A. Weis and D. W. Engels (2003). RFID Systems And Security And 
Privacy Implications Proceedings of the Cryptographic Hardware and 
Embedded Systems, pp. 454-469. 
Schneier, B. (1999). "Attack Trees." from http://www.schneier.com/paper-
attacktrees-ddj-ft.html. 
Schneier, B. (2004). Secrets and Lies, Wiley. 
Shepard, S. (2005). RFID: Radio Frequency Identification, McGraw Hill 
Networking. 
Spiekermann, S. and H. Ziekow (2005). RFID: A 7-Point Plan To Ensure Privacy. 
Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Information Systems, 2005. 
Staake, T., F. Thiesse and E. Fleisch (2005). Extending The EPC Network - The 
Potential Of RFID In Anti-Counterfeiting. Proceedings of the 2005 ACM 
Symposium on Applied Computing, pp. 1607-1612. 
Swedberg, C. (2004). "RFID Drives Highway Traffic Reports."   Retrieved 
15/11/2010, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1243/1/1. 
Swedberg, C. (2010a). "High Demand Keeps Tag Prices Steady."   Retrieved 
15/10/2010, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/7901. 
Swedberg, C. (2010b). "Sales of EPC RFID Tags, ICs Reach Record Levels."   
Retrieved 19/10/2010, from www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/7952/. 
Tan, P.N., M. Steinbach and V. Kumar (2006). Introduction To Data Mining, 
Addison Wesley. 
Teorey, T., S. Lighstone and T. Nadeau (2006). Database Modelling And Design, 
Morgan Kaufmann. 
Thompson, D. R., N. Chaudhry and C. W. Thompson (2006). RFID Security Threat 
Model. Conference on Applied Research in Information Technology. 
Wasserman, E. (2005). "Purdue Pharma To Run Pedigree Pilot."   Retrieved 
15/10/2010, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/1626/1/1. 
Weinstein, R. (2005). "RFID: A Technical Overview And Its Application To The 
Enterprise." IEEE Computer Society 7(3), pp. 27-33. 
Wessel, R. (2007). "DHL to Market RFID-Enabled Smart Box."   Retrieved 
25/11/2010, from http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/2945. 
References 
- 216 - 
Westhues, J. (2005). Hacking The Prox Card. RFID: Applications, Security, and 
Privacy. S. Garfinkel and B. Rosenberg, Addison Wesley: 291-301. 
Wnek, J. and R. S. Michalski (1994). "Hypothesis-Driven Constructive Induction In 
AQ17-HCI: A Method And Experiments " Machine Learning 14(2), pp. 139-
168. 
Zand, M. K. (1998). An Introduction to Software Reuse. Encyclopedia of Computer 
Science and Technology. A. Kent and J. G. Williams, Marcel Dekker: 73-88. 
Zetter, K. (2007). "Scan This Guy's E-Passport And Watch Your System Crash."   
Retrieved 10/11/2007, from 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/08/epassport. 
Zimmermann, H. (1980). "OSI Reference Model - The ISO Model Of Architecture 
For Open Systems Interconnection." IEEE Transactions on Communications 
28(4), pp. 425-432. 
 
 
  
;; 
 
 
APPENDIX A - RFID 
SIMULATOR 
 
This appendix is partially based on a publication presented at the 
5th International Conference on Intelligent Sensors, Sensor 
Networks and Information Processing, Melbourne, Australia, 
2009 (Mirowski et al. 2009c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Appendix 
Appendix A - RFID Simulator 
- 218 - 
A.1 OVERVIEW 
This appendix reports on the development of a Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) simulator for the purpose of modelling systems, visualising system activity, 
and predicting output data.  It addresses an outstanding research gap for RFID 
security; the problem of preliminary systems analysis without needing to examine 
actual system deployments.   
To this end, the development process is explained, beginning with an overview of the 
motivation for developing the RFID simulator.  Following this, the four phases of 
development are explained, and the results which report the simulator as validated 
for the purpose of preliminary ‘whole of system’ analysis are presented.  The last 
phase of development, phase four, has already been reported in Chapter 8.     
A copy of the Java program, which is the simulator reported in this chapter, can be 
found on the CD which accompanies this thesis.   
A.2 MOTIVATION FOR DEVELOPING AN RFID 
SIMULATOR 
The motivation for developing the simulator stems from a lack of attack evidence for 
researchers building intrusion detection systems.  To this end, it was developed with 
the purpose of generating data containing attacks, and it also models generic systems 
for a variety of general system modelling problems.   
As the RFID output data reports when events have occurred in the real world, 
research has looked for evidence of behavioural implausibility to identify attacks in 
the output data (Lehtonen et al. 2007a; Mirowski and Hartnett 2007).  However, the 
problem has been that output data containing traces of attacks has not been available 
to researchers.  This is necessary, as the attacks themselves are characterised by the 
RFID system in which they have occurred, and therefore, attack behaviour must be 
defined within a system’s context for effective countermeasures to be developed. 
The lack of available output data, to be used to develop countermeasures to detect 
clone tag attacks, was reported by Mirowski and Hartnett (2007).  Using output data 
from a real proximity card RFID system, we synthesized the effects of tag cloning 
attacks.  There were shortcomings with the approach: it was not known whether 
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attacks existed in the output data as it was obtained directly from a real system; the 
ability to realistically represent attacks relied on assumptions made on specific 
application knowledge; the data had to be sanitised to protect user privacy; and 
unpredictable behaviour of the entities made the system error prone.  Since releasing 
the attack free output data on the internet (Mirowski et al. 2008), we have observed 
that it has had over 900 downloads4.  This suggests a clear demand from researchers 
for RFID data.   
Consequently, one began to identify reasons which further supported the need for an 
RFID simulator.  A software based approach may avoid the time associated with 
generating output data when the activity of the entities which are producing the 
output data is minimal.  For example, in a real system, entities could remain 
stationary in one place and therefore produce no output data as they are not in range 
of a reader.  Also, simulation would allow for very large systems to be built, which 
contain many components and at little cost as hardware is only simulated.  Thus, 
there is a time and cost saving by using a simulator.   
A.3 DEVELOPMENT 
The development process for the software was based on a four phase lifecycle, 
illustrated in Figure 57.  The four phases of the development lifecycle were: 
conceptual modelling; implementation in software; verification and validation; and 
exploring the solution space.  During each phase, learning outcomes which 
contributed to understanding about systems emerged, and these were fed back into 
the development cycle.  After a number of iterations were performed, the software 
was deemed acceptable for use.   
 
Figure 57 - Development lifecycle of the simulator 
 
                                                 
4 Statistics were viewed on 16/12/2010 from the University of Tasmania electronic prints database at 
http://eprints.utas.edu.au/es/index.php?action=show_detail_eprint;id=6903; 
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The development of the simulator occurred in four phases, each of which provided 
the opportunity for feedback to a previous phase.  The first phase was conceptual 
modelling which resulted in the encoding of standard components of RFID systems.  
The outcome of conceptual modelling was a domain model which was reported in 
Chapter 6.  Once an initial domain model had been formed, the components were 
implemented in software as agents.  This involved translating a high level Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) (Bruegge and Dutoit 2004; Maciaszek and Liong 2005) 
representation into a lower level software based implementation.  It was through this 
translation process that concepts modelled in the conceptual model needed to be 
revised – hence some stages were repeated. 
An example of a learning outcome that emerged during the feedback between cycles 
was that, the conceptual model had assumed that it would be necessary to model 
anti-collision at the algorithm level however this was found not to be the case.  
During implementation in software, it was learnt that anti-collision could be 
simplified as a single attribute and this was called tag read rate.  This attribute 
contained a value which signified the number of data records a reader would produce 
within a time period for each tag instance at a reader.  This avoided modelling the 
underlying anti-collision algorithm which essentially results in RFID data being 
produced once tags have been scheduled.   
While simplifying a highly complex process, it was determined that such a 
simplification was acceptable at the level at which a ‘whole of system’ approach to 
RFID security was to be applied in this thesis.  This meant that instead of thinking in 
terms of the algorithmic anti-collision layer e.g. slots, scheduling, and count-down 
timers, it would be possible to think in terms of the outcomes after anti-collision e.g. 
time between successive data records, total number of data records produced by a 
tag.  These simplified complex processes, but reflected what was essentially 
achieved through their usage.   
The rest of this section explains each development phase in the lifecycle. 
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A.3.1 PHASE ONE: CONCEPTUAL MODELLING 
Conceptual modelling defined the standard components of the standard operating 
partition.  The first focus was on enumerating the major components, their 
operations, and attributes.  As a direct result of having to think about how these 
components could be simulated, the concepts of generic components, associations 
and features emerged.  Whereas Chapter 6 reported on the completed domain model 
the focus here is on explaining how simulation development gave impetus for the 
domain model to emerge.   
Components in RFID systems can be complex entities.  Radio frequency, 
backscatter, and anti-collision are just a few of these concepts (Glover and Bhatt 
2006).  Furthermore, physical entities introduce concepts which are difficult to 
define in a static context as they only emerge when entities interact.  For example, 
the effect of several tags interacting with a reader may result in a different effect at a 
reader than if a single tag was interacting.  Therefore, some simplifications needed to 
take place.   
A physical entity, for example, has a number of property simplifications in its 
conceptual model representation.  Some of these are represented as attributes: 
speed_minimum, speed_average, and speed_maximum.  In the conceptual model, and 
simulator these are simplifications, whereas, in actual systems these would vary.  
Speed for example, is usually not a fixed value; however, to convey the concept to a 
non-expert that an entity can bring a tag into contact with a reader, it was assumed 
acceptable to simplify this as a static attribute.   
Radio frequency signals were represented as a spatial concept, which is a 
simplification of the radio signals which exist in a real system.  On the basis that in a 
real system, radio frequency signals are a factor in determining the range over which 
components can interact, these were modelled as simple three-dimensional spheres.  
For passive tags, typically, the frequency and power of a reader will determine the 
distance a tag can be from a reader for it to receive enough power to switch on, and 
also, the distance to send or receive data.  Rather than simulate these complex 
processes, if a component is outside of a reader’s signal then no interaction will be 
recorded; there is a cut-off point in order for data to be generated.  Therefore, the 
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‘final effect’, which is the contact made between components, in the simulation, 
conveys the associations, and that is what is modelled.   
Attacks were represented as operations performed by components.  To specify an 
attack, the particular attack operation was instantiated by the component when it 
interacts with another component.  To represent tag cloning attacks, a tag is assigned 
two new attributes: public_name and private_name.  The public_name is how the 
duplicate tag_serial_number is specified and is the name which is recorded in the 
official data set, much like that in a real system.  Conversely, the private name is the 
name used by the simulator or conceptual model to identify the clone tag from other 
tags.  In real systems there is obviously only one data field, the public name field.  In 
modelling tag denial of service, tags can use the following operations to model the 
effects of such an attack: switch_on or switch_off or fail_to_respond.  As the attacks 
are modifying standard operations; the occurrence of these attacks can therefore be 
seen in the output RFID data which is produced when components interact.  That is, 
issuing a Kill command to a tag could be modelled using the fail_to_respond 
operation.  Thus, these higher level abstractions can achieve the same effects which 
would arise had these attacks occurred at a lower layer.   
Anti-collision protocols have been represented by allowing tags within the vicinity of 
a reader to communicate with a reader, and hence, produce data at a reader.  In a real 
system, anti-collision protocols are used to ensure that every tag is scheduled to 
respond, resulting in data being produced at a reader.  However, it was assumed in 
this section that, as tags have to be scheduled in real systems, one factor which could 
occur is a variation in the data rate of a reader, and hence, for individual tags.  That 
is, as more tags are scheduled to be read, a reader takes longer to service each tag 
request, thus, in a period of time, less data could be produced than when a single tag 
is read by a reader.  As a way of modelling this, a tag_read_rate attribute was used 
to specify a fixed number of tags that could be read in a time period.  This simplifies 
the delay factor as it records a fixed data rate – this is optimistic, whereas in reality 
this would vary according to the number of tags. 
The primary learning outcome from the conceptual modelling phase was the 
derivation of a simplification of concepts and a controlled vocabulary which could be 
used to describe complex RFID operations.  The simplification of anti-collision 
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protocol effects on the production of RFID data means non-experts could speak in 
terms of data rate for fixed tag group sizes at readers as opposed to needing to 
understand how collisions could impact on data production.  Conversely, the use of 
entity-relationship terms (1:1, 1:M, M:1, and M:M) to describe relationships in RFID 
data which emerge as a consequence of underlying component associations, such as 
those at the tag and reader layer, simplify the identification of structures in these 
systems.   
These concepts are reported in the completed domain model reported in Chapter 6, 
and in that chapter, are illustrated to contribute to a ‘whole of system’ analysis 
approach.   
A.3.2 PHASE TWO: IMPLEMENTATION IN SOFTWARE 
The conceptual model was implemented as an agent based simulation, using software 
called MASON (Balan et al. 2003; Luke et al. 2004).  MASON provided the basic 
agent libraries, visualisation and scheduling, which have been used to construct 
RFID components as agents and have these interact with each other over time.  To 
enable the specialisation of MASON into a program capable of modelling RFID 
systems, and to learn more about RFID attacks during the development process, 
additional features were included, and these were achieved using the Java 
programming language.   
Figure 58 depicts the software’s six core feature modules: conceptual model, 
application programming interface (API), script, simulation engine, three-
dimensional (3D) animation, and output data.  These features allow a user to model a 
variety of scenarios rather than a fixed simulation scenario.  The API represents a list 
of commands which the user selects from to instantiate components from the 
conceptual model (called the ‘domain model’ in Chapter 6).  A script contains all of 
the agents and instructions for a simulation scenario.  An RFID system is essentially 
encoded in the script.  The simulator executes the script, and thereby, executes a 
simulation, displaying the output, in the form of data and animation on screen.   
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Figure 58 – Simulator’s system boundary 
A user engages the six modules when encoding a simulation.  Various simulations can be modelled as 
the basis of modelling occurs from the application programming interface (API) – a library of 
commands which instantiate the domain model.   
The rest of this section explains how these features are facilitative of ‘whole of 
system’ analysis. 
Figure 59 depicts the software’s graphical user interfaces (GUI) which allows the 
user to interact with the six core modules.  In analysing RFID in a simulated 
environment, it was beneficial to provide a number of ways for a user to interact with 
the simulated system.  The expression builder GUI is a visual tree representation of 
the API; commands can be selected to build up an API script to model a scenario.  It 
is essentially an implementation of the controlled vocabulary which was derived 
through conceptual modelling.  A script is formed in the expression builder’s 
window or an already configured script can be loaded directly into this window.  
Execution of a script will cause the system to be built in the GUI.  The user can 
visualise the system and the scenario as it is executed by the simulation engine.  
RFID output data – the data produced when tags and readers interact through the 
associations - is displayed in the log GUI.  Thus, the GUI’s are the means of 
instigating a ‘whole of system’ investigation in the software. 
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Table 8 depicts some of the commands from the API which are used to instantiate 
and instruct agents.  An interface exists between the conceptual model and the API 
such that the issuing of a command will instigate a particular agent.  A user specifies 
these commands inside a text file, called a script.  A script is imported into the 
software and interpreted prior to execution.  As a result of what appears in the script, 
particular instances of agents can be instantiated with specified values, queued in the 
schedule for execution, and so forth.   
For a ‘whole of system’ approach, the outcome is that using this controlled 
vocabulary; users can communicate their understanding of the ‘whole system’ in a 
standardised manner.  For example, it is possible to encode a system, insert attacks 
into it, and then use the script as the basis for determining how solutions could more 
effectively suit the given scenario.  The commands standardise terms which could be 
used to describe the ‘whole of system’ approach.   
Table 8 – Application Programming Interface (API) 
Commands represent ways to instruct the simulation engine to load agent components and instigate 
interactions between them. 
 
create physical entity <name:string> <x:string> <y:string> <z:string> 
<diameter:string> 
create reader <name:string> <x:string> <y:string> <z:string> 
<xoff:string> <yoff:string> <zoff:string> <diameter:string> 
<database:string> <cloneName:string> <dataRate:string> 
create tag <name:string> <x:string> <y:string> <z:string> 
<xoff:string> <yoff:string> <zoff:string> <diameter:string> 
<cloneName:string> 
move <agentToMove:string> <stepsize:string> <x:string> <y:string> 
<z:string> <startTime:string> <intervalSize:string> 
moveto <agentToMove:string> <stepsize:string> <agentToMoveTo:string> 
<startTime:string> <intervalSize:string> 
read <reader:string> <startTime:string> <intervalSize:string> 
broadcast <tag:string> <startTime:string> <intervalSize:string> 
 
The API offers several benefits for ‘whole of system’ analysis.  An RFID scenario 
can be encoded once and then replayed in the simulator many times, thus, promoting 
a repeatable method of producing output data containing attacks.  As it is closely 
linked to the domain model, users can agree on the functionality expressed in a 
script, and on the output data produced by the execution of a script.  Finally, the 
output data can be interpreted alongside the script to convey the context of the 
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system which would assist in strengthening an understanding of how structures 
influence attack detection.    
Although the vocabulary is not complete, one could easily envisage that future work 
could look towards extending it such that a common way of modelling systems and 
security through a common dialogue exists.  This could lead to common system 
descriptions, and common attack patterns, and consequently, common ways of 
dealing with attacks under various system contexts.   
The simulation, when it is executing, is animated within a GUI in 3D facilitating 
learning via animation.  Animation depicts what is happening inside the simulation 
engine at the current time period.  Although this is not necessary for attack detection, 
when attacks are simulated, it enhances analysis as the interaction of agents can be 
seen by the user.  For example, agents – tags and readers – are modelled as objects 
on the screen - in this version of the simulator they appear as 3D spheres.  This 
depiction is an approximation of how radio frequency is typically depicted.  It 
represents the geometric distance to which the signal propagates, and hence, can be 
detected by another component.  It does not depict signal strength, which is 
something that deteriorates in an environment; thus, it is an optimistic representation 
of how far away a signal could be detected.   
As this is a software implementation of components, the depictions can be modified 
to gain more precise representations if required.  Hence, the software is extensible in 
this regard. 
The physical entities which control physical manipulation of tags and readers are not 
modelled as agents in the simulator.  At the moment, these remain external to the 
simulation as these were not of interest to the attack simulations this software was 
used for.  The primary effect on tags, speed and movement is, however, inherited by 
these components in their place.  A tag can therefore be instructed to move at a 
particular speed towards a location in the environment.  Moreover, underlying 
associations between physical entities, for example, configuration of physical entities 
on a pallet (a M:1 association), are represented as associations between the tags that 
would be on the physical entities.  This is because the goal is to model the structures, 
rather than the factors which lead to their creation.   
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Finally, analysis using the simulator can occur through the RFID output data which 
is produced when components interact.  For this to occur, a tag and reader, need to be 
in the same location at the same time, and both be configured to interact.  Interaction 
would result in output data being produced.  An elementary data record consists of 
the following features: tag_serial_number, reader_serial_number, reader_operation, 
and timestamp.  It is these records which are used by plausibility checks, however 
their derivation and interpretation depends on the structures.  A benefit of providing 
the RFID output data in the simulation is that analysis can occur alongside 
interpretation of events in the simulation animation and the API script which is being 
executed.   
In developing these features in the simulator, one was encouraged to think about the 
tools necessary for an analyst to take ‘whole of system’ approach to RFID security.  
The concept of the API, as a providing a controlled vocabulary for security 
proponents is one such example.  The API’s use as a basis for developing and 
communicating standardised approaches to security, allows different layers of a 
system to be encoded using command derived from the domain model.   
A.3.3 PHASE THREE: VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION  
As the simulator’s goal was to enable thinking about a ‘whole of system’ approach to 
analysis, the verification and validation phase established confidence that the 
software was capable of modelling systems.  This was established under the 
assumption that data should be produced by the simulator which contains evidence of 
attacks - tag cloning was the attack of interest here – and data should be similar to 
data from similarly built RFID systems.   
The process of verification and validation was applied in the context of Mode Two 
simulations (Robinson 2004).  The intentions of undertaking this validation were to 
establish whether: conceptual modelling and implementation in software had 
achieved a reasonable representation of systems; and that use of the simulator could 
result in reasonably accurate analysis outcomes from RFID data for ‘whole of 
system’ analysis.   
Verification established confidence that the conceptual model was translated 
accurately into the software.  The fact that various concepts have been included in 
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the depiction of agents using the Unified Modelling Language (UML) was a result of 
how systems were described.  Determining that the conceptual model was transferred 
into the software occurred during the implementation phase for each agent.  This 
involved a visual comparison between the Unified Modelling Language (UML) 
diagrams and Java classes which were developed.  It was also established using the 
application programming interface (API) - by instantiating particular concepts 
through the API command set and by determining that the expected response could 
be produced in the software.  Consequently, it appeared as though the software had 
captured the concepts in the conceptual model, and was therefore verified.   
An initial validation process established confidence in the visual representation of 
RFID systems as agents.  During implementation, a structured walk through with a 
group of users familiar with RFID systems, demonstrated representation of 
components as agents.  The animation in the software was originally implemented in 
two dimensions (2D).  However, based on user feedback, they found it easier to 
understand the ABMS analogy for RFID in three dimensions (3D).  They could 
understand the concept of components as agents, the representation of radio 
frequency signal strength and signal propagation as geometric spheres.  These users 
also accepted the characteristics of data as it was produced when components 
interacted under various structures.  Thus, this initial stage developed face validity 
(Law 2005) in the simulator.   
Next, a more complete form of validation established confidence in the software’s 
ability to model RFID systems, and from these, that the data produced was valid for 
the purpose of its intended use.  Validity in RFID output data was established by 
modelling a system in the software which also existed in the real world, and 
comparing the output data from both.  This approach to validation is called trace 
validation (Robinson 2004).   
A.3.3.1 TRACE VALIDATION 
This section describes the validation of the simulator for preliminary ‘whole of 
system’ analysis under its mode of operation.  The approach to ‘whole of system’ 
analysis relies upon the modelling of system context in which security analysis takes 
place.  Based on the domain model, which contains simple system components, each 
of which contains simple operations, attributes, and relationships, the simulator 
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validation sought to establish the appropriateness of these elements in allowing a 
context to be modelled and a problem to be instantiated within it for analysis.  The 
simulators mode was ‘mode two’ as a user (analyst) is expected to learn through 
usage of the simulator, in addition to the various data and animation outputs which 
result from experimentation.  As simulation usage occurs prior to actual systems 
experimentation, the results obtained should be sufficient such that analysis of 
systems could proceed through experimentation and output such that information is 
gleaned which is on par with actual systems.   
As a ‘mode two’ simulator, the user derives information through direct interaction 
with the simulator, as well as via various outputs.  Conversely, the results are not 
expected to be an exact representation of an actual system, but be such that useful 
information is derived.  The simulator is based on the domain model which has been 
instantiated in software and its use is facilitated via the simulator’s application 
programming interface (API).  The commands correlate to domain concepts which, 
when stored in a script, are instantiated when the script is executed.  Through 
observation, the actual system is encoded within a script and these should be 
compatible such that animation and data, when produced in simulation or actual 
system are on par.  Therefore, validation could occur on the basis of comparing the 
outcomes of a modelled system to those obtained in an actual system.   
To this end, validation occurred using the specific example of a ‘doorway monitoring 
system’ which was implemented in the simulator and the results compared to a 
similar system implemented using actual RFID equipment.  The doorway monitoring 
system was a reader mounted on a door which swings open or shut.  A series of tags 
positioned directly under the door’s pathway causes the reader, when it is within 
range of a tag, to produce a single data record at the tag.  Each data record is stored 
in a database, and a series of data records, essentially, attests to a history of doorway 
activity over a period of time.  Validation established: the ability of the API to 
encapsulate this scenario based on domain model concepts; animation of the 
interaction of scenario as similar to that of the real system; and the data derived out 
of the simulation as comparable to that of the actual system.  These parts of the 
validation process are now discussed in more detail and will suggest that the 
simulator has been validated for the purpose of preliminary ‘whole of system’ 
investigations.   
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A.3.3.2 COMPARISON OF ENCODING TO ACTUAL SETUP 
This section describes the comparisons made between the actual system and the 
encoding of the system using the API; both visually and on execution, and also 
conceptually.   
 
 
Figure 60 - The doorway monitoring system 
 
Figure 60 illustrates the actual system as implemented inside an office room with the 
reader mounted on the back of the door and tags positioned in the pathway of the 
reader as it opens or shuts.  The doorway swings open or shut causing the reader to 
pass over the tags.  Each tag contains a unique serial number, this, along with a 
timestamp is what is recorded in data.  When a tag and reader interact, a data record 
is produced in the database which records this interaction.  A series of records serves 
to indicate several pieces of information which attest to activity which has occurred 
in the doorway: opening/closing of doorway, speed of door, direction of 
opening/closing, and extent to which door was opened (based on which tags were 
read). 
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Figure 61 - The reader and tags mounted in the environment 
When the reader passes over a tag, a data record is usually instantiated in the database.  Sometimes 
interferences may occur such that not every tag is read e.g. the reader moves too quickly over the tags. 
Figure 61 illustrates the tags taped onto the floor and with the reader mounted on the 
back of the doorway, in direct flight of the tags.  The database is located on the 
computer connected via a cable to the reader; some of the elements such as the cable, 
for example, are tangential to the actual scenario.   
What is now discussed is the comparison between the actual system and the 
modelled system for: visualisation and encoding using the API.  Various illustrations 
provide evidence to suggest the simulator as capable of representing the system 
visually, whereas the API script illustrates the conceptual encoding of the system as 
similar.   
 
Appendix A - RFID Simulator 
- 233 - 
 
 
Figure 62 – Step 0 illustrates the reader at the start position of -2 
The reader is the large sphere on the far left, with tags depicted as smaller spheres arranged in a 
straight line for the reader to pass over. 
The application programming interface (API) was used to encode the same scenario, 
primarily those components which were of direct influence to the monitoring system: 
zone, door, tags and database.  Figure 62 illustrates the organisation of tags and 
reader in a conceptual zone environment demarcated along three axes.  The reader is 
the larger of the spheres, whereas the tags are the small spheres ordered in sequence.  
This captures the radio signal which emanates out of each of these components rather 
than their physical size in terms of form factor.  An approximation of the 
organisation of tags was made in a ‘line’ rather than in an ‘arc’ for the purpose of 
simplifying the encoding using Cartesian coordinates.  The ordering of tags as 
sequences was maintained with tag 01023c2807 the first tag (when the door is shut) 
and 01023bfb8e the last tag (when the door is fully open).  Finally, the reader was 
instructed to move either forwards or backwards along the path of tags, whereas the 
tags are affixed to the zone and incapable of moving.  This takes a similar 
appearance to the actual system.   
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Figure 63 – Step illustrates the reader interacting with tag ‘01023c1baa’ 
As data is produced by the tag and reader interaction, the animation illustrates the same activity to the 
user on screen facilitating ‘mode two’ operation of the simulator.   
Figure 63 and Figure 64 illustrate the movement of the reader across the tags in 
sequence as if the reader was affixed to the doorway.  Rather than depict the 
doorway, using the domain models concept of ‘speed’, the reader was directly 
instructed to make this movement itself.  The movement is relatively optimistic; in 
an actual system the doorway would arc across the tags, whereas in this example, the 
doorway (and hence reader) moves in a straight line.  Another simplification is the 
fact that speed is applied at a constant rate; in an actual doorway, the doorway would 
progressively increase and decrease in speed upon opening and closing, whereas the 
simulator applies a single fixed speed.  These are issues which have greater 
implications for the data which is produced when tags and readers interact, whereas 
visually, these appear to have minimal influence on the concept of component 
interaction.   
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Figure 64 – Step illustrates the reader approaching the end of a ‘run’ 
At this point, the simulator has produced six tags and its movement along the tags to this effect is 
illustrated on screen to the user.   
The above figures have illustrated the representation of the actual system in the 
simulator’s viewport as three dimensional objects.  The encoding was a 
simplification of the layout, with tags placed in a line rather than an arc.  The 
doorway was not physically instantiated; instead, the concept of the reader ‘moving’ 
across the tags, which is essentially the role of the door in this scenario, is encoded 
into the reader via its ‘speed’ attribute.  When considering the above illustrations of 
the simulator to that of the actual system, it seems likely a close approximation exists 
in the visual representation of elements such that a user would find the depiction 
assistive in gaining information about the actual system via the animation.   
Conversely, Figure 65 illustrates the encoding of the scenario using the API script 
using domain model concepts.  Examination of the script reveals the conceptual 
similarities in what appears in the actual system when compared to the simulated 
system.  The terminology in instantiating components and the issuance of 
instructions for components to move about the zone are apparent.  The concept of 
validation here extends to one’s ability to communicate the scenario using acceptable 
constructs such that the appropriate elements of the system are captured.   
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initialize{ 
 
setting TIME 16:40:06 
setting DATE 05/01/2009 
 
setting DISPLAY_X 800 
setting DISPLAY_Y 600 
setting TIME_UNITS Seconds 
setting WORLD 1.0 
setting PIXELS 10 
setting UNITS CM 
setting TICK_SCALE 1.0 
 
start simulator 60 60 60 
create tag 01023c2807 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 01023c2807 
create tag 01023c15b5 8 0 0 0 1 0 3 01023c15b5 
create tag 01023c364a 16 0 0 0 1 0 3 01023c364a 
create tag 01023c1baa 24 0 0 0 1 0 3 01023c1baa 
create tag 01023114f0 32 0 0 0 1 0 3 01023114f0 
create tag 010230da56 40 0 0 0 1 0 3 010230da56 
create tag 01023bfb8e 48 0 0 0 1 0 3 01023bfb8e  
 
create database mydatabase 30 60 30 
create reader phidget -6 0 0 0 0 0 5 mydatabase phidget 1 
 
associate phidget mydatabase 
 
}initialize 
 
 
runtime{ 
 
read phidget -1 -1 
move phidget 10 60 0 0 -1 -1 
 
broadcast 01023c2807 -1 -1 
broadcast 01023c15b5 -1 -1 
broadcast 01023c364a -1 -1 
broadcast 01023c1baa -1 -1 
broadcast 01023114f0 -1 -1 
broadcast 010230da56 -1 -1 
broadcast 01023bfb8e -1 -1 
 
}runtime 
 
 
shutdown{ 
}shutdown 
Figure 65 - The API script for the simulated 'doorway monitoring scenario 
 
Figure 65 illustrates the API script which encapsulates the actual scenario using 
domain model concepts to be executed by the simulation.  Initially, the script 
instructs the simulator to construct the physical zone for the system to be 
implemented inside, and nominally this was a 60 cubic centre-meters (cm) area 
which approximates the area in the actual system in which the system operates.  The 
seven tags are instantiated in order of where they are to be positioned in the zone 
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using Cartesian coordinates with equal spacing between one another.  Next, the 
reader and database are configured for data transmission and located in the 
simulation.  The behaviour of the actual system is encoded in the last section; the 
reader is instructed to move across the series of tags at a fixed speed.  Execution of 
the script instantiates the above scenario in the simulator, causing the system to be 
modelled on screen and execution ensures activity between tags and readers is 
visualised.  When comparing the API script to the illustrations of the actual system, 
the domain model concepts facilitate encoding of the actual system, and on this 
basis, appear to be conceptually similar in organisation and execution.   
To summarise, the encoding of the system in software was compared on the basis of 
visualisation in the viewport and using the API script.  When considering the above 
examples, it seems likely that the encoded system has a similar representation as the 
layout of components appears similar.  The execution of the script initiates the reader 
to pass over the tags, in a forwards or backwards motion, over the tags.  This 
movement is on par with that experienced when the doorway is visualised in the 
actual system.  By the same token, the API script attests to the encoding of the 
scenario; as domain concepts are used, a comparison of the encoding the actual 
system is evident in terms of what components exist in the environment, where these 
are located, and what actions these were instructed to undertake.  It therefore seems 
likely that on this basis the simulator is valid in terms of its representative qualities.   
A.3.3.3 COMPARISON OF DATA FROM SIMULATOR AND ACTUAL 
SYSTEM 
This section discusses the comparisons made between the output data produced by 
the simulator and actual system.  A single run of the simulator, using the above 
script, was compared to traces of runs from approximately 80 days worth of data 
collected from the actual system.  The full data set can be found on the CD which 
accompanies this thesis.  What follows is evidence to suggest that the simulator, even 
though it is based on a relatively simple domain model, can produce data which is 
‘on par’ with that of an actual system.   
Table 9 illustrates the output data obtained when the script was executed by the 
simulator.  It can be seen that seven data records were produced within five seconds 
of the reader moving from its start position, hitting the first tag, and proceeding to its 
Appendix A - RFID Simulator 
- 238 - 
end point which is beyond the final tag.  The records, which appear in sequences as 
they were produced, indicate the reader travelled over the tags in sequence and in a 
forwards direction as if the door way swinging open.   
Table 9 - Simulator output data 
When executing the API script seven data records are produced which attest to the reader travelling 
across the tags in sequence.   
Date & Time Reader Tag Operation 
5/1/2009,4:40:7:0 phidget 01023c2807 read 
5/1/2009,4:40:7:0 phidget 01023c15b5 read 
5/1/2009,4:40:8:0 phidget 01023c364a read 
5/1/2009,4:40:9:0 phidget 01023c1baa read 
5/1/2009,4:40:10:0 phidget 01023114f0 read 
5/1/2009,4:40:11:0 phidget 010230da56 read 
5/1/2009,4:40:11:0 phidget 01023bfb8e read 
 
In comparison, Table 10 illustrates the output data obtained for a run in the actual 
system which exhibits markedly similar characteristics.  The records 710144 to 
710151 constitute a complete ‘run’ which is when the door moved over all the tags, 
producing data at tags.  It can be seen that these records were also produced within 
six seconds (one second more than the simulator) and in order of most of the tags 
which were sequenced over the floor.  It can be seen that there are several 
inconsistencies: an extra data record was produced and several tags in the sequence 
are repeated even though the sequence starts and ends with the correct tags.  It is this 
stochastic behaviour, at intermediate points in the scenario, which the simulator is 
unable to reproduce.    
It should be noted that this table has been adapted marginally from the actual data set 
on the CD in that date & time columns have been rearranged and the reader column 
added – this way it has similar structure to the table above for easier comparison.   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A - RFID Simulator 
- 239 - 
Table 10 – Actual system output data for run constituted by records adapted from records 
710144 to 710151 
This run indicates eight data records were produced in a similar time frame when compared to the 
above simulator example.  
Date Time Reader Tag Operation 
3/09/2008 15:4:24:546 phidget 01023c2807 gained 
3/09/2008 15:4:26:859 phidget 01023c15b5 gained 
3/09/2008 15:4:27:281 phidget 01023c364a gained 
3/09/2008 15:4:27:781 phidget 01023c1baa gained 
3/09/2008 15:4:28:250 phidget 01023114f0 gained 
3/09/2008 15:4:28:343 phidget 01023c1baa gained 
3/09/2008 15:4:28:437 phidget 01023114f0 gained 
3/09/2008 15:4:29:15 phidget 01023bfb8e gained 
 
Recall that the simulator is optimistic when it comes to modelling a scenario.  Based 
on the domain model which has fixed data fields for such things as ‘speed’, the 
simulator does not account for the gradual increase and decrease which would be 
exhibited in an actual doorway system, when the door is being opened and shut.  The 
simulator also does not model environmental interferences which occur in actual 
systems: the door is not fully opened; the door opens too quickly for all tags to be 
read; the door hits the doorstop and bounces back across some tags thereby 
producing ‘runs’ with noise in them.  Nor does the simulator model the stochastic 
behaviour of the door-opener: different people open or close the door.  Such 
conditions in the actual system would have influenced the production of data from 
something which is relatively predictable to something which is difficult to model.   
Consequently, to provide some indication of the usefulness of fixed data fields when 
it is known that the values in these fields, in actual systems varies, a brief summary 
of observations of the data from the actual system data is listed:   
• 307 complete runs were identified over 80 days of system activity.  These are 
when the first and last tag was read within a time period constituting a full 
opening of the door. 
• 287 of these runs produced 7 data records or less 
• Only 10 runs produced exactly 7 records (the right number) whereas 248 runs 
produced 5 records.  As it appears as though two tags were usually missed by 
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the reader and these were centre tags, the door may have been travelling too 
quickly for tags to be read.   
When considering the above observations of the actual system data, it seems likely 
that the simulator is highly optimistic in terms of its data production for a modelled 
system.  The data it produces represents the ‘upper bound’ on what one may expect 
the system to produce for the input settings.  In the actual system, only 10 runs out of 
307 produced exactly 7 records, whereas the simulator, for this scenario, would 
always produce exactly 7 records.  Most of the time, the actual system produced 5 
data records per complete run.  The simulator’s lack of variability in entity speed, for 
example, or consideration to environmental influences such as tag/reader 
interferences, may account for its optimism in data production.  Conversely, if one 
required less optimistic data, it may then be appropriate to modify the domain model 
such that it could account for ‘noise’ in the system.  Although this may not be 
appropriate for the simulator’s existing intended usage as a mechanism for 
preliminary investigations.  However, the questions of whether preliminary analysis 
would be likely facilitated on optimistic results as opposed to less than optimistic 
results, is a question which should be explored by further work.   
Finally, the simulator, as simple as it is, will only ever account for the things which it 
has been instructed to model.  In actual systems, there may be influences which are 
not apparent to the user, which therefore endear an exact representation in the 
simulation.  The simulation works on the basis of the user observing the organisation 
and hardware of an actual system, or theorising systems RFID hardware settings and 
configuration, and simulating from that description.  It does not encourage exactness 
in such things as: anti-collision, radio frequency, or stochastic entity behaviour.  Its 
purpose is to be a mode two simulator which facilitates learning through a 
combination of simulation interaction as well as some simulation output.  These 
facets, combined with user-driven analysis, should provide sufficient impetus and 
optimisation of search for solutions prior to actual systems experimentation.   
The process of validation of the simulator, which is based on the domain model, was 
reported in this section.  Validation examined its ability to encode the specific 
example of a doorway monitoring system using commands within the application 
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programming interface (API), and then execute this script within simulation to 
produce markedly similar representation and output data.  
The results have suggested that a relatively simple system can be encapsulated 
although some of the limitations are apparent.  Commands were able to encapsulate 
all relevant concepts for the purpose of modelling the system to produce output data.  
Tags and readers were represented as three-dimensional spheres in a zone.  
Conversely, commands in the API did not have the capacity to capture variability in 
entity attribute values for things like speed.  This meant that data produced was 
optimistic in terms of the number of data records produced when compared to those 
collected in the actual system.   
As a mode two simulator, the simulator appears as valid on the basis that information 
can be gleaned from it through user interaction via API; viewport/animation; and 
output data.  Although some differences in output data would be obtained when 
compared to an actual system, when all facets of the simulator are considered, it 
appears suitable for preliminary ‘whole of system’ analysis.   
A.3.4 PHASE FOUR: EXPLORING THE SOLUTION SPACE 
Finally, while four phases are depicted in the development lifecycle diagram in 
Figure 57, the fourth phase is actually the outcomes of using the model – these are 
reported in Chapter 8.   
A.4 SUMMARY 
The outcomes from developing the simulator can be summarised as follows: 
• A repeatable method for ‘whole of system’ analysis was developed which is 
based on the domain model.  It enables preliminary ‘whole of system’ 
investigations to begin in software prior to analysis on actual systems.   
• The concept of a controlled vocabulary, captured in the domain model, but 
implemented as an application programming interface (API), offers a way for 
analysts to communicate system designs. 
• Verification and validation phases illustrated support for the usage of the 
simulator as a tool for ‘whole of system’ analysis. 
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Although the simulator is not a complex program, nor one that captures the complex 
interactions of RFID technology, its extensible design which is based on a domain 
model, facilitates future enhancements.  This work has illustrated that the simulator’s 
current instantiation is useful for preliminary ‘whole of system’ analysis expounded 
in this thesis.   
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B.1 OVERVIEW 
This appendix briefly describes the Java program written to perform the experiments 
with the Electronic Product Code (EPC) Class-One Generation-Two hardware.  The 
source code can be found on the CD which accompanies this thesis.   
The software has been written specifically for use with an Alien Technology EPC 
Class-One Generation-Two ALR-9650 reader.  The software utilises commands from 
the reader’s application programming interface (API) to instruct the reader into a 
particular operating state at various stages of experimentation.  For the purposes of 
this thesis: the reader is reset prior to an iteration; a new configuration is written to 
the reader; the reader is instructed to poll the field for tags for a single Inventory 
Cycle; and the responses collected by the reader are obtained and written to file.   
The software also behaves in accordance with the behaviour of the reader such that it 
captures the reader’s data which is streamed back to the software.  After issuing the 
inventory command to the reader, the software will wait a predefined amount of time 
before resetting the reader.  This is because the reader does not indicate when it has 
obtained all tag responses; however, the assumption is that it does so within a few 
milliseconds.  Thus, this software will only work for this reader; however, the 
general principles of experimentation and obtainment of data should be applicable to 
all EPC Class-One Generation-Two hardware.   
All reference manuals for setup of hardware in addition to other API commands can 
be sourced from AlienTechnology (2007), AlienTechnology (2008a) and 
AlienTechnology (2008b).   
Installation, usage guidelines, and other relevant information for the software can be 
found in the Readme.txt file under this appendix on the CD.   
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C.1 OVERVIEW 
This appendix describes the full set of results obtained through experiments with 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) Class-One Generation-Two equipment.  A brief 
description of the data is provided here, while all data sets can be found on the CD 
which accompanies this thesis.   
 
Figure 66 - Sample of experiment results 
The results depicted above illustrate the format of data and ordering of results which is found on the 
accompanying CD.   
Figure 66 illustrates the format and ordering of results from an iteration which was 
performed during experimentation.  The first part indicates the repetition number of 
the total number of repetitions.  The second part indicates the physical tags that were 
randomly selected for use by the software, and also indicates their position in the 
Faraday enclosure.  Once the user has confirmed that the physical tag setup is 
complete, the get TagList command is issued by the software – the result of this 
issuance is recorded in the results.  The results are then collated in tag streams.  A tag 
stream is the way the software organises collected results.  When the population of 
tags is large, results for each inventory cycle will be recorded across multiple tag 
streams.  Once all data has been collected by the software, as supplied by the reader, 
the software will terminate.  This termination is indicated by the Finished statement 
on the last line.   
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The organisation of the individual data files which record the results of each 
experiment are reported in the Readme.txt file under this appendix on the CD.   
 
 
 
